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ABSTRACT
This study is mainly intended to determine quantitatively the economic effects of
crawfish imports on the domestic crawfish industry. Inverse demand systems are used to
estimate the price and scale flexibility as an indicator for the effects of imports on
crawfish domestic price.
A variety of algebraic forms for empirical consumer allocation models have been
developed. Economic theory, however, does not provide the necessary fundamental
criteria to choose ex ante among the alternative specifications. Bartern (1993) and Brown,
Lee, and Seale (1995) examined a family of inverse demand systems, showing that the
integrated demand system, in its own right, has more parameters than any of the
component systems, and is, therefore, more flexible. This study also finds that among the
different type of inverse demand systems the generalized inverse demand model (GIDS)
is a better fit for the data used in this study.
As expected, the cross price flexibility of imported crawfish and scale flexibility
in the domestic crawfish equation are shown to be negative, implying that crawfish
imports have negative effect on domestic crawfish price and imports of aggregate fish
also have a negative effect on the domestic crawfish price. At the same time, cross price
flexibilities show either substitutability or complementarity. The Morishima elasticity of
complementarity was used as a more adequate measure of interaction between
commodities than the coefficients of the Antonelli matrix. The study showed that the
elasticities of complementarity are all positive, implying both the tendency toward
complementarity and the negativity of the own-quantity elasticities.

ix

As the negativity of cross price flexibility of imported crawfish indicates,
domestic crawfish producers will suffer economic losses from increased imports of
crawfish, while the domestic crawfish consumer will be better off. Even though the
economic loss to the domestic crawfish producers resulting from increases in the imports
of crawfish is relatively small compared with the gains to domestic crawfish consumer
welfare, the impact of imports is serious to the domestic crawfish industry because the
loss is accrued to a small number of domestic crawfish processors. This study however,
shows a net social welfare gain from increasing crawfish imports.

x

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Louisiana leads the nation in the production of freshwater crawfish.1 In Louisiana,
the commercial crawfish industry has a long, historical background. In the beginning, the
supply of crawfish was large based on wild harvest. By the end of the 1960s, farm-raised
crawfish had become a common supply source. However, some farmers still catch
crawfish in the Atchafalaya Basin Swamp for the live and processed markets.
In 2004, total commercial crawfish production was 78 million pounds. Of this
total, 70 million pounds (90% of the total) was farm-raised with the remaining 8 million
pounds being harvested naturally.

Table 1.1. Louisiana Crawfish Production in 2004
No. of Producers

Acres

Production (lb)

Gross Farm Value ($)

Farm-Raised

1,226

118,250

69,546,680

41,728,008

Wild-Caught

1,481

-

8,267,173

4,808,939

Source: Louisiana Ag. Summary.
In 2004, 1,226 farmers produced crawfish in ponds thus ensuring the quality of the
product with a total pond acreage of 118,250 (Table 1). Gross farm value of the harvest
(farm-raised and wild-caught) was $46 million.
Crawfish aquaculture is an important complementary component of integrated
farming systems in which rice is the principal crop. To use natural and economic
resources efficiently, many rice producers double-crop crawfish in rice fields after the
______________________________
1

Other states such as Texas, California, and North Carolina produce minimal amounts of freshwater
crawfish.

1

rice has been harvested. In the last ten years this co-cropping approach has progressed
from an incidental practice to a vital economic component of many rice producers’
operations. In fact, most crawfish in Louisiana are now being cultured in rice fields. The
species of crawfish commercially important in Louisiana are the red swamp crawfish
(Procambarus clarki) and the white river crawfish (Procambarus zonangulus).
In the U.S. market, crawfish can be sold whole and live, or as tail meat. Tail meat,
in turn, can be sold fresh (chilled) or frozen. Fresh tail meat does not keep more than a
couple of weeks, so the U.S. market for fresh tail meat is dominated by U.S. producers.
Frozen tail meat can keep for up to a year or more, and is the focus of Chinese imports.
U.S. crawfish growers are the sole supply source for the live whole crawfish market, and
each year also sell some of their product for peeling (i.e. processing whole crawfish into
tail meat). Crawfish tail meat is then purchased by restaurants, distributors, and retail
food stores. This processed crawfish tail meat is usually sold within Louisiana or to
national distributor’s local outlets.
Since crawfish is a perishable product (even frozen tail meat has a limited shelf
life) usage generally tracks production. Although the volume of crawfish consumed in
other states is still comparatively insignificant, consumer recognition of crawfish and
market acceptance has spread significantly over the past decade. U.S. per capita
consumption of crawfish was approximately 0.25 pounds in 2002. However, in Louisiana
per capita consumption of crawfish is approximately 10.4 pounds, as 70% of the crawfish
produced in the state is consumed locally.
Up to 1999, crawfish price was relatively stationary, fluctuating from $3.00 to
$3.50 per pound. However, during the 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 crawfish seasons,

2

extreme drought conditions considerably lowered crawfish production resulting in the
soaring of domestic crawfish prices. Until 1994, domestically produced crawfish had not
met market challenges from imported products. For the first time, domestic production
from aquaculture and capture sources was supplemented by value-added tail meat from
China. Within three years, the market share of tail meat from China had increased to 87
percent (ITC, 1997). This increase caused that an antidumping petition (marketing at less
than fair market value) was filed with the U.S. International Trade Commission. An
investigation led to a finding of an industry being materially injured by reason of
crawfish tail meat imports from China being sold in the U.S. at less than fair value. As a
result, tariffs averaging 123% were established. The tariff remedy had limited impact.
Severe domestic tail meat shortages resulted from two consecutive years of drought in
producing areas (Kenneth, 2002). Chinese crawfish tail meat imports, heretofore under an
antidumping duty, rebounded to meet domestic demand in 2000 and 2001.2 Even after
recovering normal production of crawfish, Chinese crawfish tail meat imports did not
recede to their previous, lower levels. On October 28, 2000, the U.S. Congress passed the
agriculture spending bill.3 The Law instructs the U.S. Commissioner of Customs to
collect certain antidumping and countervailing duties and place them in a clearing
account. Once entries are liquidated, the money is transferred to a special account from
which they are distributed to affected domestic producers who petition for qualifying
expenditures (Schmitz and Seale, 2004).
______________________________

2

In September 1997, U.S. International Trade Commission determined that an industry in the United States
was materially injured by reason of imports crawfish tail meat from China that were sold at less than fair
value. On September 15, 1997, U.S. Commerce issued an antidumping duty order on subject imports of
crawfish tail meat from China.
3
Public Law 106-387, which attached the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA) as
amendment Title X by Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia as part of the Agricultural, Rural
Development, Food and Drug Administration and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2001.
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The so-called “Byrd Amendment” effectively empowers domestic producers and
processors, who successfully petition the U.S. government to impose antidumping and
countervailing duties on competing imports, to keep the proceeds of those tariffs. For a
company to be eligible for payouts, it must prove that it successfully litigated an
antidumping and countervailing duty case against a specific industry in a specific
country. Companies that did not participate in the original antidumping duty case do not
receive any of the collected funds. Table 1.2 and 1.3 show CDSOA disbursements for
food products and for crawfish tail meat from China, respectively (Schmitz and Seale,
2004).
On the basis of the record developed in the subject five-year review, the
Commission determined in August 2002 that revocation of the antidumping duty order on
crawfish tail meat from China would likely lead to the continuation or recurrence of
material injury to an industry in the United States within a reasonably foreseeable time.
1.1. Research Problem
Even though the crawfish industry in Louisiana has proven its’ economic
potential, many challenges remain. Competition from imports associated with low market
price and World Trade Organization (WTO) regulation are becoming increasingly
important for the domestic crawfish industry.4 Although the imported products are
flowing into the domestic market through different agents or market channels,
_______________________

4

U.S. trading partners react vigorously against the CDSOA. On July 21, 2001, Australia, Brazil, Chile, the
European Communities, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Thailand requested that the WTO form a panel
to investigate the CDSOA with respect to U.S. obligations under Article 18.1 of the WTO Antidumping
Agreement (AD) and Article 32.2 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM). The panel found against the U.S. on the CDSOA payments and recommended that the CDSOA be
repealed. On October 18, 2002, the U.S. appealed the ruling to the WTO Appellate Body, but on January
16, 2003, the Appellate Body confirmed that the CDSOA was incompatible with WTO rules. In January
2004, the EU and other nations asked for WTO permission to take retaliatory action against the U.S.
because of its failure to repeal the amendment.
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Table 1.2. CDSOA FY 2001-2003 Disbursements for Food Products ($1000)
Case Number
A-475-818
A-570-848
A-549-813
C-475-819
A-533-813
A-351-605
A-560-802
A-570-831
A-337-803
A-337-804
A-403-801
C-403-802
C-507-601
A-301-602
A-570-851
A-570-863
C-408-046
C-489-806
A-489-805
A-570-855
A-507-502
A-357-812
C-357-813

Case Name
Pasta/Italy
Crawfish tail meat/China
Canned pineapple/Thailand
Pasta/Italy
Preserved mushrooms/India
Frozen concentrated orange juice/Brazil
Preserved mushrooms/Indonesia
Fresh garlic/China
Fresh Atlantic salmon/Chile
Preserved mushrooms/Chile
Fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon/Norway
Fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon/Norway
Roasted in-shell pistachios/Iran
Fresh cut flowers/Columbia
Preserved mushrooms/China
Honey/China
Sugar/EU
Pasta/Turkey
Pasta/Turkey
Non-frozen apple juice concentrated/China
Raw in-shell pistachios/Iran
Honey/Argentina
Honey/Argentina

Food Total
Grand Total
Source: U.S. Customs Service.
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FY2001

FY2002

FY2003

Total

17,533
1,792
2,480
171
83
25
46
18
33
8
7
11
-

4,674
7,469
531
2,528
2,155
1,175
443
536
173
59
29
20
17
9
4
1
-

1,730
9,764
5,395
379
1,326
0
524
342
644
170
18
7
42
12
29
0
8
6
5
0
0

23,938
17,233
7,718
5,387
3,652
1,176
1,050
903
817
170
123
54
42
33
32
29
26
24
15
8
5
0
0

22,209
231,202

19,824
329,871

20,402
190,247

62,434
751,320

Table 1.3. CDSOA Disbursements for Crawfish Tail Meat from China, FY2002-2006
Antidumping Case Number A-570-848 ($1000)
Claimant

Atchafalaya Crawfish Processors
Seafood International Distributors
Catahoula Crawfish
Prairie Cajun Wholesale Seafood Dist.

Bayou Land Seafood
Basin Crawfish Processors
Acadiana Fishermen’s Co-Op
Crawfish Enterprises, Inc.*
Bonanza Crawfish Farm
Riceland Crawfish
Cajun Seafood Distributors
Randol’s Seafood & Restaurant*
Choplin Seafood
Carl’s Seafood
Sylvester’s Processors
Blanchard Seafood, Inc.*
Harvey’s Seafood
Louisiana Premium Seafoods
Schexnider Crawfish
Phillips Seafood
C.J.’s Seafood & Purged Crawfish
Arnaudville Seafood
Teche Valley Seafood
A&S Crawfish
Clearwater Crawfish Farm
L.T. West
Louisiana Seafood
Bellard’s Poultry & Crawfish
Becnel’s Meat & Seafood
Lawtell Crawfish Processors
Brown Aubrey
Dugas Allen J
TOTAL for A-570-848

Amount Paid
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

793
707
620
517
420
0
318
399
313
320
319
305
211
219
219
209
165
163
0
95
374
36
48
70
0
238
200
106
68
17
0
0

1,367
1,051
910
734
629
593
583
487
460
411
407
349
278
255
249
217
203
150
137
109
80
46
45
15
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

894
637
607
461
464
277
397
837
314``
330
327
260
201
161
148
210
141
70
64
57
437
41
23
0
0
215
217
24
0
0
0
369

256
192
171
123
130
81
113
54
92
107
98
77
62
43
37
58
40
0
14
14
140
12
5
0
0
96
63
1
0
0
119
0

535
373
327
245
252
171
227
117
199
271
202
163
119
82
97
113
79
26
0
31
276
21
11
0
1
224
0
2
0
0
245
136

7,469

9,764

8,183

2,198

4,545

Source: U.S. Customs Service.
*
Indicates member of the Crawfish Processors Alliance (CPA).
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all imported products are consumed indiscriminately with domestically produced goods.
As a result of the massive imports of Chinese crawfish, major distortions occurred in the
domestic market because price is the strongest motivation among many determining
factors that influences a consumer’s willingness to purchase these goods. However,
domestic prices of these goods are typically higher than those prices in major exporting
countries due to the relatively high cost of production. The low-price imported goods
force domestic producers to reduce production or go out of business. However, domestic
crawfish consumption has increased constantly because of the relative health benefits
related to Selenium and Vitamin B12 and/or low price of the product. Furthermore,
aquaculture products, like crawfish, are increasing in importance as a source of protein
along with red meat and chicken.
Louisiana’s crawfish industry has high economic value. Many farmers and
processors are producing not only crawfish meat but also value added products with
crawfish as one of the main ingredients. Such economic activities are not only providing
safe jobs and high quality foods for what people demand increasingly, they also serve to
reinvigorate Louisiana’s rural communities. A number of consumers and producers of
crawfish are clearly involved in these economic activities (Harrison et al, 2003).
As this discussion suggests, Louisiana’s crawfish industry is facing strong
competition from low-priced imports and an increase in imports of these goods affects
not only domestic consumers but also domestic producers and processors. As a result, in
order to encourage the crawfish industry, it is necessary to assess the economic impacts
these imports have had on the domestic crawfish industry in Louisiana.

7

1.2. Justification
Gorman’s study (1959) postulated that the price of fish depends, in part, on the
quantity consumed (or supplied) of the own good and in part on the quantities available
of the other related goods as well as real income. Since an increase in fish imports
increases total supply, increased imports might affect domestic price by which domestic
crawfish consumers and producers’ welfare could be affected. In fact, domestic crawfish
prices are exhibiting instability especially after 2000 and 2001, along with varying
imports of crawfish and other related fishery products. The purpose of this study is to
focus on the downstream effects of crawfish imports and the other related fishery
products such as catfish, shrimp, and oysters which are expected to compete with
crawfish. This study will accomplish this goal by using a system of inverse demand
equations in which price variations are explained by functions of quantity variations.
The justification of the use of inverse demand systems for fish was well
illustrated by Barten and Bettendorf (1989) as follows:
“For certain goods, like fresh vegetables or fish, supply is very inelastic in the
short run and the producers are virtually price takers. Price taking producers and price
taking consumers are linked by traders who select a price which they expect clears the
market. In practice this means that at the auction the wholesale traders offer prices for
the fixed quantities which, after being augmented with a suitable margin, are sufficiently
low to induce consumers to buy the available quantities. The traders set the prices as a
function of the quantities. The causality goes from quantity to price.”
In developing an inverse demand system for empirical price and welfare analysis,
the system should meet the curvature conditions implied by microeconomic theory. Holt
and Bishop (2002) summarized the curvature conditions required as follows: (1) the
direct utility function should be quasi-concave in quantities; (2) the indirect utility
function should be quasi-convex in prices; and (3) the expenditure function should be
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concave in prices. If an inverse demand system sufficiently satisfies these curvature
conditions, then the inverse demand system can be applied to welfare effect analysis
associated with a price change.5
In order to analyze the downstream effects of increased imports of crawfish, this
study is conducted on the basis of the economic theory related to a theoretically
consistent, inverse demand system in which the prerequisite curvature condition is
sufficiently satisfied. In an inverse demand function, price is the endogenous variable as
opposed to a traditional demand function, where quantity is the endogenous variable.6
An inverse demand system is more desirable for analysis of demand for perishable
fishery products because even though these products can be stored either in a frozen state
or as processed goods, the life span of these products should be limited.
1.3. Objectives
1.3.1. General Objectives
This study has the following main objectives:
1. To provide a theoretical and practical way of determining the impacts on domestic
price given a change in import volume; and,
2. To obtain measurements of welfare changes in the inverse demand system and
provide exact welfare measures associated with changes in imports.
_________________________
5

Many economists showed that in practice encountering situations where curvature conditions hold
spontaneously and globally are rare. The result is that researchers have increasingly considered model
specifications that allow these restrictions to be imposed either globally or locally during estimation. See,
respectively, Barten and Geyskens (1975), Barnett (1983 and 1985), Gallant and Golub (1984), Barnett and
Lee (1985), Barnett, Lee, and Wolfe (1987), Chalfant, Gray, and White (1991), Brenton (1994), Koop,
Osiewalski, and Steel (1994), Ramajo (1994), Terrel (1996), Moschini (1998), Ryan and Wales (1999),
Holt and Bishop (2002), and Wong and Mclaren (2005).
6
The inverse demand equation is defined as follows: pi = f (q ) .
The traditional demand equation is defined as follows: qi = g ( p ) .

9

1.3.2. Specific Objectives
The specific objectives of the study are as follows:
1. To illustrate the theoretical basis of using price and scale flexibilities to describe
how these concepts can be used as a measure of quantity’s impact on price;
2. To estimate and compare empirical scale, compensated, and uncompensated
flexibilities for crawfish by using Generalized Inverse Demand System (GIDS)
and four different inverse demand systems, i.e., Differential Inverse Rotterdam
Demand System (DIRDS), Differential Inverse Almost Ideal Demand System
(DIAIDS), Differential Inverse Demand of Central Bureau of Statistics (DICBS),
and Differential Inverse Demand of National Bureau of Research (DINBR);
3. To estimate empirical approximations versus exact measures of consumer welfare
change in quantity space by using the estimated price and scale flexibilities; and,
4. To develop a practical way in which to measure the crawfish producer welfare
changes associated with variations in price and quantity.
1.4. Research Procedure
1.4.1. Objective One
Like Hicksian decomposition in traditional demand systems, price change in an
inverse demand system can be decomposed into two parts: 1) substitution effect and 2)
scale effect in Antonelli’s decomposition. 7 Since price change in Antonelli’s
decomposition is explained by changes in not only quantity but also real purchasing
power, the inverse demand system should be formulated to explain both effects.

_________________________
7

Kim (1997) showed the Antonelli decomposition of the price effect of a quantity change into the
substitution and scale effects.
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In an inverse demand system, compensated price flexibility describes the substitution
effect and scale flexibility explains the income effect. The uncompensated price
flexibility is the sum of compensated price and scale flexibilities.
The objective will be achieved by using a family of inverse demand systems:
(1.1)

wi d ln pi = g i d lnQ+∑ g ij d lnq j

(GIDS)

wi d ln p i =hi d lnQ+∑hij d ln q j

(DIRDS)

j

(1.2)

j

(1.3)

dwi =ci d lnQ+∑cij d ln q j

(DIAIDS)

j

pi*
=ci d lnQ+∑hij d ln q j
P
j

(1.4)

wi d ln

(1.5)

dwi −wi d lnQ=hi d lnQ+∑cij d ln q j

(DICBS)
(DINBR)

j

where pi is the normalized price of the ith good, pi* is the nominal price of the ith good,
wi = pi qi is the ith good’s budget share, d ln Q is a differential Divisia quantity index,

and d ln P is a differential Divisa price index.8,9 In equations (1.1) – (1.5), g i , hi , and ci
represent the move from one difference surface to another, implying scale effect and that
g ij , hij , and cij represent a movement along the same indifference surface, implying

substitution effect.

_________________________
8

A Differential Divisia quantity index: d ln Q = ∑ wi d ln q i .
i
9
A Differential Divisia price index: d ln P = ∑ wi d ln pi .
i
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1.4.2. Objective Two
1.4.2.1. Consumer Welfare

The use of the inverse demand systems is motivated by our interest in the price
and welfare effects of imported crawfish products. Consumer welfare can be measured by
consumer’s surplus of uncompensated inverse demand and compensating variation or
equivalent variation calculated by compensated flexibility. As the uncompensated
flexibility overestimates the quantity effect on price, in which the quantity effect includes
both substitution and scale effects, consumer surplus is only an approximated
measurement. However, compensated flexibility measures exactly the quantity effect in
which the scale effect can be separated from the substitution effect. As a result,
compensating variation will be used in this study to exactly measure the effect of imports
on consumer welfare.
1.4.2.2. Producer Welfare

As the production and profit of domestic crawfish processors might be affected by
imports of crawfish and/or other related fishery products, depending on positive or
negative impacts of the imports on domestic crawfish price, the welfare effect of the
domestic crawfish processor could be easily measured through dual cost and profit
functions. To measure quantitatively the welfare impact of the domestic crawfish
processor in quantity space, flexibilities will be used in the profit equation of domestic
producer of q j . For example, the change in crawfish imports can affect not only the
domestic crawfish price but also the domestic production because domestic production
can be affected by domestic price. The change then in profit represents producer’s
welfare impact.
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1.5. Data Requirement

The fish species represented are five types of commercial fish: domestic crawfish,
imported crawfish, catfish, shrimp, and oysters. There are wide ranges in the supplied
quantities of each type of fish. This is especially true with domestic crawfish. Combined,
the captive and cultured harvests of domestic crawfish ranged from 27 to 56 thousand
MT during the 1990’s. The wide range in such a short time period reflects the production
swings in the capture fishery. During this period, the range for capture supply was 8 to 32
thousand MT. Although varied, culture sources were more reliable, producing from 16 to
28 thousand MT annually. While variation in the capture supply is mostly rooted in
fluctuating water levels in rivers, the culture supply variation is more reflective of the
producers response to prices and conditions in the rice industry (Kenneth, 2002).
The data refers to the fish commercially available in the U.S. market through
domestic supply and imports, from 1980 to 2005. The data are annual time series
consisting of prices and quantities (see Appendix II). Let qi* denote the quantity variable
of ith fishery good. Conversion of qi* into a normalized quantity, qi , which is the
requisite form utilized in inverse demand systems, is calculated as:
(1.6)

qi =

qi*
qi ,mean

where qi ,mean

,

⎛ n *⎞
⎜ ∑ qi ⎟
= ⎝ i =1 ⎠
N

qi > 1 , if qi* >qi ,mean ,
qi = 1 , if qi* =qi ,mean , and
qi < 1 , if qi* <q i ,mean .
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Now, let pi* denote the price variable of ith fishery good. Then, total expenditure
on the products included in the analysis is calculated as follows:
n

(1.7)

m = ∑ pi* ⋅ qi .
i =1

To get the normalized price, pi , pi* is divided by m as follows:
(1.8)

pi =

pi*
.
m

Note that pi is the same for wholesale, retail, and processor prices if the trader’s
marginal is proportional to the price. Then, the budget share of each fish, wi , is obtained
through multiplying pi by qi as follows:
(1.9)

wi = pi ⋅ qi , where

n

∑w
i =1

i

= 1.

1.6. Outline of Dissertation

This work accomplishes its’ two main objectives through a “traditional-style”
dissertation. A comprehensive literature review is presented in chapter two. Chapter three
will discuss the economic theory related to inverse demand systems. Chapter four will
describe the econometric skills required, including a restricted system estimator,
homogeneity, adding up, symmetry, singularity, autocorrelation, and endogeneity issues
encountered in estimating price and scale flexibilities. Empirical results and discussion
will be presented in chapter five, with chapter six serving as an overall summary.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Many theories are available to explain the benefits of free trade for both importing
and exporting countries – see Krugman and Obstfeld (1991), Ohlin (1933), Ricardo
(1817), and Smith (1776). While both nations can benefit from free trade as long as each
nation has a comparative advantage in the production of one commodity, lower-priced
imported goods often reduce the domestically produced goods’ price in the importing
country so that the importing country’s producers could be negatively impacted with a
reduction in profits. In the early 1990s, the crawfish processing business in Louisiana was
a well-established and profitable component of the state’s economy. Domestic crawfish
price was stable, hovering at around $3.50 per pound during that time. However, with the
introduction of increased Chinese crawfish tail meat imports into the domestic market,
domestic price for crawfish became more unstable. For example, the domestic monthly
price of crawfish has fluctuated from $1.92/lb. to $6.06/lb. during 2001-2004. As a result,
Louisiana crawfish processors have suffered from price instability attributed to the
increased imports of lower-priced Chinese crawfish tail meat.
The use of econometric models to analyze fish markets provides a quantitative
approach for structural, forecasting, and policy evaluation. Given that theoretical
concepts of fish price formation, inverse demand system, compensating and equivalent
variation, and price and scale flexibilities are closely related to construct structural
econometric model for the U.S. crawfish market, the relevant literature review needs to
include studies that model inverse demand systems, that measure welfare in quantity
space, and that examine developments in econometric methods applied to these problems.
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2.1. Fish Price Formation

Gorman (1959) proposed that the price of fish partially depends on specific
factors, stipulating that price is a function of quantity consumed and income, and in part
on the shadow prices of basic characteristics shared by all types of fish. The biological
nature of the production process of fish results in many fishery products being produced
annually or only at regular time intervals. Some of these products are perishable or semiperishable, and cannot be stored for long periods. The products must be consumed within
a certain period of time. Hence the situation results in fixed supply and a given of
demand for a specific time period. In the short term, the level of production cannot be
changed. For such goods, the causality is from quantity to price.
Elasticities long have been used as the basic conceptual tools both in demand
theory and in estimation. However, agricultural economists often find that price
flexibility is more useful and easier to measure, especially in whole market situations.
Price flexibility is the percentage of change in the price of a commodity, associated with
an isolated one percent change in the quantity or in a related variable. This term, used in
this way, was introduced in 1919 by H. L. Moore in his pioneering article, “Empirical
Laws of Demand and Supply and the Flexibility of Prices.” Moore drew attention to price
flexibility in order (1) to focus on price phenomena from the producers’ viewpoint and
(2) to provide analytic content to his cotton-demand-curve estimates. The concept’s
usefulness grew out of Moore’s observation that, although individuals make quantity
decisions based on given prices, market supplies of many agricultural products are so
fixed in the short run that prices must bear the entire adjustment burden. Consequently,

16

the amount by which market prices change in response to output changes between
production periods is particularly important in the farm sector (Houck, 1966).
Houck (1966) explained the relationship of direct price flexibilities to direct price
elasticities. He showed that it is frequently easier to estimate direct and cross price
flexibilities rather than price elasticities in agricultural economics research. However,
elasticity estimates may be needed or wanted. His paper showed that, under rather
general conditions, the reciprocal of the direct price flexibility is the lower absolute limit
of the direct price elasticity. The departure of the true price elasticity from the flexibility
reciprocal depends on the strength of the cross effects of substitution and
complementarity with other commodities.
Huang (1994) examined the relationships between price elasticities and price
flexibilities with emphasis on comparing differences between a directly estimated
demand matrix and an inverted demand matrix. He concluded that since the common
practice of inverting an elasticity matrix to obtain measures of flexibilities or vice versa
can cause sizable measurement errors, only directly estimated flexibilities should be used
to evaluate price effects of quantity changes.
Eales (1996) disagreed with Huang’s recommendation for three reasons. First,
Huang inverted matrices from separable subsystems. This, in general, can be expected to
be misleading because the conditional and unconditional elasticities derived from a
separable ordinary demand system are not equal. Second, inversion of sensitivity
matrices from conditional demand may or may not produce good estimates of
unconditional sensitivities. That is, if one estimates an ordinary meat demand system and
inverts the elasticity matrix, it cannot, in general, be expected to produce good estimates
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of the unconditional meat flexibilities and vice versa. Finally, expenditures cannot be
viewed as predetermined in conditional demand systems. He argued that one should not
employ directly estimated elasticities unless one is willing to believe that those estimates
are consistent, i.e., prices and expenditure are predetermined.
However, according to Huang’s reply to Eales’ comment, there are at least two
drawbacks in obtaining a matrix of demand elasticities by inverting a directly estimated
price flexibility matrix or vice versa. He indicated that in the process of inversion, the
point estimates must be treated as pure numbers representing the true parameters,
ignoring the stochastic properties of the estimates. Another drawback is that the inverted
results are quite sensitive to the numerical structure (for example, existence of a
singularity problem) of a demand matrix being inverted, and that could cause unstable
results. Due to the stochastic properties in estimating elasticities or flexibilities by
adopting time series data, the consistency between direct and indirect flexibilities is not
guaranteed.
The difference between the estimations of both stochastic parameters can be seen
in the following examples. Assume that there are two goods, q1 and q 2 , and their
respective prices, p1 and p 2 , as well as income, m. One can estimate both linear
regression models for the inverse and direct demand equations. First, the inverse demand
statistical equations are shown as follows:
(2.1)

ln p1 = β 10 + β11 ln q1 + β 12 ln q 2 + β 13 ln m+ε 1

(2.2)

ln p 2 = β 20 + β 21 ln q1 + β 22 ln q 2 + β 23 ln m+ε 2

where ε i is the random error term. According to the assumption of statistical regression
procedure, E (ε ) = 0 and q and ε are independent, such that E (q ⋅ ε ) = 0 where q
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represents the set of quantities (q1 and q 2 ). Second, the direct demand statistical
equations are shown as follows:
(2.3)

ln q1 =α 10 +α 11 ln p1 +α 12 ln p 2 +α 13 ln m+e1

(2.4)

ln q 2 =α 20 +α 21 ln p1 +α 22 ln p 2 +α 23 ln m+e2

where e is the random error term. According to the assumption of statistical regression
procedure, E (e) = 0 and p and e are independent, such that E ( p ⋅ e) = 0 where p
represents the set of prices ( p1 and p 2 ). Using the four different equations, the
relationships among parameters can be estimated, representing direct flexibilities in (2.1)
and (2.2) and direct elasticities in (2.3) and (2.4). Furthermore, it can be shown that

β1 ≠

1

α1

and β 2 ≠

1

α2

.

In addition to this, assume that p = q' β + ε . p and q are vectors of prices and
quantities. We can then rewrite this equation as q = p'α + e, where α =

u=

−1

β

ε . Further manipulation allows the following to be obtained:

(2.5)

α =( p' p) −1 p'q

(2.6)

α =( p' p ) −1 p'( pα +e)

(2.7)

α =( p' p) −1 p' pα +( p ' p) −1 p'e

(2.8)

α =( p' p ) −1 p ' p⎜⎜ 1 ⎟⎟+( p' p ) −1 p '⎜⎜ −1ε ⎟⎟
⎝β ⎠
⎝β ⎠

(2.9)

α = 1 −( p' p ) −1 p'⎜⎜ 1 ε ⎟⎟
β
⎝β ⎠

⎛

⎛ ⎞

⎛

⎞

⎞
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1

β

, and

If p and ε are correlated, then α ≠

1

β

; however, if p and ε are not correlated, the direct

price flexibility is equal to the reciprocal of the direct price elasticity.
In empirical modeling, direct price flexibility is derived from the inverse demand
function in which price is a function of the quantity supplied of own commodity, related
commodities, and a shift variable. In contrast, indirect price flexibility is acquired
utilizing the ordinary demand function, in which quantity is a function of the price of the
commodities and income. As shown in equations (2.1) to (2.9), the reciprocal of the
flexibility (elasticity) estimated in an empirical model is not always a good
approximation of the elasticity (flexibility) since different variables are held constant in
the two different estimations. Even though the critical issue of price flexibility is
unresolved, Houck (1966), Huang (1994), and Eales (1996) ascertained the benefits of
using price flexibilities to empirically evaluate price effects of quantity.
Price flexibility is the percentage change in price resulting from a particular
change in quantity with all other factors held constant.10 If demand is inelastic, then the
absolute value of the indirect price flexibility coefficient is likely to be greater than one.
A flexible price is consistent with an inelastic demand. In other words, a small change in
quantity has a relatively large impact on price. If demand is elastic, then the absolute
value of the price flexibility coefficient is likely to be less than one. An inflexible price is
consistent with an elastic demand.

________________________
10

dp q
⋅ .
dq p

The price flexibility coefficient (f) is defined as follows: f =
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The cross flexibility of i with respect to j is the percentage change in the price
of commodity i in response to an one percent change in the quantity of commodity j ,
other factors remaining constant.11
The cross flexibility based on the quantity variable of a substitute is expected to
be negative. This is in contrast to cross elasticities for substitutes that usually are positive.
A larger supply of a substitute results in a lower price for the substitute, which in turn
results in a decline in demand for the first commodity. The lower demand implies a
reduction in price. Hence, a larger supply of the substitute (commodity j) reduces the
price of the commodity under consideration (commodity i).
The price flexibility of income is the percentage change in price in response to an
one percent change in income, other factors remaining constant.12 The flexibility of
income is typically expected to be positive. Price moves directly with the shift in demand.
A higher income implies a larger demand, in turn, suggesting a higher price for any given
level of quantity.
2.2. Modeling Inverse Demand System

In recent years, there has been increasing interest in inverse demand systems
based on different objectives. Key objectives are (1) the specification of inverse demand
system for which curvature conditions implied by economic theory are maintained, (2)
the quantitative estimation of price effects of quantity change, and (3) quantity-based
welfare measures. Most inverse demand systems use normalized price as a function of
_________________________
11

The algebraic relationship of cross price flexibility is as follows: f ij =

12

The algebraic relationship of income flexibility is as follows: f im =

21

dpi q j
⋅ .
dq j pi

dp i m
⋅ .
dm p i

quantities demanded in inverse demand systems.
The curvature conditions require that (1) the direct utility function should be
quasi-concave in quantities, (2) the indirect utility function should be quasi-convex in
prices, or (3) the expenditure function should be concave in prices. The curvature
conditions of inverse demand systems are required to consistently satisfy microeconomic
theory of demand system. Like in the direct demand systems, however, in practice
encountering situations where curvature conditions hold spontaneously and globally are
rare, which is one reason about why the empirical estimation is not consistent with what
we expect under microeconomic theory of demand system.
In the seminal stages of inverse demand systems development, economists
adopted the theoretically well-developed direct demand system from which the inverse
demand system is derived, basing their reasoning on the same theoretical conditions of
adding up, homogeneity, and symmetry. The contribution of this effort was to
parameterize both direct and inverse demand systems such that comparisons between the
two systems could be made.
Anderson (1980) established some theoretical properties of inverse demand
systems which aid in their interpretation and facilitate calculations related to them. He
introduced the notion of scale elasticity, which is shown to play for inverse demand
systems much the same role that income elasticity does for direct demand systems. It is
used in a decomposition of Antonelli effects which is analogous to the Slutsky equation
for direct demand systems. He explained the duality process for uncompensated elasticity,
expenditure elasticity, compensated elasticity, quantity elasticity (price flexibility), and
scale elasticity simply given utility maximization and the knowledge of budget share.
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Barten and Bettendorf (1989) developed differential inverse demand systems to
parameterize eight different fishery quantity variables. Specifically, they developed (1)
the Inverse Rotterdam Demand System (IRDS) from the Rotterdam Demand System (as
developed by Barten (1964) and Theil (1965), (2) the Inverse Almost Ideal Demand
System (IAIDS) from the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) (as developed by Deaton
and Muellbauer (1980)), and (3) the Inverse Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) from the
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) which was first proposed by Laitinen and Theil (1979).
Through using these three different inverse demand systems in application for a fishery
demand system, they provided insight into the interpretation of the coefficients.
Neves (1994) proposed the National Bureau of Research (NBR) direct demand
system, which has an inverse National Bureau of Research (INBR). The INBR combines
IAIDS quantity effects with an IRDS scale effect.
Brown, Lee, and Seale (1995) developed a generalized inverse demand system,
which combined the features of the IRDS and IAIDS. The synthetic inverse demand
system nests the inverse analogs of all of the models nested within the generalized
ordinary demand system.
Moschini and Vissa (1993) showed the alternative of using a direct approximation
to mixed demands, in which prices of some goods are predetermined such that the
respective quantities demanded adjust to clear the market, whereas for the remaining set
of goods quantities supplied are predetermined and prices must adjust to clear the market.
The proposed mixed demand system was illustrated with an application to the Canadian
meat market. The fact that Canada has virtually free trade in beef and pork, whereas the
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supply of chicken is restricted, indicates that a mixed demand approach is more appealing
in this case.
Eales, Durham, and Wessells (1997) modeled Japanese fish demand using both
ordinary and inverse demand systems, each of which nests a number of competing
specifications. Results indicated that the inverse demand systems dominate the ordinary
demand systems in forecasting performance and in non-nested tests.
Park and Thurman (1999) showed that scale flexibilities in inverse demand
systems describe how marginal valuations change with expansions in the consumption
bundle. Such effects clearly are related to income elasticities in direct demand systems.
However, the connection is not so close as it first appears. They argued that the link
between scale flexibilities and income elasticities is tight only if preferences are
homothetic, a situation where neither measure is interesting, or if all elasticities of
substitution are unitary. They illustrated the relationship between the two measures in a
coordinate system focusing on how marginal rates of substitution change with
consumption scale and proportion.
Beach and Holt (2001) introduced inverse demand systems that include quadratic
scale terms. These systems are similar to regular quadratic demand systems introduced by
Howe, Pollak, and Wales (1979). The models developed were used to estimate inverse
demand equations for finfish landed commercially in the South Atlantic from 1980-1996.
Overall, they showed that including quadratic terms in inverse demand specifications
offers an improvement in modeling systems in which quantities are taken as exogenous.
Holt and Bishop (2002) proposed the normalized quadratic distance function,
which is similar to the normalized quadratic expenditure function of Diewert and Wales
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(1988a) as a new inverse demand system. Aside from being able to maintain concavity in
quantities globally, the resulting specification is also flexible. In addition, to obtain more
parsimonious specifications, they applied the rank reduction procedures of Diewert and
Wales (1988b) to the model’s Antonelli matrix. They illustrated the techniques by
estimating a system of inverse demands for bi-monthly fish landings, 1971-1991, for U.S.
Great Lakes ports. To illustrate the model’s usefulness, exact welfare measures
associated with catch restrictions are derived.
Park, Thurman, and Easley Jr.(2004) used the combined inverse demand systems
from IRDS, IAIDS, ICBS, and INBR to measure the welfare loss of fish catch restrictions.
Unlike single equation models, the system-wide approach does not exclude substitution
possibilities and includes interactions that are potentially important for understanding fish
consumption patterns and price determination. They applied the estimated system by
analyzing welfare measures of quantity restrictions: catch restrictions in the grouper and
snapper complex off the southeast coast of the U.S.
Wong and Mclaren (2005) proposed a new approach, a distance function
approach, to the specification of inverse demand systems for empirical estimation of
fishery products that is directly and weakly separable from other commodities. The
separability assumption needs to be held with an aim of keeping the estimation process
manageable by merely dealing with certain aspects of the static demand model. They
advocated a more general use of the distance function in specifying regular and estimable
inverse demand systems. Note that they only focus on the type of distance functions for
which it is not necessary to have closed functional forms for the inverse uncompensated
demand functions, nor for the direct utility function. Their results indicated that the
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distance function approach is a promising tool of empirical analysis of inverse demand
systems subject to tight theoretical conditions. This opens up a further avenue for
ultimately obtaining systems of inverse demand functions.
Matsuda (2005) provided a new interpretation of the scale effects in differential
inverse demand systems. A scale curve is defined as a curve that shows how the
expenditure share of a good or service changes as the consumption level changes. It was
shown that Brown, Lee, and Seale’s synthetic model has the same scale effects as do the
Box-Cox scale curves. In this light, their model is not a mere composite but a model in its
own right. The empirical illustration given for fresh food demand in Japan has suggested
that none of the four nested models, IRDS, IAIDS, ICBS, and INBR is adequate and that
there are some nontrivial differences between their elasticity estimates and those in the
synthetic model. The data have preferred the synthetic model and not supported either
linear or logarithmic linear scale curves.
2.3. Welfare Measurements

Most welfare analyses are concerned with the welfare effects of price changes.
There are, however, many situations in which policy options are directly related to
quantity changes. The welfare effects of price changes are analyzed with the direct
demand system in which commodity quantities are determined as functions of their prices.
The welfare effects of quantity changes, on the other hand, are associated with the inverse
demand system in which commodity prices are dependent on their quantities. In
conventional welfare analysis of price change, prices are taken to be exogenous or
predetermined, while quantities are endogenous. In contrast, in welfare analysis of
quantity changes, quantities are exogenous, while prices are endogenous. Price-based or
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dual welfare measures are relevant when there are well-functioning competitive markets
and quantities are fully adjusted to changes in prices; on the other hand, quantity-based or
primal welfare measures are useful in situations where there are constraints on
commodity quantities, or when transaction costs impede consumers from fully adjusting
to changes in prices (Kim, 1997).
The choice between price- and quantity-based welfare measures is empirical, and
proper measurement of welfare effects requires the knowledge as to which variable –
price or quantity – is exogenous. For individual consumers, it may be reasonable to
assume that the supply of commodities is perfectly elastic, and therefore prices can be
taken as exogenous. But this assumption may not be tenable for consumers in the
aggregate or if highly aggregated economy-wide data are used to estimate demand
relations. At the aggregate level, quantities (rather than prices) are viewed more properly
as being exogenous. Although individual consumers make their consumption decisions
based on given prices, the quantities of commodities are predetermined by production at
the market level and prices must adjust so that the available quantities are consumed
(Kim, 1997).13,14 This implies that although price-based measures are useful for analyzing
the welfare of individual consumers, quantity-based measures may be more appropriate at
the aggregate level.15 Given the fact that most of the consumer demand studies based on
time-series data involve the estimation of aggregate demand functions, there is a clear
need for the inverse demand system and hence welfare analysis of quantity changes in
empirical analysis. Moreover, while these results hinge on competitive behavior,
quantity-based measures are essential for analyzing the welfare effects for noncompetitive firm or industry behavior (Kim, 1997).

27

Quantity-based welfare measures are not totally new. Indeed, consumer surplus is
often discussed for changes in price or quantity for a single commodity, and the
Marshallian surplus measure (together with producer surplus) for quantity changes is
used to analyze social welfare (or deadweight loss) or the welfare properties of market
equilibrium. There are some limited empirical studies on consumer welfare for quantity
changes using the Marshallian surplus. Rucker, Thurman, and Sumner (1980) estimate
the inverse demand function for tobacco which is subject to quantity restrictions (quotas)
and investigate the welfare effect associated with changes in quotas. Bailey and Liu
(1995) estimate an inverse demand for airline services in which air fares are specified as
a function of network scale and examine consumer welfare for changes in network scale.
However, the Marshallian surplus is an approximate welfare measure for quantity
changes, and there is no formal analysis of exact welfare measures pertinent to the
inverse demand system for quantity changes.16 This is in stark contrast to the literature on
price-based welfare measures which provides well-established welfare measures for price
change.
_________________________
13

According to Hicks, “When we are studying the behavior of the individual consumer, it is natural to
regard the former (‘price into quantity,’ i.e., direct demand) approach as primary, for the consumer is
concerned with given prices on the market, and he chooses how much to purchase at a given price. But
when we are studying market demand, the demand from the whole group of consumers of the commodity,
the latter (‘quantity into price,’ i.e., inverse demand) approach becomes at least as important. For we then
very commonly begin with a given supply, and what we require to know is the price at which that supply
can be sold” (Hicks, 1957 and Kim, 1997). Katzner (1970) argues that the inverse demand system may be
useful to the economic planner since he may be interested in the prices required to clear the market of
planned commodities.
14
Bronsard and Lise (1984) examine whether a direct or inverse demand system is appropriate in empirical
analysis and find that the level of commodity aggregation is important. In particular, their test rejects the
exogeneity of prices in three-commodity models, but prices are often considered as exogenous at a more
disaggregate level. In addition, see Huang (1988), Barten and Betterdorf (1989), and Eales and Unnevehr
(1994) for the rationale of the use of the inverse demand system in food demands.
15
This is true in a general equilibrium view of the economy where total supply is fixed for the economy,
while it is not fixed for individual consumers.

changes (Kim, 1997).
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Kim (1997) fundamentally established the theoretical procedure for measurement
of welfare changes for the inverse demand system and provided exact welfare measures
associated with quantity changes through using compensating and equivalent variation.
He explained many circumstances that warrant the use of quantity-based welfare
measures, in contrast to the conventional price-based measures. He employed the
distance function as a useful tool to develop compensating and equivalent variations for
quantity changes, which are contrasted to the Marshallian surplus. He also showed that
many results derived for quantity changes are parallel to those of welfare measures for
price changes. In view of the increased usage of inverse demand systems and distance
functions, welfare measures of quantity changes are of great importance in policy
analysis. Moreover, quantity-based welfare measures can also deal with the welfare
effects of price changes when there are well-functioning competitive markets.
Beach and Holt (2001) developed the models which were used to estimate inverse
demands for finfish landed commercially in the South Atlantic. These models were used
to obtain compensating and equivalent variation estimates associated with a 10%
reduction in the quantity landed for individual species. Overall, it appears that including
quadratic terms in inverse demand specifications offers an improvement in modeling
systems in which quantities are taken as exogenous and may prove beneficial in future
applications to inverse demand models.
_________________________
16

There is a growing literature on quantity-based welfare measures for the restricted or partial demand
system in which some subset of commodities are subject to quantity restrictions. Hicks (1956) originally
introduced so-called compensating and equivalent surplus measures for this situation. Mäler (1974) shows
that Hicksian compensating and equivalent variations defined for price changes can be readily adapted to
welfare measures of quantity changes for a partial demand system. Randall and Stoll (1980) demonstrate
that with appropriate modifications, Willig’s (1976) formulas for bounds on compensating and equivalent
variations for price changes carry over to welfare measures of quantity changes. For more, see Bockstael
and McConnell (1993), Brslaw and Smith (1995), Lankford (1988), and Haneman’s (1991).
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Holt and Bishop (2002) developed normalized quadratic inverse demand systems
to examine the welfare implications associated with reductions in fish landings. Because
state and regional managers of the Great Lakes fishery must balance the competing
interests of commercial and recreational fisherman in the face of diminished fish stocks,
such an exercise has meaning in a larger policy context. An oft-used policy instrument in
this regard is a commercial catch quota (restriction). It is therefore desirable to have a
theoretically consistent money-metric measure of the welfare loss to fish consumers
associated with the imposition of harvest restrictions. The results showed considerable
variations in the magnitudes and relative importance of the compensating and equivalent
variation estimates across species and over time.
Park, Thurman, and Easley (2004) used a recently developed synthetic inverse
demand system to measure the welfare loss of fish catch restriction. Unlike single
equation models, the system-wide approach does not exclude substitution possibilities
and includes interactions that are potentially important for understanding fish
consumption patterns and price determination. They applied the estimated system by
analyzing welfare measures of quantity restrictions: catch restrictions in the grouper and
snapper complex off the southeast coast of the U.S. They found the own- and crossquantity elasticities of inverse demand to be small, implying that prices themselves are
good estimates of the average value of restricted catches. Because the quantities, and not
the prices, of fish closely related in demand are held constant, these quantity elasticities
have the proper general equilibrium interpretation for welfare analysis.
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2.4. Econometric Methodology

A large number of econometric studies have focused on the estimation of
parameters in singular equation systems (i.e. systems in which the sum of the regressands
at each observation is equal to a linear combination of certain regressors). In the context
of consumer demand systems, many previous studies have reported results in which the
sum of the regressands (typically expenditure on various commodities) at each
observation is equal to the value of a regressor (typically total expenditures). Share
studies especially constitute one group of empirical studies with singular equation
systems, e.g., budget shares, factor shares, and market shares.
In a variety of share studies, the sum of the regressands (shares) at each
observation is equal to the unit, regressor. In both the expenditure and share context,
singularity of the equation system implies that the contemporaneous disturbance
covariance matrix is also singular.
Barten (1969) has shown that when disturbances are serially independent,
maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of the parameters in the complete n-equation system
can be derived from ML estimation of n-1 equations; moreover, these ML estimates are
invariant to the equation deleted.
Aigner (1973) and Parks (1969) specified that the disturbance vector in the
singular equation system follows a first order autoregressive process by using Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (SUR). The problem with application of SUR estimation technique
to the system of equations is that the assumption of no time dependence among the
disturbances is clearly untenable for the time series data. Parks (1967) has generalized
Zellner’s SUR estimation technique to the case where the disturbances exhibit not only
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contemporaneous correlation, but n autocorrelated pattern as well. The technique
involves estimating the parameters for the pattern of serial correlation in the separate
equations, then transforming the data to eliminate the serial pattern. The transformed
equations then satisfy the Zellner’s assumptions; and the estimates are obtained in the
usual way. In the presence of serially correlated disturbances the Parks estimation
technique can be shown to be consistent and asymptotically more efficient than the
Zellner’s SUR method.
Berndt and Savin (1975) analyzed what singularity implies for the estimation and
hypothesis testing of systems of equations with autoregressive disturbances. Although the
study restricted the attention to singular equation systems employing shares as
regressands, the results carried over to the expenditure specifications. They found in the
study that the adding up property of the shares imposes restrictions on the parameters of
the autoregressive process. These restrictions generally have not been taken into account
in the Parks’ study. When these restrictions are not imposed the specification of the
model is conditional on the deleted equation. As a result, the system estimates of the
parameters and the likelihood ratio (LR) tests are no longer invariant to the equation
deleted. Furthermore, singularity of the contemporaneous disturbance covariance matrix
raises issues concerning the identification of parameters of the autoregressive process.
This identification problem complicates the interpretation of the LR tests. In order to
preserve adding up, the autocorrelation coefficients are constrained to be the same in all
equations.17
________________________

17

Berndt and Savin showed that the adding up property imposes the diagonals of the unknown parameter
vector of covariance matrix of error terms to be same. The estimation of misspecified diagonal will provide
consistent, but asymptotically inefficient estimates. Even more important, however, the estimate based on
the misspecified diagonal will vary with the equation deleted.
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Thus, the feasible generalized least square (FGLS) procedure has three steps: (1) estimate
the system equations by Zellner’s SUR; (2) estimate ρ in the equations with adding up
restrictions from the residuals; and (3) use the estimated parameters to transform the
model according to the autoregressive FGLS formula and apply SUR to the transformed
model.
2.5. Fish Consumption

Katharine (1992) detected a variety of factors affecting on aquaculture products.
The study indicated that changes in lifestyle in the U.S., including an increased
preoccupation with healthy behaviour leading to a shift away from red meat to other
sources of protein and increased away-from-home eating, may explain the recent growth
in seafood consumption. Shifts in fish consumption patterns may also be explained by
technological improvements in preparing and marketing of processed fishery products,
including convenience products such as breaded shrimp and seafood dinners.
As more and more women enter the work force, increase in opportunity cost of
the household meal preparer’s time made processed fishery products popular.
Improvements in distribution and merchandising techniques by seafood producers and
retailers of seafood products, ensure that quality standards meet consumers’ expectations.
At the same time, national and state-supported consumer education campaigns,
attempting to raise the average American’s knowledge about the advantages of eating a
broader range of seafood products may have had a significant impact on seafood demand.
Adams et. al. (1987) assessed causal relationships by using Haugh-Pierce, Sims,
and Granger methods. Price models at three different market levels were estimated.
Economic factors analyzed were income, prices of competing products, landings and
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imports of raw headless shrimp, total retail supply, beginning stocks, and marketing
costs.
Monthly prices generally exhibited unidirectional causality from ex-vessel to
retail price. Quarterly prices were determined interdependently among market levels.
Price responses between market levels were found to be symmetric with beginning
stocks, landings, and imports of own-size shrimp the most important determinants of
prices. The study recognized that several factors are suspected to have contributed to
price volatility, such as limited domestic shrimp supplies, increasing dependency on
tariff-free imports of wild catch and increasing amounts of maricultured product,
disproportionate increases in costs of production (i.e., fuel, financing, and marine
insurance), and fluctuation domestic economic conditions.
Carel et. al. (1996) evaluated the effects of increased exports from NAFTA
member countries on the U.S. domestic catfish industry. The study showed that the
quantity of catfish imported will fall if the domestic price of catfish falls relative to the
import price. Past imports have no effect on present imports. The income elasticity was
negative indicating that imported catfish may be an inferior good. This study also showed
that doubling present levels of imports from NAFTA member countries is not a threat to
the U.S. catfish industry.
Keefe (2001) provided an in-depth analysis of shrimp price flexibility and the
impact of decreases in quantity supplied of shrimp on world price. Seemingly Unrelated
Regression is utilized to determine price flexibility of shrimp and changes in quantity
supplied on world shrimp price. The key objective of this paper is to use Huang’s direct
procedure and Eales’ indirect technique for calculating price flexibilities to evaluate the
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effects of a reduction in quantity supplied from shrimp aquaculture sources on world
price. Estimated price flexibility for the quantity supplied of aquaculture shrimp was
-0.32. The results indicate that if world supply should plummet, due to deteriorating
environmental conditions, such as disease or pollution, world shrimp price would
increase substantially.
Jolly (1998) forecasted catfish industry prices by using linear and nonlinear
methods. Autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) models and the generalized
autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (GARCH) are employed with ordinary least
squares (OLS), unconditional least squares (ULS), and maximum likelihood (ML)
models to forecast prices. These forecasts are compared to traditional OLS model
forecasts. All models had comparable statistics (RSME, MAE, R2), but ULS and the ML
produced forecasts with less deviation from the observed values. The nonlinear models
showed an improvement in price forecasts over the ordinary least squares (OLS) medels
for prices of whole and frozen catfish.
Schmitz and Seale (2004) analyzed the effect that offset payments under the
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA also known as the “Byrd
Amendment”) have on tariff levels that are lobbied for by U.S. producer groups. The
study derived the optimum antidumping tariff that would maximize the welfare of
producers receiving CDSOA offset payments. They compared and contrasted this newly
derived “optimal antidumping tariff” (that maximizes the sum of producer surplus and
tariff revenue) with the optimal revenue tariff (that maximizes tariff revenue alone) and
the optimal welfare tariff (that maximizes the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus,
and tariff revenue). Prior to the CDSOA, U.S. producers would always lobby for
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prohibitive tariffs that maximize producer surplus. However, under the CDSOA,
producers will, in most cases, lobby for a tariff that is not prohibitive but is still higher
than the optimal revenue or optimal welfare tariffs.
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CHAPTER 3
ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK

Since inverse demand systems provide the theoretical basis for empirical
applications related to analysis of quantity effects for price adjustable products, the
studies of inverse demand systems have been focused on by many economists. For
example, due to biological lag of the production process and perishability of fish, price
should be adjusted based on quantity supplied to clear the market, for which the inverse
demand system provides theoretical basis.
Gossen, who earlier introduced the concept of diminishing marginal utility,
described a consumer’s equilibrium as the proportionality between the vector of prices
and that of the consumer’s marginal utilities. This concept became commonly known
later as Gossen’s Second Law.18 The consumer’s marginal utilities are functions of the
quantities of commodities. This function can be derived from maximizing the utility
condition of given income as follows:
(3.1)

Max U (q ) subject to p 'q=1 .
q

Under the regularity condition, this equilibrium implies a relation between price
variations and quantity variations.19
_________________________

18

Gossen’s Second Law was his most original contribution and presaged the Marginalist Revolution of
1871-74. For example, Walras (1874) stated as that “In fact, the whole world may be looked upon as a vast
general market made up of diverse special markets where social wealth is bought and sold. Our task then is
to discover the law to which these purchases and sales tend to confirm automatically. To this end, we shall
suppose that the market is perfectly competitive, just as in pure mechanics we suppose to start with, that
machines are perfectly frictionless.” Moor (1914) followed this same train of thought when he made the
statement: “In the closing quarter of the last century, great hopes were entertained by economists with
regard to the capacity of economics to be made an “exact science”. According to the view of the foremost
theorists, the development of the doctrine of utility and value had laid the foundation of scientific
economics in exact concepts, and it would soon be possible to erect upon this new foundation a firm
structure of interrelated parts which, in definiteness and cogency, would be suggestive of the severe beauty
of the mathematico-physical sciences. But this expectation has not been realized.”
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If one writes this relation with the quantities expressed as a function of the prices, then
one has a direct consumer demand system, q = h( p ). From a theoretical point of view
one could just as well express the prices as a function of the quantity. One then has what
is known as an inverse demand system, p = b(q).
From an empirical point of view, however, direct and inverse demand systems are
not equivalent as has been shown previously in Chapter II. To avoid statistical
inconsistencies, the right-hand side variables in such systems of random decision rules
should be the ones which are not controlled by the decision maker, i.e., E ( p ⋅ e ) = 0 in
equations (2.3) and (2.4) for direct demand systems and E (q ⋅ ε ) = 0 in equations (2.1)
and (2.2) for inverse demand systems, respectively. If the consumer is a price taker and a
quantity adjuster for most of the products and services usually purchased, the direct
demand system is desirable for the case. However, due to biological lag in the production
process for certain goods like fresh vegetables or fish, supply is very inelastic in the short
run and producers are virtually price takers. These price taking producers and price taking
consumers are linked by traders who select a price which they expect will clear the
market. This means, in practice, that at auction, wholesale traders offer prices for the
fixed quantities which, after being augmented with a suitable margin, are sufficiently low
enough to induce consumers to buy the available quantities. In that case, traders set the
prices as a function of the quantities so that the inverse demand system can be obtained.

_________________________

The regularity condition assumes that the direct utility function, u = U ( q ), is to be twice-continuously
differentiable, increasing, and quasi-concave in q, a vector of commodities.

19
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There has been in recent years an increasing interest in the systems of inverse
demand functions in which normalized prices are functions of normalized quantities
demanded.20 These systems are particularly useful in markets for agricultural and natural
resource commodities like fish and vegetables. Such inverse demand systems have been
developed according to two different approaches. The first one utilizes the Rotterdam
methodology, which is a direct approximation of the conceptual inverse demand
relationships without imposing the rigid structure that is implied by utility maximization
– see Barten and Bettendorf (1989), Eales, Durhan, and Wessells (1997), Park, Thurman,
and Easley (2004), and Matsuda (2005). Even though the Rotterdam method is difficult
to incorporate into the demand systems without having an idea about the structure of
preferences, the Rotterdam method can obtain the inverse demand systems which explain
well the quantity effect on price in terms of the substitution effect and the scale effect.
An alternative method to the Rotterdam method is based on a dual representation
of preferences, which, in turn, is based on a specified functional form of the direct utility
or distance function – see Kim (1997), Beach and Holt (2001), Holt and Bishop (2002),
and Wong and McLaren (2005).

_________________________
20

Normalized price of commodity i is obtained as follows:

pi =

n
pi*
, where pi* is nominal price of commodity i and m = ∑ pi qi* .
m
i =1

Normalized quantity is obtained as follows:

qi =

qi*
qi ,mean

, where qi* is quantity of commodity i and qi ,mean is mean of quantity of commodity i.
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Since the Rotterdam method starts initially from the relationship between price
and quantity to derive the targeted inverse demand system, this methodology does not
need the specific functional form of consumer preference.21 The Rotterdam method is
initially constructed by Barten and Bettendorf (1989) and subsequently by Brown, Lee,
and Seal (1995), Park (1996), and Eales, Durhan, and Wessels (1997). With assumptions
of weak separability of the total commodity bundle into eight fishery products and
collective consumer behavior as a rational representative consumer, Barten and
Bettendorf (1989) initiated the four different types of inverse demand systems,
Differential Inverse Rotterdam Demand System (DIRDS), Differential Inverse Almost
Ideal Demand System (DIAIDS), Differential Inverse Central Bureau of Statistics
(DICBS), and Differential Inverse National Bureau of Research (DINBR). Since the
appearance of the inverse demand systems, Brown, Lee, and Seale (1995) have
developed the inverse demand systems into the generalized inverse demand system,
nesting these four inverse demand systems. Since then, economists have used the
generalized inverse demand systems for empirical analysis. For example, Eales, Durham,
and Wessells (1997) developed generalized inverse demand systems of Japanese demand
for fish from the inverse demand systems. Park, Thurman, and Easley (2004) modeled
inverse synthetic demand systems for empirical welfare measurement in Gulf and South
Atlantic fisheries.

_________________________

21

Wong and McLaren (2005) indicated the weakness of the Rotterdam methodology as follows: “It may be
inconvenient to incorporate prior idea about the structure of preferences, which is always required when
working with highly disaggregated inverse demand systems, noting that such information (which must be
matched to the aggregation level at which estimation is to proceed) often takes the form of statements about
relative substitutability among items within different commodity groups."
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An alternative methodology to the Rotterdam method based on a dual
representation of preference is typified by Kim (1997), who theoretically derived the
targeted inverse demand system from the distance function, which is derived from a
given direct utility function. This inverse demand system was also used for welfare
measurement in quantity space.
In this chapter, this study will discuss 1) the two different economic approaches to
derive inverse demand systems, 2) consumer’s economic welfare measurement in
quantity space, and 3) producer welfare measurement using price and cost flexibilities.
3.1. Inverse Demand System
3.1.1. Rotterdam Methodology

From here the study will use the same quantity and price variables defined in
equations (1.6) and (1.8). According to basic demand theory, the market demand can be
defined by a system of Marshallian demand as follows:
(3.2)

q = f ( p * ,m )

where q is the n-vector of normalized quantity, p * is the n-vector of corresponding
nominal price, and m is total expenditure on the sub-bundle of commodities, m = p * ' q.
This specification is more convenient to derive the inverse demand systems whenever we
can easily recognize what type of functional form of regular demand in the light of
relationship between price and quantity than that of the distance function methodology,
which requires the specific form of the utility or distance function rather than that of the
demand function. In view of homogeneity of degree zero in m and p * , the equation
(3.2) can be normalized without losing any of the following demand function properties:
(3.3)

q =h( p )
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p*
where p =
is the normalized price vector. Here, pi would be interpreted as the
m
fraction of total expenditure paid for one unit of good i. It should be noted that the
normalized price, p, is the same for the producer, wholesale, and retail prices if the
seller’s margin is proportional to the price. The traders will select p such that the given
quantities q are bought. The prices they offer to the fish producers result in the inverse
demand system from inverting equation (3.3) as follows:
(3.4)

p =h −1 (q )=b(q )

which does not lose any property held by equations (3.2) and (3.3). Now, in order to
derive more flexible inverse demand systems, we should carefully review the properties
of inverse demand systems and an adequate parameterization. Recalling that the
properties of the inverse demand system depends on the properties of equations (3.2) and
(3.3), the properties of equation (3.4) can be deduced directly from the following
conditions:
(3.5)

u q = λp ,

p' q = 1

where u q = dU (q ) / dq is the vector of marginal utilities and λ =q'u q is a Lagrange
multiplier. u q = λp describes consumer equilibrium as the proportionality between the
vector of prices and that of the consumer’s marginal utilities indicated by Gossen. Now,
these systems for p should be solved to define the inverse demand systems as a function
of quantities. Therefore, p is expressed as follows:
(3.6)

p =(1/ λ )u q =(1/ q 'u q )u q

which is another mathematical expression for (3.4). However, equation (3.6) gives a clue
on how to derive more useful information regarding consumer preference and price
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behavior related to a change in quantity. In order to study the relation between quantity,
price, and utility in more detail, it should be considered that a small change in q results
in a shift in p, noting that a change in marginal utility can be calculated by using the
Hessian matrix of the utility function because du q = u qq dq where u qq = [d 2U (q) / dqdq ]
is the Hessian matrix of the utility function. This relation would be studied by total
differentiation of equation (3.6). The total differential equation is as follows:
(3.7)

dp =−(1/ q 2 u q )u q dq +(1/ q 'u q )du q −(1/ q 'u q2 )u q du q
=(1/ q 'u q )[− pu q' dq +( I − pq ')du q ]
=− pp 'dq +( I − pq ')(1/ q 'u q )u qq dq

=− pp'dq+( I − pq')Vdq
where V = (1 / q' u q )u qq is a symmetric matrix because the Hessian matrix, u qq , is
symmetry. Equation (3.7) can be rearranged to be more efficient form as follows:
(3.8)

dp = −[ p − ( I − pq' )Vq ] p' dq + ( I − pq' )V ( I − qp' )dq

= gp'dq+Gdq
where g = −[ p − ( I − pq' )Vq] and G = ( I − pq' )V ( I − qp' ).
With equation (3.8), we can describe the change in p caused by a change in q. The
change in p would be interpreted by the effect of two shifts in q. The first one, gp' dq,
can be described as a scale effect, which is equivalent to the second part of right hand
side of equation (3.79) in the distance function methodology. Since a proportionate
increase in q means dq = kq, with k being a positive scalar, it follows from equation
(3.5) then that p' dq = kp' q = k . Simultaneously, we also know Gq = 0 because

( I − pq' ) = 0 . As a result,

the second effect in equation (3.8) will be zero,
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Gdq = kGq = 0, for a proportionate increase in q. Therefore, the change in scale can
only be explained by gp'dq whenever a proportionate increase in q occurs. The change
in scale is monotonically related to a change in utility. Let du be such a change. One has,
using equation (3.5), du = u q' dq = λp ' dq = λkp' q = λk with λ > 0. This means that Gdq
is the (utility or real income) compensated for substitution effect of quantity changes,
which is equivalent to the first part of the right hand side of equation (3.79) in distance
function methodology. Also, G is the counterpart of the Slutsky matrix for regular
demand systems and known as the Antonelli (substitution) matrix – Antonelli (1886),
Salvas-Bronsard et al. (1977), Laitinen and Theil (1979), Anderson (1980), and Barten
and Bettendorf (1989). Gdp represents the move along an indifference surface, while

gp' dq is the move from one difference surface to another.
Substitution effect, Gdq , and scale effect, gp' dq , can be shown under different
relationships between commodities. Figure 3.1 shows the substitution effect and scale
effect for q-complements of qj and qi, in which an increase in qj increases pi . An increase
in pi causes the demand of qi to decrease by dqi shown in Figure 3.1. In contrast, Figure
3.2 shows the substitution effect and scale effect for q-substitutes of qj and qi, in which an
increase in qj decreases pi . A decrease in pi causes the demand of qi to increase by dqi
shown in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.3 shows substitution effect and scale effect for the case of
an inferior good of qj, in which substitution effect is positive but scale effect is negative
so that the total effect is the substitution effect minus the scale effect.
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Figure 3.1. Substitution Effect and Scale Effect for q-Complements.
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Figure 3.2. Substitution Effect and Scale Effect for q-Substitutes.
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Figure 3.3. Substitution Effect and Scale Effect for Inferior Good of qj
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p' dq in equation (3.8) can be manipulated to have the form of scale measure as
follows:
(3.9)

p'dq =∑ pi dqi =∑ pi q i d ln q i =∑wi d ln qi =d lnQ
i

i

i

where wi = pi qi = pi* qi / m is the share of expenditure on good i in total expenditure.

We may thus consider p' dq also as the change in the Divisia quantity index. Now,
equation (3.8) would be modified by the Divisia quantity index as follows:
(3.10)

dp = gd ln Q + Gdq

A further property follows from the differential form of

p' q = 1,

namely

p' dq + q' dp = 0 , yielding q' dp = − p' dq = − d ln Q.

From this property and from the definitions of g and G we can derive the
adding-up conditions as follows:

(3.11)

p' dq + q' dp
= p 'dq + q '( gp 'dq +Gdq )
= p 'dq + q 'g ( p 'dq )+ qGdq
= p 'dq (1+q 'g )+qGdq
=0

As a result, the adding up conditions will be defined by q' g = −1 and q' G = 0. The
property Gq = 0 can be named homogeneity condition because it ensures that a
proportionate increase in q is neutralized as far as this substitution effect is concerned.
The matrix G is obviously symmetric. It is moreover negative semi-definite of rank one
less than its order. This last property follows from the strictly quasi-concavity condition
of the underlying utility function, which implies that x' u qq x < 0 for all x ≠ 0 such that
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u q' x = 0 - see Barten and Böhm (1982). This condition is equivalent to x'Vx < 0 for all
x ≠ 0 such that p' x = 0. Then, we can write for y = ( I − qp' ) z as follows:

zGz = z '(I − pq')V ( I −qp') z = y 'Vy

(3.12)

This equation will be zero if and only if z is proportional to q , because then y = 0 .
Otherwise it is negative, since p' y = p' ( I − qp' ) z = 0. One consequence of this property
is the negativity of the diagonal elements of Antonelli matrix G .
The adding-up (q' g = −1) and homogeneity (Gq = 0) conditions for the vector g
and the Antonelli matrix G involve the vector of the variable quantities. It should be
noted that “Using the g and G as constants is then not very attractive, at least if one
wants to use these conditions as constraints on the parameter estimation” as Barten and
Bettendorf indicated.22
In differential inverse demand systems, the individual equation of equation (3.10),
dpi = g i d ln Q + ∑ g ij dq j , would be multiplied through by qi to obtain the following
j

equation:
(3.13)

qi dpi =hi d lnQ+∑hij dq j / q j
j

with hi = qi g i , and hij = qi g ij q j as constants. For the variable on the left-hand side we
⎛ dp
have qi dpi = qi pi ⎜⎜ i
⎝ pi

⎞
⎟⎟ = qi pi d ln pi = wi d ln p i . Equation (3.13) can then be written as
⎠

follows:
(3.14)

wi d ln pi =hi d lnQ+∑hij d ln q j
j

_________________________
22

A similar situation occurs for a regular demand system in differentials. Theil (1965) proposed to multiply
the ith regular demand equation through by pi to arrive, after some rearrangements, at a choice of

constants which satisfy the usual conditions in a natural way. The resulting system is known as the
Rotterdam system.
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Equation (3.14) is the inverse analogue of the regular Rotterdam demand system. It is
named the differential inverse Rotterdam demand system (DIRDS).
In equation (3.14), we can define adding up, homogeneity, and symmetry of hi and hij
with negativity condition as follows:
(3.15)

∑h =−1

(Adding up)

∑h

=0

(Adding up)

∑h

=0

(Homogeneity)

i

i

(3.16)

ij

i

(3.17)

ij

j

(3.18)

hij = h ji

(3.19)

∑∑ x h
i

i

j

(Symmetry)
ij

xi <0 ∀x ≠ θ l , θ∈ℜ

(Negativity)

Actually, the differential inverse demand system of Laitinen and Theil (1979) is
somewhat different.23 It can be obtained by adding to both sides of equation (3.14)
wi d ln Q and treating the ci = hi + wi as constants. The variable on the left-hand side is

then modified as follows:
(3.20)

wi (d ln pi + d ln Q)
= wi (d ln p * i −d ln m+ d lnQ)
= wi (d ln p * i −d ln P)
= wi d ln( p * i / P)

with d ln m−d lnQ=d ln m−∑wi d ln qi =∑wi d ln pi* =d ln P , Divisia price index. We then
i

i

have another differential inverse demand system called the differential inverse CBS
demand system (DICBS) as follows:
_________________________

23

Laitinen and Theil (1979) showed that the inverse demand models can be formulated by means of the
Antonelli matrix or the reciprocal Slutsky matrix. The two approaches differ with respect to the price
deflator and the role of the Divisa quantity index.
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(3.21)

wi d ln( p * i / P) = ci d ln Q + ∑ hij d ln q j

i, j = 1,..., n

j

In equation (3.21), the dependent variable now involves the relative price of commodity

i rather than the normalized prices. Equation (3.21) relates to equation (3.14) as the
Central Bureau of Statistics regular demand system of Keller and Van Driel (1985) does
to the regular Rotterdam system.24 In equation (3.21), adding up, homogeneity, and
symmetry of ci and hij can be defined similarly with in DIRDS as follows:
(3.22)

∑ c = ∑ (h
i

i

i

(3.23)

+ wi ) = 0

(Adding up)

i

∑h

=0

(Adding up)

∑h

=0

(Homogeneity)

ij

i

(3.24)

ij

j

(3.25)

hij = h ji

(Symmetry)

Another variant is possible by adding wi (d ln qi − d ln Q) to both sides of equation
(3.21). On the left-hand side we then have, in view of equation (3.20),
wi (d ln p * i + d ln qi − d ln P − d ln Q) = wi d ln wi = dwi .

Consequently, we can get another type of inverse demand systems as follows:
(3.26)

dwi =ci d lnQ+∑cij d ln q j
j

with the cij = hij + wi δ ij − wi w j (where δ ij is a Kronecker delta) now treated as constants.
This is the differential inverse almost ideal demand system (DIAIDS), which is the

_________________________

24

Keller and Driel (1985) derived the CBS model, which combines the preferred Engel curve with the
simplicity of Slutsky matrix, including the ease of implementing concavity and other restrictions. The
model is based on the PIGLOG Engel curve and constant Slutsky coefficients.
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inverse analogue of the linear version of the regular differential Almost Ideal Demand
System (AIDS) of Deaton and Mullbauer (1980).25
In equation (3.26), the adding up, homogeneity, and symmetry conditions of ci and
cij can be defined as follows:

∑ c = ∑ (h

(3.27)

i

i

(3.28)

∑c

ij

∑c

ij

i

(3.29)

j

i

+ wi ) = 0

(Adding up)

i

= ∑ (hij + wi δ ij − wi w j ) = 0

(Adding up)

= ∑ (hij + wi δ ij − wi w j ) = 0

(Homogeneity)

i

j

cij = c ji , or (hij + wi δ ij − wi w j ) = (h ji + w j δ ji − w j wi )

(3.30)

(Symmetry)

Another variant is possible by subtracting wi d ln Q from both sides of equation
(3.26), which will lead to another type of differential inverse demand system which is as
follows:
(3.31)

dwi −wi d lnQ=hi d lnQ+∑cij d ln q j
j

This is the differential inverse NBR demand system (DINBR), which is the inverse
analogue of the linear version of the regular differential NBR demand system of Neves
(1994).26 In equation (3.31), the adding up, homogeneity, and symmetry conditions of hi
and cij can be defined as follows:

_______________________

25

Deaton and Mullbauer (1980) introduced the AIDS model, in which the budget shares of the various
commodities are linearly related to the logarithm of real total expenditure and the logarithms of relative
prices. The model is shown to possess most of the properties usually thought desirable in conventional
demand analysis, and to do so in a way not matched by any single competing system.
26
Neves (1994) showed that the Rotterdam, AIDS, CBS, and NBR models constitute a class of differential
regular demand system.
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(3.32)

∑h =−1

(Adding up)

i

i

(3.33)

∑c

ij

∑c

ij

i

(3.34)

j

(3.35)

= ∑ (hij + wi δ ij − wi w j ) = 0

(Adding up)

= ∑ (hij + wi δ ij − wi w j ) = 0

(Homogeneity)

i

j

cij = c ji , or (hij + wi δ ij − wi w j ) = (h ji + w j δ ji − w j wi )

(Symmetry)

There is not a parallel to the negativity condition in this case, however. Clearly,
DICBS and DINBR are crosses between DIRDS and DIAIDS (Barten and Battendorf,
1989). With these four inverse demand systems, economists have constructed a more
flexible inverse demand system wherein others are nested. The development follows, in
the inverse demand context, a suggestion by Barten (1993). The extension of Bartern’s
method to inverse demand systems was recorded independently by Brown, Lee, and
Seale (1995) and by Park (1996). An application can be found in Eales, Durham, and
Wessells (1997). Barten’s motivation for combining models is that, empirically, a
particular coefficient in one model may perform better than its counterpart in other
models. This motivates interest in combinations of models that allow the data to choose
the forms for specific effects.
As just seen in equation (3.14), (3.21), (3.26), and (3.31), the left-hand sides in the
four differential inverse demand systems are different, while the right-hand sides are
linear in the same variables. This allows the four systems to be written as follows:
(3.36) DIRDS:

y iR = X ' Π iR + ε iR

DICBS:

y iC = X ' Π Ci + ε iC

DIAIDS:

y iA = X ' Π iA + ε iA

DINBR:

y iN = X ' Π iN + ε iN

A linear combination of the four systems can be written as follows:
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(3.37)

a R y iR + aC y iC + a A y iA +a N y iN = X 'Π i +ε i

where Π = a R Π iR + aC Π Ci + a A Π iA + a N Π iN and ε i is a composite error. Normalizing the
sum of the a k weights to equal one yields:
(3.38)

y iR = X 'Π i + aC ( y iR − y iC )+ a A ( y iR − y iA )+ a N ( y iR − y iN )

Finally, note that the right-hand side differences in equation (3.25) are (i) exogenous and
(ii) collinear, which can be seen as follows:
(3.39)

y iC − y iR = wi d ln( pi* / P) − wi d ln( pi* / M ) = wi d ln Q
y iA − y iC = wi d ln( pi* q i / m) − wi d ln( pi* / P) = wi d ln(qi / Q)
y iN − y iA =dwi −wi d ln(Q)−dwi =− wi d lnQ

Equation (3.39) allows the hybrid system to be written in estimation form as follows:
(3.40)

y iR = X 'π i +θ1 ( y iR − y iC )+θ 2 ( y iR − y iN )

where θ1 = aC + a A and θ 2 = a N + a A . In terms of the underlying variables:
(3.41)

wi d ln pi =∑π ij d lnq j +π i d lnQ−θ1 wi d lnQ−θ 2 wi d ln(qi /Q)
j

=∑(π ij −θ 2 wi δ ij +θ 2 wi w j )d lnq j +(π i −θ1 wi )d lnQ
j

where π ij ≡(1−θ 2 )hij +θ 2 cij and π i ≡(1−θ 1 )hi +θ 1ci .
This basic nesting system of equations will be called the Generalized Inverse
Demand System (GIDS). The θ 1 and θ 2 parameters can be thought of as indicators of
DIAIDS scale and substitution effects. If θ 1 = θ 2 = 0, the DIAIDS effects are zero and
the GIDS reduces to the DIRDS. If θ 1 = θ 2 = 1, both DIAIDS effects are present and the
system becomes DIAIDS. If θ 1 = 1 and θ 2 = 0, the GIDS becomes the hybrid DICBS. If

θ1 = 0 and θ 2 = 1, the GIDS becomes the complementary hybrid, the DINBR.
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There are two sets of restrictions on the parameters of equation (3.41). As in
DIRDS, DIAIDS, DICBS, and DINBR, the restrictions of adding up, homogeneity, and
symmetry can be imposed for equation (3.41) as follows:
(3.42)

∑(π

ij

−θ 1 wi )=−1

∑(π

ij

−θ 2 wi δ ij +θ 2 wi w j )=∑π ij =0

(Adding up)

∑(π

ij

−θ 2 wi δ ij +θ 2 wi w j )=∑π ij =0

(Homogeneity)

(Adding up)

i

(3.43)

i

(3.44)

j

(3.45)

i

j

π ij =π ji

(Symmetry)

In the Rotterdam methodology, monotonicity and concavity cannot be easily
imposed. However, these restrictions can be easily reflected in the inverse demand
system whenever we can define the distance function as linear homogeneity and
concavity (see the distance function methodology). The scale and price flexibilities can
be derived easily from equation (3.41). The scale flexibility can be described as follows:
(3.46)

f i =π i / wi −θ1

(Scale flexibility)

The price flexibilities can be described as follows:
(3.47)

f ij* =π ij / wi +θ 2 w j

(3.48)

f ii* =π ii / wi −θ 2 +θ 2 wi

(3.49)

f ij = f ij* + w j f i

(Compensated cross-price flexibility)
(Compensated own-price flexibility)
(Uncompensated price flexibility)

In equation (3.46) to (3.48), if θ 1 = θ 2 = 0, the DIRDS’s scale and price
flexibilities are turned on as follows:
(3.50)

f i = hi / wi

(DIRDS’s scale flexibility)

The DIRDS’s price flexibilities can be described as follows:
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(3.51)

f ij* = hij / wi

(DIRDS’s compensated cross-price flexibility)

(3.52)

f ii* = hii / wi

(DIRDS’s compensated own-price flexibility)

(3.53)

f ij = f ij* + w j f i

(DIRDS’s uncompensated price flexibility)

If θ 1 = θ 2 = 1, the DIAIDS’s scale and price flexibilities are turned on as follows:
(3.54)

f i =ci / wi −1

(DIAIDS’s scale flexibility)

The DIAIDS’s price flexibilities can be described as follows:
(3.55)

f ij* =cij / wi + w j

(3.56)

f ii* =cii / wi −1+ wi

(DIAIDS’s compensated own-price flexibility)

(3.57)

f ij = f ij* + w j f i

(DIAIDS’s uncompensated price flexibility)

(DIAIDS’s compensated cross-price flexibility)

If θ 1 = 1 and θ 2 = 0, the hybrid DICBS’s scale and price flexibilities are turned
on as follows:
(3.58)

f i =ci / wi −1

(DICBS’s scale flexibility)

The DICBS’s price flexibilities can be described as follows:
(3.59)

f ij* = hij / wi

(DICBS’s compensated cross-price flexibility)

(3.60)

f ii* = hii / wi

(DICBS’s compensated own-price flexibility)

(3.61)

f ij = f ij* + w j f i

(DICBS’s uncompensated price flexibility)

If θ 1 = 0 and θ 2 = 1, the DINBR are turned on as follows:
(3.62)

f i = hi / wi

(DINBR’s scale flexibility)

The DINBR’s price flexibilities can be described as follows:
(3.63)

f ij* =cij / wi + w j

(3.64)

f ii* =cii / wi −1+ wi

(DINBR’s compensated cross-price flexibility)
(DINBR’s compensated own-price flexibility)
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(3.65)

f ij = f ij* + w j f i

(DINBR’s uncompensated price flexibility)

In order to confirm the availability for estimation of price flexibility and scale
flexibility for the nine types of fish used in this study, this study will not only utilize the
four individual inverse demand systems but will also employ the generalized inverse
demand system developed from the four inverse demand systems.
3.1.2. Distance Function Methodology

Even though the Rotterdam methodology is a convenient tool to generate a system
of inverse demand equations, the curvature conditions implied by economic theory
should be maintained to generate a theoretically consistent inverse demand system. In
view of such restrictions, it is useful to specify a distance function with a given level of
utility, u. Due to the relative ease with which curvature can be related to the properties of
the Antonelli matrix, the distance function is a convenient vehicle for generating inverse
demand systems incorporating structural features required for most welfare analysis
applications. Furthermore, since concavity (the curvature property of the distance
function) and monotonicity are preserved under addition and the nesting of increasing
concave functions, a straightforward way of generating wider classes of regular distance
functions is readily available (Wong and McLaren, 2005).
According to Shephard’s lemma, duality theory indicates that the compensated
inverse demand systems can be derived from the distance function via simple
differentiation. While these functions are conditioned on an unobservable variable
(utility), in most cases they do not have an explicit closed form representation as the
uncompensated inverse demand functions, that is, in terms of the observable variables
such as quantities.27 As McLaren, Rossiter, and Powell (2000) showed in the context of
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the expenditure function, the unobservability of utility need not hinder estimation.28 A
simple one-dimensional numerical inversion allows estimation of the parameters of a
particular distance function via the parameters of the implied inverse uncompensated
demand functions.
Like in the Rotterdam methodology, we can suppose that there exists a direct
utility function related to consuming a bundle of commodities, u = U (q ) , which is
assumed to be twice-continuously differentiable, increasing, and quasi-concave in q.
Assuming that consumers are price takers, consider the following optimization problem:
(3.66)

MaxU (q) s.t. p'q=1

The Hotelling-Wold identity gives the normalized uncompensated inverse demand
system b(q) . The result is as follows:
(3.67)

⎧
⎫
p u ={dU (q)/ dq}/ ⎨∑(dU (q)/ dqi )qi ⎬≡b(q)
⎩ i
⎭
Equation (3.67) is equivalent to equation (3.4). Inverse demands measure

marginal utility or marginal willingness to pay for commodities by consumers. In
equilibrium, marginal utility or marginal willingness to pay for a commodity equals its
market price.

_________________________

27

Compensated inverse demand system:

pc =

dD(u, q )
≡ a(u, q) , where a(u, q) is conditioned on an unobservable utility.
dq

Uncompensated inverse demand system:

pu =

dU (q)
≡b(q) , where b(q) has an explicit closed form in terms of the observable quantity variable.
dq

28

McLaren, Rossitter, and Powell (2000) describes a way to overcome the limitations in incorporating prior
ideas about the structure of preferences by using the cost function to generate Marshallian demand systems.
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Solving equation (3.67) for q gives the uncompensated direct demand system:
q = h( p ). Equivalently, it can be obtained explicitly from the normalized indirect utility

function V ( p) :
V ( p )≡max{U (q ): p 'q =1}

(3.68)

q

by using Roy’s identity. The result is as follows:
⎧
⎫
q=h( p)={dV ( p)/ dp}/ ⎨∑(dV ( p)/ dp) pi ⎬
⎩ i
⎭

(3.69)

Equation (3.69) is equivalent to equation (3.3).
The indirect utility function is continuous, decreasing, linearly homogeneous, and
quasi-convex in p. Equations (3.67) and (3.69) show that the uncompensated inverse and
direct demand systems have similar structures. However, while the inverse demand
system takes quantities as exogenous, the direct demand system treats prices as
exogenous. The duality between the direct and indirect utility functions suggests that the
direct utility function can be recovered from the indirect utility function. That is,
(3.70)

U (q )≡min{V ( p ): p 'q =1}
p

Given the direct utility function, the distance function D(u, q ) is defined as
follows:
(3.71)

D (u ,q )≡max{t >0:U (q /t )=u}
t

which gives the maximum amount by which commodity quantities must be deflated or
inflated to reach the indifference surface (Shephard, 1970). The utility function exists if
and only if D(u, q ) = U (q) / u = 1. The distance function is continuous, increasing,
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linearly homogenous, and concave with respect to q, and decreasing in u. Given the
distance function (3.71), the expenditure function E (u , p ) can be described as follows:
(3.72)

E (u , p)≡min{ p'q:D(u ,q)=1}
q

if and only if the distance function is defined as follows:
(3.73)

D(u,q )≡min{ p'q:E (u , p)=1}
p

(Shephard, 1970). The expenditure function is continuous, increasing, linearly
homogeneous, and concave with respect to p, and increasing in u. These results imply
that the distance function can be interpreted as a normalized expenditure function and
that the two functions are dual to each other.
Application of Shephard’s lemma to the distance function yields the compensated
inverse demand system a(u, q) :
(3.74)

p c =dD(u ,q)/ dq≡a(u ,q)

dp in equation (3.7) could be also derived from equation (3.74).

Unlike uncompensated inverse demands, compensated inverse demands are
defined with the level of utility held constant. Linear homogeneity of D(u, q ) implies that
a(u, q) is homogeneous of degree zero in q , which condition is equivalent to Gq = 0 in

the Rotterdam methodology. The concavity implies that a(u, q ) is negative and
symmetric, i.e., da(u, q) / dq < 0 and dai (u , q ) / dq j = da j (u , q) / dqi
homogeneity of p c implies
(3.75)

∑η

c
ij

=0

i
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(i ≠ j ). Zero

where η ijc ≡ d ln ai (u , q ) / d ln q j , compensated price flexibility , with ηiic < 0 and sign
(ηijc ) = sign (η cji ) (i ≠ j ). Two goods i and j are net q-complements if ηijc > 0 and net q-

substitutes if ηijc < 0 . η ijc is corresponding to π ij (or hij , c ij ) which is the substitution
effect estimated by the Rotterdam methodology.
In addition, solving equation (3.74) for q implicitly gives the compensated direct
demand system q c = h(u , p ), which is equivalently obtained explicitly by applying
Shephard’s lemma to the expenditure function. The result is as follows:
(3.76)

q c =h (u, p)=dE (u, p)/ dp

Thus the compensated inverse and direct demand systems have similar structures, the
difference being whether prices or quantities are exogenous.
To derive the relationship between compensated and uncompensated inverse
demands, equate p u = b(q) and p c = a(u, q) and substitute u = U (q) into equation
(3.74) to obtain
(3.77)

b(q)≡a(u,q)=a (U (q),q)

Individual equation of equation (3.77) for commodity i can be expressed as follows:
(3.78)

bi (q )≡ai (u ,q )=ai (U (q ),q )

Now, partial differentiation of both sides of equation (3.78) with respect to q j
yields the Antonelli matrix of the price effect of a quantity change into the substitution
and scale effects as follows:
(3.79) ∂bi (q )/ ∂q j =∂ai (u ,q )/ ∂q j +(∂ai (u ,q )/ ∂u )(∂U (q )/ ∂q j )
In elasticity form, equation (3.79) becomes
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(3.80) ∂lnbi (q )/ ∂ln q j =∂ln ai (u ,q )/ ∂ln q j +(∂ln ai (u ,q )/ ∂lnu )(∂lnU (q )/ ∂ln q j )
∂ln ai (u ,q )/ ∂ln q j =∂lnbi (q )/ ∂ln q j −(∂ln ai (u ,q )/ ∂lnu )(∂lnU (q )/ ∂ln q j )
η ijc =η ij −S j μ i
where

η ij ≡ ∂ ln bi (q) / ∂ ln q j

is

uncompensated

price

flexibility,

and

μ i ≡ (∂ ln a i (u , q) / ∂ ln u )(∑i∂ ln U (q) / ∂ ln qi ) is a scale flexibility, with S j (expenditure
share of the jth goods) = p j q j = (∂ ln U (q) / ∂ ln q j ) /(∑ j ∂ ln U (q ) / ∂ ln q j ). Two goods i
and j are gross q-complements if η ij > 0 and gross q-substitutes if η ij < 0. For a normal
good, a change in quantities has a negative scale effect, i.e., μ i < 0, with μi = −1 for
homothetic preferences. This implies that the uncompensated inverse demand is more
quantity-elastic than the compensated inverse demand.
Since

∑ p q = ∑ b (q)q
i

i

i

(3.81)

∑η

ij

i

i

= 1, this implies the restriction on ηij :

i

S i =− S j

i

Summing equation (3.80) over j to satisfy equation (3.75) and noting that

∑S

j

= 1, we

j

obtain the restriction on μi :
(3.82)

μ i =∑η ij
j

which shows that the scale flexibility is obtained as the sum of the uncompensated price
flexibilities. Moreover, summing equation (3.81) over j, we obtain the restriction on
equation (3.82):
(3.83)

∑S μ =−1
i

i

i
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which says that the weighted sum of the scale flexibilities (with the weights given by the
expenditure shares) is equal to -1. Equation (3.83) is equivalent to equation (3.15) and
(3.32),

∑h

i

= −1 , equation (3.22) and (3.27),

i

∑(π

i

∑c

i

= 0 , and equation (3.42),

i

−θ 1 wi )=−1 in the Rotterdam methodology.

i

Equation (3.80) shows that when the expenditure share of a good is small or when
a change in quantities has no scale effects, i.e., μi = 0, the uncompensated and
compensated inverse demands coincide. An issue of great concern is under what
condition a change in quantities has no scale effects. This occurs when the indirect utility
function is quasi-linear. In the case of two goods, the quasi-linear indirect utility function
is of the form:
(3.84)

V ( p1 , p 2 )=α 1 f ( p1 )+α 2 p 2

where indirect utility is linear in p 2 but nonlinear with respect to p1 , which implies that
the (price) indifference curves are vertical translates of each other with respect to the p 2
axis.29 Following equation (3.70), minimization of equation (3.84) with respect to p1 and
p 2 subject to p1 q1 + p 2 q 2 = 1 yields ∂f ( p1 ) / ∂p1 = α 2 q1 / α 1 q 2 . This implies that the

inverse demand for q1 is independent of the scale of the quantities of q1 and q 2 , in
which case the uncompensated and compensated inverse demands for q1 coincide.

___________________

29

A quasi-linear indirect utility function does not imply, nor is it implied by, the quasi-linear direct utility
function which produces a zero income effect for the direct demand function.
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3.2. Consumer Welfare Measurement

When quantity changes, consumers may be made better off or worse off
depending on price and scale flexibilities which are estimated by one of either the
Rotterdam methodology or distance function methodology. The classical economic
measure of welfare change examined is consumer’s surplus. However, consumer surplus
can be an exact measure of welfare change only in special circumstances in which the
utility function of consumers is quasilinear as the study previously discussed in equation
(3.84). Therefore, more general methods for measuring welfare change are required.
These general methods will include consumer’s surplus as a special case.
If we can derive the inverse demand systems through using one of either the
Rotterdam methodology or distance function methodology, it can provide the general
method to exactly measure the change in consumer welfare. The theoretical review of the
inverse demand systems in the previous section is motivated by our interest in the price
and welfare effects of imports in fishery products. Typically, consumer welfare can be
measured by consumer’s surplus (CS) for which uncompensated flexibility is used, and
compensating variation (CV) or equivalent variation (EV) for which compensated
flexibility is used. As uncompensated flexibility overestimates the quantity effect on
price, in which the quantity effect includes both substitution and scale effects, the
consumer surplus is only an approximated measure. However, compensated flexibility
exactly measures the quantity effect in which the scale effect can be separated from the
substitution effect. As a result, compensating or equivalent variation can be used in this
study to exactly measure the effect of imports on consumer welfare. Figure 3.4 shows CV
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and EV in quantity space. Furthermore, the difference between CS and CV or EV can be
shown in Figure 3.5.
The flexibility estimated by the Rotterdam methodology or distance function
methodology provides a useful method to measure not only new price but also consumer
welfare resulted from change in quantity. For example, the new price resulting from a
change in quantity can be calculated as follows:
(3.85)

⎡
⎛ Δq ⎞⎤
p 1 = p 0 + Δp = p 0 ⎢1 + ( flexibility ) × ⎜⎜ 0 ⎟⎟⎥
⎝ q ⎠⎦
⎣

where Δq = q 1 − q 0 is the change in quantity.
CV is associated with a change in quantity from q 0 to q 1 . CV is calculated as follows:

(3.86)

⎡
⎛
p0 ⎞
CV =Δq ⎢ p 0 +0.5⎜ comp. flexibility× 0 ⎟Δq
⎜
q ⎟⎠
⎢⎣
⎝

⎤
⎥
⎥⎦

The area (a+b+c+d) in Figure 3.5 is CV. CV is the amount of additional (normalized)
expenditure required for the consumer to reach the initial utility level, u 0 , while facing
the new quantity of q 1 . When q 1 > q 0 , CV measures the willingness to accept. The
consumer is clearly better off while facing quantity q 1 if CV is greater than zero. In
contrast, when q 1 < q 0 , CV measures the willingness to pay. The consumer is clearly
worse off with facing quantity q 1 of CV is less than zero.
The equivalent variation (EV) of a change in the quantity from q 0 to q 1 is
calculated as follows:
(3.87)

⎡ 1
⎤
⎛
p0 ⎞
⎜
EV = Δq ⎢ p − 0.5 comp. flexibility × 0 ⎟Δq ⎥
⎜
q ⎟⎠
⎢⎣
⎥⎦
⎝
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The area (a+b) in Figure 3.5 is EV. EV is the amount of additional (normalized)
expenditure that would enable the consumer to maintain the new utility level u1 while
facing the initial quantity of q 0 . When q 1 > q 0 , EV measures the willingness to pay.
The consumer is clearly worse off with facing quantity q 1 if EV is greater than zero. In
contrast, when q 1 < q 0 , EV measures the willingness to accept. The consumer is clearly
better off with facing quantity q 1 if EV is less than zero. CV and EV are exact
(normalized) measures of welfare change.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the CV and EV associated with an increase in the quantity of
one good q j . The indifference curve is defined over price space characterized by the
indirect utility function (3.68). The slope of the budget line is the ratio of the commodity
quantities- q j / qi . From Roy’s identity, in equilibrium the slope of the (price)
indifference curve is equal to the ratio of the quantities. The initial equilibrium is at A.
With an increase in q j , the new equilibrium occurs at B. Note that CV is conditional
upon the utility level u 0 , while EV is associated with the utility level u 1 . When a change
in quantities has no scale effects, the two welfare measures coincide. In general, the
relationship between CV and EV cannot be ascertained.
Equations (3.85) and (3.86) suggest that CV and EV can be measured by the area
under the compensated inverse demand curve from q 0 to q 1 with the old and new utility
levels, respectively. For an increase in the quantity of one good, j, the compensated
inverse demand curve p cj = a j (u 1 , q ) lies below the compensated inverse demand curve
p cj = a j (u 0 , q ) because of the negative scale effect when the good in question is a normal
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good. This implies that EV is smaller than CV for an increase in the quantity of one good.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.5.
In contrast to CV and EV which can be described by the compensated inverse
demand function, consumer’s surplus is expressed in terms of the uncompensated inverse
demand functions. The quantity-based change in consumer surplus (CS) area (a+b+c), is
bounded by CV and EV and is calculated as follows:
(3.88)

⎡ 0
⎛
p0 ⎞
CS = Δq ⎢ p + 0.5⎜ uncomp. flexibility × 0 ⎟Δq
⎜
q ⎟⎠
⎢⎣
⎝

⎤
⎥
⎥⎦

For a normal good, the uncompensated inverse demand curve is steeper than that
of the compensated curve, implying that the CS associated with a change in quantities
from q 0 to q 1 is bounded from below by the CV and from above by the EV - see Figure
3.5. When the scale flexibility is zero, CS coincides with CV and EV, i.e., CS = CV = EV.
When a change in quantity has a scale effect, however, CS will bias the true welfare
change. For a normal good, the uncompensated inverse demand curve is steeper than the
compensated curve implying that the CS associated with a change in quantities is
bounded from below by the EV and from above by the CV so that (EV < CS < CV). Figure
3.5. portrays CS in relation to CV and EV, using the inverse demand curves. The price
axis pertains to a range of implicit prices corresponding to the domain of quantities being
considered. a j (u 0 , q ) and a j (u 1 , q ) are the two compensated inverse demand curves
corresponding to initial and new utility levels u 0 and u 1 , while b j (q) is the
uncompensated inverse demand curve. The initial situation is at A, given by p 0 and q 0 .
The final situation is at B, given by p 1 and q 1 . CV is shown by the area abcd under the
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compensated inverse demand curve a j (u 0 , q ). EV is the area ab under the compensated
inverse demand curve a j (u 1 , q ). CS is the area abc under the uncompensated inverse
demand curve b j (q), which is bounded by CV and EV.
The CS is a relevant welfare measure for quantity changes when preferences are
homothetic or when a quantity change has no scale effects. Homothetic preferences are,
however, unrealistic, and commodity demands are found to have pronounced scale
effects. Moreover, when many goods are considered, CS is not independent of the path of
quantities chosen for integration since the associated uncompensated inverse demands are
not symmetric in contrast to the compensated inverse demand functions associated with
CV and EV. This implies that CS is approximate welfare measure for quantity changes
relative to CV or EV. Nevertheless, CS is employed as the relevant measure for quantity
changes, especially in analysis of social welfare or welfare properties of market
equilibrium.30

_________________________

30

Hoteling (1938), in his pioneering study on welfare, addresses the relevance of total surplus defined as the
sum of consumer and producer surpluses as a social welfare measure, and shows that the required condition
is that the inverse demand and supply functions be integrable. The inverse supply or marginal cost
functions are integrable because they are symmetric. In the case of demand, the integrability conditions
hold only for the compensated inverse demand functions because they are symmetric. Hoteling, however,
does not consider the compensated inverse demand functions. An implication of this discussion is that the
conventional measure of total surplus based on the Marshallian consumer surplus derived from the
uncompensated inverse demand function is biased in relation to the exact measure derived from the
compensated inverse demand function.
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Figure 3.4. Compensating Variation and Equivalent Variation in Quantity Space.
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Figure 3.5. Welfare Measures of Change in Quantity.
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qj

3.3. Producer Welfare Measurement

As the producer’s profit might be affected by a change in price caused by a
change in quantity, producer welfare can be a critical issue related to the inverse demand
systems. The welfare of the producer could be measured through dual cost and profit
functions. For example, if there exists a production function assuming twice-continuously
differentiable, increasing, and quasi-concave in x , a vector of inputs whose elements are
xi (i = 1,..., n) and producer as price taker, the general form of the cost minimization
equation can be defined as follows:
(3.89)

Min ri xi

s.t. q j = F ( xi )

where ri is a vector of input prices and xi is a vector of inputs.
Its solution, as summarized by the Lagrangian first order condition, gives the dual cost
function,
(3.90)

c = C (ri , q j )

By using the given cost function, the cost flexibility, ψ j can be obtained as follows:
(3.91)

∂C (ri ,q j ) q j
⋅
∂q j C (ri ,q j )

ψ j=

Cost flexibility determines how a change in output level affects cost. That is, given
constant input prices, the cost of the domestic producer would vary according to the level
of production of q j . To measure quantitatively the impact of producer profit caused by a
change in quantity, a profit function is exemplified as follows:
(3.92)

v j = p j ⋅q j −C (ri ,q j )

In terms of short run, the profit will depend on the sign and size of price flexibility
because the producer cannot respond to a change in price in the short run. Therefore,
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when p j changes from p 0j to p 1j , the change in producer’s profit can be calculated as
follows:
dv j =v1j −v 0j =[ p 1j ⋅q 0j −C 0 (ri ,q 0j )]−[ p 0j ⋅q 0j −C 0 (ri ,q 0j )]=dp j q 0j

(3.93)

Consequently, if dp j > 0, the producer will be better off, while if dp j < 0, the producer
will be worse off.
In the long run, however, the price shock will be reflected in the production
process. When p j changes from p 0j to p 1j , the change then in profit can be calculated as
follows:
(3.94)

dv j =v1j −v 0j =[ p 1j ⋅q 1j −C 1j (ri ,q 1j )]−[ p 0j ⋅q 0j −C 0j (ri ,q 0j )]=(dp j −dc j )dq j

As we see in equation (3.94), the change in profit will depend on the sign and magnitude
of price flexibility along with cost flexibility. In general, cost flexibility is positive
because an increase in output requires more labor and/or capital. For the case of dpj > 0,
the producer will increase the profit by increasing production whenever dpj > dcj.
However, whenever dpj < dcj, the producer will reduce the profit by increasing
production. For the case of dpj < 0, the producer will reduce the profit by increasing
production, while the producer will be better off by decreasing production.
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CHAPTER 4
ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY

Prior to quantitative estimation of inverse demand systems as developed in the
previous chapter, it is necessary to consider the stochastic properties of relevant
econometric models in selecting a desirable model, in which the estimated, unknown
parameters should be unbiased, consistent, and efficient. Especially as it is related to
estimating the parameters of quantity variables in the inverse demand systems, the
econometric model specification should be formed to reflect the features of stochastic
procedure and the data used in the study. This includes contemporaneous correlation of
disturbance terms in the equations of the system, singularity related to the adding up
condition in the budget share equations, the autoregressive process in the time series data,
and endogeneity in the inverse demand systems. In order to describe the stochastic
process of an econometric model, a disturbance term is added to each budget share
equation of the system. There is either an implicit or explicit correlation between the
disturbances in individual budget share equations of the system because of the
substitutability/complementarity of the fishery products used in the study. If the
disturbances are correlated with each other, then any one of the single equation
econometric models is not at least efficient.
Owing to this drawback, single OLS or even GLS is not the best method to
estimate the parameters. Therefore, this study will basically use Zellner’s SUR because it
allows more flexible estimation than the single equation model. However, in using a SUR
model, many other stochastic issues should be solved to get a consistent and efficient
estimation. Related to the adding up condition in budget share equations, singularity is a
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critical problem because in that if the covariance matrix of disturbance terms is also
singular it is not possible to use a SUR model to estimate the unknown parameters in the
system of equations. In a later sub-section, the study will discuss that issue more in detail.
Serial correlation should also be considered when specifying the econometric model
because time series data of quantity and price for the fish were used in the study.
Furthermore, autocorrelation will create difficulty in estimating the unknown parameters
with singularity of the covariance matrix of disturbance terms of the system equations.
Fortunately, Berndt and Savin (1975) thoroughly explained this issue. The study will
discuss this in more detail using as a basis of Berndt and Savin’s paper.
One of the distinguishing features of inverse demand systems is that quantity is
predetermined. However, fish imports and domestic landings are presumed to respond to
price incentives so that the tests for endogeneity would be in order to confirm whether or
not the inverse demand system is more desirable than the regular demand system.
Endogeneity can be tested utilizing the Wu-Hauseman test. Other related issues will also
be discussed in the future.
4.1. Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)

Given a set of regression equations, the problem of efficiently estimating
regression coefficients should be considered. For each equation in the set, the classical
ordinary least-squares method (applied equation-by-equation) yields the most efficient
coefficient estimators. However, if the disturbance in each equation is correlated with
each other, system of estimation procedure yields coefficient estimators, at least
asymptotically, more efficient than single-equation least-squares estimators. In this sub-
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chapter, the study will discuss the stochastic description of the system estimator implying
that the regression coefficients in all equations are estimated simultaneously.
In order to construct such estimators, the study will employ a restricted Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (SUR). As Zellner (1962) described, SUR can be applied in the
analysis of data provided by budget share study when regressions for several
commodities are to be estimated. Further, we can restrict the parameters of variables used
in the equations. For example, as we discussed in the previous chapter, adding-up,
symmetry, and homogeneity conditions can also be imposed on SUR.
As a vehicle for introducing Zellner’s SUR, let us define SUR as follows:
(4.1)

y it = X it β it + ε it

where i = 1,2,..., M , and t = 1,2,..., T . Therefore, y it is a MT × 1 vector of observations
on the dependent variables, X it is a MT × MK matrix with rank K of observation on K
independent nonstochastic variables, β it is a MK × 1 vector of regression coefficients,
and ε it is a MT × 1 vector of random error terms. Equation (4.1) may be written in matrix
form as follows:
1
L x11K
⎡ x11
⎤ ⎡ β11 ⎤
⎡ y11 ⎤
⎡ ε 11 ⎤
⎢ M M M
⎥ ⎢
⎢ M ⎥
⎢ M ⎥
⎥
⎢
⎥ ⎢ M ⎥
⎢
⎢
⎥
⎥
⎢ x11T L x1KT
⎥ ⎢ β 1K ⎥
⎢ y1T ⎥
⎢ ε 1T ⎥
K
⎢
⎥ ⎢ β 21 ⎥
⎢ y 21 ⎥
⎢ ε 21 ⎥
x121 L x 21
⎢
⎥ ⎢
⎢
⎢
⎥
⎥
⎥
M M M
⎥ ⎢ M ⎥ + ⎢ M ⎥
⎢ M ⎥ = ⎢
⎢
⎥ ⎢β ⎥
⎢ y 2T ⎥
⎢ ε 2T ⎥
x12T L x 2KT
⎢
⎥ ⎢ 2K ⎥
⎢
⎢
⎥
⎥
O
M ⎥
M ⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢ M ⎥
⎢
⎢
x 1M 1 L x MK 1 ⎥ ⎢ β M 1 ⎥
⎢
⎢ yM1 ⎥
⎢ε M 1 ⎥
⎢
⎢ M ⎥
⎢ M ⎥
M M M ⎥ ⎢ M ⎥
⎢
⎥ ⎢
⎢
⎢
⎥
⎥
⎥
K
x 1MT L x MT
⎢⎣
⎥⎦ ⎣ β MK ⎦
⎣ y MT ⎦
⎣ε MT ⎦

( MT × 1)

( MT×MK )
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( MK × 1) ( MT × 1)

We can compactly describe the system equation at time t as follows:

(4.2)

⎡ y1 ⎤ ⎡ X 1
⎢y ⎥ ⎢
⎢ 2⎥=⎢
⎢ M ⎥ ⎢
⎢ ⎥ ⎢
⎣ yM ⎦ ⎣

X2

⎤ ⎡ β1 ⎤ ⎡ ε 1 ⎤
⎥⎢ β ⎥ ⎢ ε ⎥
⎥⎢ 2 ⎥ + ⎢ 2 ⎥
⎥⎢ M ⎥ ⎢ M ⎥
O
⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
X M ⎦ ⎣ β M ⎦ ⎣ε M ⎦

Now, we write more briefly as follows:
(4.3)

y = Xβ + ε

where y=[ y1' , y 2' ,..., y M' ] , β =[β1' ,β 2' ,...,β M' ] , ε =[ε 1' ,ε 2' ,...,ε M' ] , and X represents the
'

'

'

block-diagonal matrix on the r.h.s. of (4.2). The disturbance vector in (4.1) and (4.3) is
assumed to have the following variance covariance matrix:

(4.4)

⎡ δ 11 I δ 12 I
⎢δ I δ I
22
V (ε i ) = ⎢ 21
⎢ M
M
⎢
⎣δ M 1 I δ M 2

L δ 1M I ⎤ ⎡ δ 11 δ 12
L δ 2 M I ⎥⎥ ⎢⎢ δ 21 δ 22
=
L
M ⎥ ⎢ M
M
⎥ ⎢
L δ MM I ⎦ ⎣δ M 1 δ M 2

L δ 1M ⎤
L δ 2 M ⎥⎥
⊗ I = ∑c⊗ I = Ω
L
M ⎥
⎥
L δ MM ⎦

where I is a unit matrix of order T × T and δ ii ' = E (ε it ε it' ) for t = 1,2,..., T and i , i '
=1,2,...,M . In a temporal, cross-section regression, t represents time and equation (4.3)

implies constant variances and covariances from period to period as well as the absence
of any auto or serial correlation of disturbance terms. The δ ii ' with i = i ' are then the
variances (and with i ≠ i ' the contemporaneous covariances of the disturbance terms (or
dependent variables) for any time period.
In a single cross section budget share equation of each commodity where t
represents the t’th budget share of each commodity, and individual share equation
explains expenditure share on a particular commodity, δ ii is the covariance between the
disturbance term in the share equations for commodity i and that in the share equations
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for commodity i ' while δ ii is the variance of the disturbance term in the share equation
for expenditure on commodity i.
The form of (4.4) implies that the δ ii ’s are the same for all budget shares and that
there is no correlation between different budget shares’ disturbances. The assumption is a
very critical one related to singular equation and autoregressive process in using time
series data in the budget share equations. If this assumption not satisfied, we will
encounter problems in estimating the parameter vector for the budget share equations.
Later, we will discuss this in more detail. Lastly, t stands for the particular point of time
and the form of (4.3) is such that there is correlation between disturbances or dependent
variables related to a particular point of time, t but not to a different point of time, s

(t ≠ s). It is referred to as the “contemporaneous covariance matrix.” The
contemporaneous covariance might come from either the substitutability or
complementarity of fish used in the study. Also disturbance variances and covariance are
assumed to be constant from period to period.
4.2. SUR with Cross Equation Restrictions

We have discussed in the previous section, an unrestricted SUR framework under
the assumption that the β i ’s are unrelated across equations. When systems of equations
are used in economics, especially for modeling budget share equations, there are often
cross equation restrictions on the parameters. Such models can still be written in the
general form covered in (4.3) and so they can either be estimated by system OLS or
FGLS. We still refer to such systems as SUR systems, even though the equations are now
obviously related, and system OLS is no longer OLS equation-by-equation. For example,
consider the two-equation population model as follows:

77

(4.5)

y1 =γ 10 +γ 11 x11 +γ 12 x12 + β1 x13 + β 2 x14 +ε 1
y 2 =γ 20 +γ 21 x 21 + β 1 x 22 + β 2 x 23 +γ 24 x 24 +ε 2

where we have imposed cross equation restrictions on the parameters in the two
equations because β 1 and β 2 show up in each equation. We can put this model into the
form of equation (4.2 or 4.3) by defining X and β appropriately. For example, define

β =[γ 10 ,γ 11 ,γ 12 ,β 1 ,β 2 ,γ 20 ,γ 21 ,γ 24 ] ’ which we know must be an 8 × 1 vector because there
are 8 parameters in this system. The order in which these elements appear in β is up to
us, but once β is defined, X must be chosen accordingly. For each observation i , define
the 2 × 8 matrix as follows:
(4.6)

⎡1 xi11
X =⎢
⎣0 0

xi12
0

xi13
xi 22

xi14
xi 23

0 0
1 xi 21

0 ⎤
xi 24 ⎥⎦

Multiplying X by β gives equation (4.5).
In applications such as the previous example, it is fairly straightforward to test the
cross equation restrictions, especially using the sum of squared residuals statistics. To
obtain the statistic, we would use the unrestricted estimates to obtain Ω̂ , and then obtain
the restricted estimates using Ω̂ . The statistic is calculated as follows:
(4.7)

M
a
−1
−1
⎛M ~
⎜∑εi Ω
ˆ ε~i' ⎞⎟ − ⎛⎜ ∑ εˆi Ω
ˆ εˆi' ⎞⎟ ~ χ Q2
⎝ i =1
⎠ ⎝ i =1
⎠

where ε~i denote the residuals from restricted system OLS (with Q restrictions imposed
on β ), εˆi is the residuals from unrestricted model, respectively. The statistic in (4.7) is
the difference between the sum of squared residuals from the restricted and unrestricted
models, but it is just as easy to calculate (4.7) directly. Gallant (1987) has found that an F
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statistic has better finite sample properties. The F statistic in this context is defined as
follows:
(4.8)

M
M
−1
−1
−1
⎡⎛ M
⎤
F = ⎢⎜ ∑ ε~i Ω
ˆ ε~i' ⎞⎟ − ⎛⎜ ∑ εˆi Ω
ˆ εˆi' ⎞⎟ ⎛⎜ ∑ εˆi Ω
ˆ εˆi' ⎞⎟⎥ [TM − K ] Q
⎠ ⎝ i =1
⎠ ⎝ i =1
⎠⎦
⎣⎝ i =1

4.3. Singular Variance Matrices in SUR System
In the discussion so far we have assumed that the variance-covariance matrix, Ω ,
of ε i is nonsingular. In budget share applications this assumption is not always true in the
original structural equations because of the adding up condition. For example, let us
suppose that there are three fishery products. Because of different prices and quantities
consumed of each product, the individual budget share will be different. Now, define one
particular set of the individual budget share equations in terms of the quantity as follows:
(4.9)

w1 = β 10 + β11 ln q1 + β 12 ln q 2 + β 13 ln q3 +ε 1
w2 = β 20 + β12 ln q1 + β 22 ln q 2 + β 23 ln q3 +ε 2
w3 =β 30 + β13 ln q1 + β 23 ln q 2 + β 33 ln q3 +ε 3

where the symmetry restrictions (from consumption theory) have been imposed. For a
SUR analysis we would assume that
(4.10)

E (ε i | qi ) = 0

where ε i ≡ (ε 1 , ε 2 , ε 3 )' and qi ≡ (q1 , q 2 , q3 )'. Because the budget shares must sum to
unity for each i,

β 10 + β 20 + β 30 = 1,

β 11 + β12 + β 13 = 0,

β 21 + β12 + β 23 = 0,

β 31 + β 32 + β 33 = 0, and ε 1 + ε 2 + ε 3 = 0. This last restriction implies that Ω ≡ Var(ε i )
has rank two. Therefore, we can drop the last equation and analyze the equations for w1
and w2 . We can describe the restrictions on β in these first two equations as follows:
(4.11)

β 13 =− β 11 − β12
β 23 =− β 21 − β 22
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Using the algebraic fact that ln(a / b) = ln(a ) − ln(b), we can plug (4.11) into (4.9) to get
(4.12)

w1 = β10 + β 11 ln(q1 / q3 )+ β 12 ln(q 2 / q3 )+ε 1
w2 = β 20 + β12 ln(q1 / q3 )+ β 22 ln(q 2 / q3 )+ε 2

We now have a two-equation system with variance matrix of full rank, with unknown
parameters β 10 , β 20 , β 11 , β 12 , and β 22 . To write this in the form (4.3), redefine ε =(ε 1 ,ε 2 )'
and w=( w1 ,w2 )'. Take β = ( β 10 , β 11 , β 12 , β 20 , β 22 )' and then X must be
(4.13)

0 ⎤
⎡1 ln(q1 / q3 ) ln(q 2 / q3 ) 0
X =⎢
0
ln(q1 / q3 ) 1 ln(q 2 / q3 ⎥⎦
⎣0

This formulation imposes all the conditions implied by inverse demand theory.
This model could be extended in several ways. The simplest of them would be to
allow the intercepts to depend on commodity characteristics such as seasonality. For each
commodity i, let z i be a 1 × J vector of observable commodity characteristics, where
z i1 ≡ 1. Then we can extend the model to

(4.14)

w1 = z i δ1 + β 11 ln(q1 / q3 )+ β 12 ln(q 2 / q3 )+ε 1
w2 = z i δ2 + β 12 ln(q1 / q3 )+ β 22 ln(q 2 / q 3 )+ε 2

where E (ε i | z i , q1 , q 2 , q3 ) = 0 .
Because we have already reduced the system down to two equations, theory implies no
restrictions on δ1 and δ2 . However, in equation (4.9), we need additional restrictions on
parameters, δi like δ1 + δ2 + δ3 =0 .

4.4. Singular Equation Systems with Autoregressive Disturbances
In the previous section, the study showed that when disturbances are serially
independent, SUR estimates of the parameters in the complete n-equation system can be
derived from SUR estimation of n-1 equations: moreover, these SUR estimates are
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invariant to the equation deleted. However, Berndt and Savin (1975) found that the
adding up property of shares imposes restrictions on the parameters of the autoregressive
process. When these restrictions are not imposed, the specification of the model is
conditional on the deleted equation. As a result, the SUR estimates of the parameters are
no longer invariant to the deleted equation. Furthermore, singularity of the
contemporaneous covariance matrix raises issues concerning the identification of
parameters of the autoregressive process.
For example, let us suppose that the disturbance of (4.3) is a sample from a
stationary vector stochastic process which satisfies the stochastic difference equation and
each dependent variable has the same independent variables as follows:
(4.15)

y t = X t β +ε t

(4.16)

ε t = Rε t −1 + et

t = 2,..., T

where y t is an M ×1 vector of dependent variables, X t is a K × 1 vector of exogenous
variables with unity as the first element, β is an M ×K matrix of unknown parameters,
and

the sequence e2 , e3 ,..., consists of independently identically distributed normal

random vectors with mean vector zero and covariance matrix Ω and where R=[Rij ] is an

M ×M matrix of unknown parameters.
Here it is assumed that y t satisfies the adding up condition
(4.17)

i' yt = 1

(t = 1,..., T )

where i is an M ×1 vector with all elements equal to unity. (4.15) and (4.17) imply
(4.18)

i ' β = [1 0 0 L 0]

and
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(4.19)

i' ε t = 0

Since ε t −1 and et are statistically independent, it follows from (4.16) and (4.19) that
(4.20)

i' R = k '

and
(4.21)

i ' et = 0

(t = 1,..., T )

Hence in the context of an autoregressive model the adding up condition (4.17) implies
that each column of R must sum to the same unknown constant k and that Ωi = 0 which
means that Ω is singular. Furthermore, if R is specified to be diagonal, then the
restriction of (4.20) requires that all diagonal elements be equal.
Now we delete the last equation from (4.15) and (4.16) gives
(4.22)

y tM =β M X t +ε tM

(t = 2,..., T )

ε tM = RM ε t −1 +etM

(t = 2,..., T )

and
(4.23)

where y tM and ε tM are the vectors y t and ε t with the last element deleted and β M and
RM are the parameter matrices β and R with the last row deleted. Since RM is not a

square matrix (it has order M −1×M ) , the SUR estimation procedure are not applicable to
(4.22) and (4.23). However, this difficulty can easily be remedied. Since i ' ε t = 0, we can
rewrite the stochastic difference equation (4.16) as follows:

(4.24)

⎡ ε 1t ⎤ ⎡ R11 − R1M L R1M −1 − R1M ⎤ ⎡ ε 1t −1 ⎤ ⎡ e1t ⎤
⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎥⎢
⎢ ε ⎥ ⎢ R −R
⎢ 2t ⎥ = ⎢ 21 2 M L R2 M −1 − R2 M ⎥ ⎢ ε 2t −1 ⎥ + ⎢ e2t ⎥
⎥⎢ M ⎥ ⎢ M ⎥
⎢ M ⎥ ⎢
M
M
⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎥⎢
⎢ ⎥ ⎢
⎣ε Mt ⎦ ⎣ RM 1 − RMM L RMM −1 − RMM ⎦ ⎣ε M −1t −1 ⎦ ⎣eMt ⎦

or more compactly,
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(4.25)

where

ε t = R ε tM−1 +et

(t = 2,..., T )

⎡ R11 L R1M −1 ⎤
⎥
⎢
R21 L R2 M −1 ⎥
R =⎢
⎢ M
M ⎥
⎥
⎢
⎣ RM 1 L RMM −1 ⎦

(it

has

order

M ×M −1)

and

Rij = Rij − Rij

(i =1,...,M ; j =1,...,M −1).
From (4.20) and (4.25) it follows that all columns of R sum to zero, i.e.,
(4.26)

R1 j + R2 j +...+ RMj =0

Now it is readily apparent that (4.22) combined with
(4.27)

ε tM = RM ε tM−1 +etM

(t = 2,..., T )

where RM is the matrix R with the last row deleted, can be estimated using SUR
procedure. Hence the parameter matrices β M , RM , and Ω M have a unique SUR estimate
and using these estimates we can obtain SUR estimates of the full parameter matrices β ,
R and Ω . To obtain invariant SUR estimates to the equation deleted, the R in (4.16)

should be diagonal and R11 = R22 =...= RMM . If the R is diagonal and R11 ≠ R22 ≠...≠ RMM , then
the SUR estimates will vary with the equation deleted.

4.5. Endogeneity in Supply and Demand Framework
4.5.1. Demand Normalization and the Consistency of Least Squares
In models where demand adjusts to current price shocks but supply does not, the
choice of the dependent variable is crucial for estimation and for economic interpretation.
For example, the main motivation behind estimating an inverse demand system is that
imports of fish are naturally taken to be predetermined. While fish supply is presumed to
respond to price incentives, actual imports are not likely to be influenced by random
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disturbance in the short run price. However, one might question this assumption.
Therefore, consider a model where price and quantity are determined simultaneously, in
which it matters little whether either price or quantity is placed on the left-hand side in
the demand equation. And then define the system of the demand and supply as follows:
(4.28)

ϑ1 qt +ϑ2 pt = X t' β +et :

Demand

(4.29)

ϕ1 qt +ϕ 2 pt = Z t'α +u t :

Supply

(4.30)

E[ X t' Z t' ]'[et u t ] = 0

(4.31)

E[et u t ] = 0

X t and Z t are column vectors of predetermined variables while β and α are

conformable coefficient vectors. All other variables and coefficients are scalars. The
demand shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated with the supply shocks.
There are two alternative restrictions on the system of equations (4.28) and (4.29)
which predetermine supply. Each of the two implies its own normalization of demand.
We have (i) direct demand equation and (ii) inverse demand equation as follows:
[Direct Demand Equation]

ϕ1 =0
(4.32)

qt =(1/ϑ1 ) X t 'β −(ϑ2 /ϑ1 ) pt +(et /ϑ1 )
qt =ϑpt + X t 'β1 +e1t

[Inverse Demand Equation]

ϕ 2 =0
(4.33)

pt =(1/ϑ 2 ) X t 'β −(ϑ1 /ϑ2 )q t +(et /ϑ 2 )
pt =(1/ϑ )qt + X t 'β 2 +e2t
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q t is predetermined in the inverse demand equation; it is decomposed by the

supply equation into a function of observable predetermined variables and an
unobservable variable which is uncorrelated with the demand disturbance. Similarly, the
supply equation predetermines pt in the direct demand equation.
The quantity-dependent equation (4.32) and the price-dependent equation (4.33)
can be consistently estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS). If an estimate of ϑ is
desired and the true structure is the inverse demand equation then the inverse of the OLS
slope coefficient from the price-dependent equation is consistent for ϑ . Under the same
circumstance, namely the truth of the inverse demand equation, OLS applied to a
quantity-dependent demand equation is inconsistent for both ϑ and ϑ −1 , in which a more
consistent technique would be to use an instrumental variables (IV) estimator on the
quantity-dependent demand equation. This is inferior to the inverted, price-dependent
OLS coefficient, on asymptotic variance grounds. Symmetric arguments hold if the
inverse demand equation is true. Consistent estimators of ϑ are obtained from OLS on
the price-dependent demand equation or from inverting the IV estimator from the
quantity-dependent demand equation. OLS applied to the quantity-dependent demand
equation is inconsistent for ϑ and for ϑ −1 .

4.5.2. Wu-Hausman Test
Consider a price-dependent demand equation wherein the endogeneity of the
quantity variable is at issue. The null hypothesis is stated as the inverse demand equation
restriction on the system of equations (4.28) – (4.31) as follows:
(4.34)

pt =(1/ϑ )qt + X t' β 2 +e2t
H 0 :Cov(qt ,e2t )=0 or ϕ 2 =0 in (4.29)
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The Wu-Hausman test indicates the consistency of the restricted SUR, but the
inconsistency of IV, under the null hypothesis. Specifically, the test measures the distance
between the SUR and IV estimators standardized by a variance estimator that is consistent
under the null hypothesis being tested. If the distance measured in this manner is large,
the estimators are judged to have different probability limits and H0 is deemed to be false.
If the distance is small, one concludes that the SUR and IV estimators are converging to
the same parameter and that H0 is true – see Thurman (1986).
In order to describe the test’s construction, let ϑ̂ be the estimator of ϑ from the
restricted SUR regression and ϑ * be an IV estimator of ϑ in the same inverse demand
equation specification. Let q=ϑˆ −ϑ * . The Wu-Hausman statistic is defined as follows:
(4.35)

a

T =(ϑˆ −ϑ * )'[Vˆ (q )]−1 (ϑˆ −ϑ * )~ χ q2

If Vˆ (q ) is a consistent estimator of Var(q) under H0 the T is asymptotically chi-square.31
The expression for T generalizes the demand equation example in that there could be
more than one variable whose predeterminedness is questionable.

4.5.3. Interpreting Wu-Hausman Test Results in a Demand Equation
The test of the inverse demand equation is seen to be a comparison of two
estimators of ϑ in (4.34). A large value for T rejects the null hypothesis of predetermined
quantity and, in the present context, rejects predetermined supply. Notice that the
particular notion of predetermined supply (direct demand equation or inverse demand
equation from the previous section) is fixed by the normalization of the demand.

_________________________

Construction of the test is made simple by noting that, asymptotically, Var ( q )=Var (ϑ * )−Var (ϑ )
under H0. See Hausman (1978) for a discussion.

31
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A Wu-Hausman test in a price-dependent demand equation can only test for
predetermined quantity, while in a quantity-dependent equation a Wu-Hausman test can
only test for predetermined price. The difference in the two null hypotheses is the
difference between a horizontal and a vertical supply curve. Consider the effects of
performing the test in equation (4.34) if supply truly is predetermined, but predetermined
in the sense of quantity supplied being unresponsive to current price. That is, assume the
true structure to be the inverse demand equation.
The Wu-Hausman test in this instance involves a comparison between two
estimators: the first being consistent and efficient under the null hypothesis of
predetermined quantities, but inconsistent under the alternate hypothesis of endogenous
quantities (the restricted SUR estimator) and the second being consistent under both null
and alternate hypotheses (restricted three-stage least squares or 3SLS). To implement the
3SLS estimator requires instrumental variables not already included in the right-hand
sides of the inverse demand equations and should be at least equal, in number, to the
number of variables in question.
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The inverse demand system approach is particularly useful in markets for fishery
and natural resource commodities where quantities available are regarded as being
predetermined rather than as being adjusted in the short run. In order to conduct empirical
analyses, the raw data on quantities and nominal prices were collected from the different
sources for each type of fish. The data for crawfish, shrimp, and oysters was obtained
from the National Marine Fisheries Service while the catfish data came from the National
Agricultural Statistics Service. The plots of quantity and nominal price are shown in
Figures 5.1 to 5.10. As shown in Figure 5.1, the wide range in domestic crawfish tail
meat supply in the 1990’s is attributed to the variation in the captive and cultured
harvests of live crawfish during this period. As Figure 5.2 shows, crawfish tail meat
imports have contantly increased with slight fluctuations since 1990. Figure 5.3 and 5.4
show that there appears overall an upword trend in total supplies (domestic plus imported
supplies) of both catfish and shrimp, respectively from 1980 to 2005. After peaking out in
1985, the total supply of oysters started decreasing and continued decreasing until 1992.
However, since 1992 total oyster supply has increased. Domestic crawfish price tended to
decrease between 1980 and 1995, then began increasing to levels that were generally
above those of 1980 and continued increasing until 2001. However, crawfish domestic
price decreased to 1980 level after 2001 (see Figure 5.6). Figure 5.7 shows the unit price
for imported crawfish tail meat from 1989 to 2005. The unit price for imported crawfish
tail meat was calculated by dividing the total value of imports by the total amount of
imports. In particular, the unit prices of imported crawfish tail meat after 2001 include
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antidumping tariffs because of the high tariffs rate during these periods. Figure 5.8, 5.9,
and 5.10 show the domestic prices of catfish, shrimp, and oysters, which are shown to
more relatively stable than the domestic crawfish tail meat price. The price data were
normalized before being used in the logarithmic equations of inverse demand systems.
Quantities are divided by their sample mean before the logarithmic transformation. As a
result, flexibilities will be estimated at quantity mean value.
Because estimation of a differential inverse demand system requires converting
the differential terms to finite changes, logarithmic differences are computed between
two consecutive years, and the averages of shares are taken for those same years. For
instance, dln pi is approximated to be d ln p i ≡ ln p i ,t − ln p i ,t −1 and the approximation of
wi is wi ≡( wit + wi ,t −1 )/ 2 , where subscript t indexes time. Furthermore, it is interesting to

note

that,

unlike

in

continuous

space,

where

∑w d ln p =q'dp=−d lnQ
i

i

t

⎛
⎞
⎜Q∑wi d ln wi =∑dwi =0 ⎟ , the left-hand sides of the finitely approximated equations do
i
⎝ i
⎠

not add up to exactly the same value as the right-hand sides, because

∑w Δln w ≠0 . To
i

i

i

maintain the adding up restriction, therefore, d lnQ are replaced with

∑w Δln p
i

i

instead

i

of ΔlnQ in the finite approximation.
To estimate the parameters of the GIDS, specifications must be modified to
reflect the discrete-time nature of the data and to accommodate for serial correlation in
the system’s disturbances. Equation (3.41) takes the following form:
(5.1) GIDS:

5

wit Δln pit =α i +∑π ij Δln q j +π i ΔlnQ−θ1 wit ΔlnQ−θ 2 wit Δln(qit /Qt )+ε it ,
j =1
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5

where Δ ln Q = ∑ w jt Δ ln q jt and wit = wit + wit −1 .
2
j =1
Depending on the values of θ1 and θ 2 in equation (5.1), equation (5.1) will be
turned into DIRDS, DIAIDS, DICBS, and DINBR as follows:
(5.2) DIRDS:

5

wit Δln pit =α i +∑hij Δln q j + hi ΔlnQ+ε it

(θ 1 =θ 2 =0)

j =1

(5.3) DIAIDS:

5

Δwit =α i +∑cij Δln q j +ci ΔlnQ +ε it

(θ 1 =θ 2 =1)

j =1

(5.4) DICBS:

5
⎛ p* ⎞
wit Δln⎜ i ⎟=α i +∑hij Δln q j +ci ΔlnQ+ε it
j =1
⎝P⎠

(5.5) DINBR:

Δwit − wit ΔlnQ=α i +∑cij Δln q j + hi ΔlnQ+ε it

5

(θ1 =1,θ 2 =0)

(θ 1 =0,θ 2 =1)

j =1

For estimation, the quantities are treated as exogenous, their covariance with
current and lagged disturbance terms taken to be zero. Under these assumptions, the
GIDS and the four other nested models can be estimated consistently using the
generalized least squares estimator, or equivalently, SUR estimator. The assumption of
predetermined quantities will be tested later using the Wu-Hauseman endogeneity test.
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Figure 5.1. Domestic Crawfish Tail Meat Supply: 1980 – 2005.
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Figure 5.2. Imported Crawfish Tail Meat Supply: 1980 – 2005.
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Figure 5.3. Catfish Supply: 1980 – 2005.
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Figure 5.4. Shrimp Supply: 1980 – 2005.
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Figure 5.5. Oysters Supply: 1980 – 2005.

95

2000

2005

1000kg

20.00
18.00
16.00
14.00
12.00
10.00
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

Year

Figure 5.6. Domestic Crawfish Tail Meat Price: 1980 – 2005.
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Figure 5.7. Imported Crawfish Tail Meat Price: 1980 – 2005.
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Figure 5.8. Domestic Catfish Price: 1980 – 2005.
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Figure 5.9. Domestic Shrimp Price: 1980 – 2005.
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Figure 5.10. Domestic Oyster Price: 1980 – 2005.
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2005

The demand theory restrictions of the adding up, homogeneity, and symmetry
conditions are imposed. Adding up implies singularity of the error variance-covariance
matrix, Ω , because

∑

5

ε it =0 . This can be imposed by dropping one of the equations as

i =1

discussed in Chapter IV. Further, adding up implies the following parametric restrictions:
5

∑α =0 .
i

i =1

Symmetry and homogeneity of the π ij , hij , and cij coefficients are also imposed.
Note that restricted SUR estimates of equation (5.1) to (5.5) are consistent and
efficient if the disturbances are serially independent. However, if the disturbances are
autocorrelated, SUR will not be efficient and the estimated standard errors will be
inconsistent as discussed in Chapter IV. Thus, a transformed model is estimated by a
FGLS procedure. Specifically, let the disturbances follow:
(5.6)

ε it = ρε it −1 +u it

i =1,...,5

In order to preserve the adding up condition, the autocorrelation coefficients are
constrained to be the same in all equations (see Berndt and Savin, p.954, 1975). Thus, if
the model detects serial correlation, then the FGLS procedure has three steps: (1) estimate
equation (5.1) to (5.5) by SUR; (2) estimate ρ in equation (5.6) with the adding up
restrictions from the SUR residuals; and (3) use the estimated parameters to transform the
model according to the autoregressive FGLS formula and apply SUR to the transformed
model.
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5.1. Empirical Data
5.1.1. Preview of Empirical Data Properties
Table 5.1 shows the fish types, the average shares of total expenditure and
quantity, and variations in expenditure and quantity over the sample periods, from 1980
to 2005.

Table 5.1. Fish Types, Shares and Variation in Total Expenditure and Quantity
Budget Share (wi)
Type of fish

Mean
%

a
b

$1,000

Qunatity (qi)

Minimum

Maximum

$1,000

$1,000

Mean
%

1000kg

Minimum

Maximum

1000kg

1000kg

1. Crawfish (D)a

0.41

13,655

1,902

41,661

0.26

1,586

121

4,500

2. Crawfish (I)b

0.52

17,028

0

123,131

0.25

1,538

0

7,101

3. Catfish

11.84

390,784

55,688

649,938

28.76

177,872

27844

302,516

4. Shrimp

84.55

2,790,824

1,120,757

4,448,097

68.11

421,259

252917

661,732

5. Oysters

2.68

88,549

51,325

143,615

2.63

16,246

9399

24,086

Indicates Domestic Crawfish Tail Meat
Indicates Imported Crawfish Tail Meat
From Table 5.1 we see that shrimp is associated with the highest average share in

total expenditure, at 84.55 percent. Catfish ranks second at 11.84 percent while other fish
take only a relatively small portion of total expenditure ranging between 2.68 percent for
oysters to 0.41 percent for domestic crawfish.
Average supplies by species, in 1000kg, are also reported in Table 5.1. Shrimp is
associated with the highest average supply, at 421,259 thousand kg. Catfish ranks second
at 177,872 thousand kg. Average supplies of domestic and imported crawfish are 1,586
and 1,538 thousand kg, respectively. Again there is considerable variation in quantity
supplied and price. In all, there appears to be sufficient variation in the data so that it
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should be possible to determine what systematic relationships exist among the demand
for these various fish products.

5.2. Testing Autocorrelation in a System Perspective
Table 5.2 contains the results of the system-wide specification test to assess the
adequacy of the fitted AR1 residual serial correlation model for the five different inverse
demand models used in the study. Edgerton and Shukur (1999) describe the Rao
generalization to systems of the Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation (see Edgerton
and Shukur, 1999, p346). Under the null hypothesis that an AR1 is an adequate
specification, the Breush-Godfrey statistic is distributed as an F(p,q) distribution, in
which p is the number of restrictions and q is degrees of freedom of denominator (n - k).
This study tested AR1 residual serial correlation for the five different inverse models
using systemwise Breusch-Godfrey tests.

Table 5.2. Test Statistics of Serial Correlation for Inverse Demand Models
Model

Estimated

Null

F

P-value

GIDS

-0.03830

0.02

0.8879

DIRDS

0.34778

1.61

0.2254

DIAIDS

-0.37567

2.20

0.1601

DICBS

0.06689

0.06

0.8054

DINBR

-0.11533

H 0 :ρˆ =0
H 0 :ρˆ =0
H 0 :ρˆ =0
H 0 :ρˆ =0
H 0 :ρˆ =0

0.20

0.6609

Table 5.2 shows the results of the test statistic for the models. All models do not
reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Therefore, the coefficients will be
estimated by SUR rather than FGLS.
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5.3. Nested Tests of the Generalized Inverse Demand Model
It is important to determine which of the nested inverse demand systems, if any,
fits the data. Thus, the study reports in Table 5.3, the estimated parameters θ1 and θ 2
from equation (5.1). The parameters θ1 and θ 2 are DIAIDS scale and substitution
indicators. If θ1 =θ 2 =1 , the GIDS reduces to the DIAIDS model. If θ1 =θ 2 =0 , the GIDS
reduces to DIRDS. As seen in Table 5.3, θ1 and θ 2 are close to one, implying a DIAIDS
form. Note, however, that θ1 and θ 2 are both statistically distinguishable from the
DIAIDS values of ones with showing relatively small standard errors of both θ1 and θ 2 .
Table 5.3. Estimated Mixing Parameters
Mixing Parameter

Standard Error

θ1 = 1.04315

(0.0245)

θ2 = 0.85708

(0.0448)

The study conducted joint likelihood ratio tests of the four hypotheses to confirm
whether the estimated θ1 and θ 2 are statistically different from one. As can be seen in
Table 5.4, the results of joint likelihood ratio tests of the four hypotheses that restrict the
GIDS to its constituent models reject the null hypotheses. Even though the estimated
values of θ1 and θ 2 suggest something like the DIAIDS model, the test restricting θ1 and

θ 2 to one in DIAIDS has a p-value of only 0.0033. These results are similar to those
found by other recent works in quite different empirical applications. For example,
Matsuda (2005) studied monthly Japanese fresh fish, meat, vegetables, and fruit
consumption data, fitting data utilizing inverse demand systems. In this study it is
indicated that the results of the Wald tests for nested models are adequate. Among the
null hypotheses of θ1 and θ 2 tested against the synthetic model. All four nested models,
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where both θ1 and θ 2 are fixed, are strongly rejected. Park, Thurman, and Easley (2004)
studied monthly fish consumption in the Gulf of Mexico and South Atlantic regions,
inducing movements along inverse demand curves. They found that even though the
estimated values of θ1 and θ 2 suggest the DICBS model, the test results strongly rejected
the null hypothesis.

Table 5.4. Test Statistics for Nested Models
Null
θ1=0
θ1=1
θ2=0
θ2=1

DIRDS
(θ1=0, θ2=0)
DIAIDS
(θ1=1, θ2=1)
DICBS
(θ1=1, θ2=0)
DINBR
(θ1=0, θ2=1)

F
758
(0.0001)
1.30
(0.2593)
153
(0.0001)
4.24
(0.0438)
390
(0.0001)
6.29
(0.0033)
104
(0.0001)
390
(0.0001)

Eales, Durham, and Wessells (1997) and Brown, Lee, and Seale (1995) showed
additional examples. They fit the GIDS model and, like this study, can reject the submodels such as DIRDS, DIAIDS, DICBS, and DINBR. But the mixing parameters
estimated in this study are similar to those that result in the DIAIDS model, which is a
different result from that of the other mentioned studies.

105

5.4. System Estimates
The main motivation for estimating an inverse demand system is that the supply
of fishery products is naturally taken to be predetermined. While fish supply is presumed
to respond to price incentives, actual imports and domestic supply are not likely to be
influenced by random perturbations in that price. Still, one might question this
assumption. Therefore, this study investigated the predeterminedness of quantities
supplied with a pair of Wu-Hausamn tests. The Wu-Hausman test in this instance
involves a comparison between two estimators: the first being consistent and efficient
under the null hypothesis of predetermined quantities, but inconsistent under the alternate
hypothesis of endogenous quantities (the restricted SUR estimator) and the second being
consistent under both null and alternate hypotheses (restricted three-stage least squares or
3SLS). The Wu-Hausman test statistic based on this structural model had a value of
16.19, which is less than the 10% critical value in the chi-square (16) distribution of
23.54. In sum, neither test of the predeterminedness of quantities could reject the null
hypothesis. The restricted SUR estimates reported in following tables are supported by
this evidence.
In order to estimate quantity effects on price, the study estimates scale and
Antonelli substitution coefficients by using the GIDS model as well as nested models
such as DIRDS, DIAIDS, DICBS, and DINBR. As the results of these nested tests shows,
the GIDS model is statistically fitted for these fish. However, this study estimates the
scale and substitution coefficients of the four nested models as for reference.
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5.4.1. Estimation of Scale Flexibility
Table 5.5.1 shows the results of the GIDS model. The last column of Table 5.5.1
gives the coefficients of determination (R2) as an indicator for model fit and DurbinWatson statistics as an indicator of first-order autocorrelation. The R2-estimates are
higher in the GIDS model than in any other of the nested models and none of the
equations appear to have first-order autocorrelation in the GIDS model.
Look first at the estimated scale flexibilities in Table 5.5.1, which have all been
estimated and are negative in sign. As the aggregate quantity increases, the normalized
price goes down. This is to be expected. As Barten and Bettendorf (1989) explained,
under the pi* , absolute prices stay constant, an increase in the aggregated quantity means
an increase of total expenditure m, hence a decrease in pi = pi* / m . The scale coefficients,

π i , can be converted into scale flexibilities by using equation (3.46). A value of -1 for
the scale flexibility means that the relative price and the sales share are constant. If
preferences are homothetic, all scale flexibilities would equal -1. The estimated values for
the scale flexibilities of the considered products are given in Table 5.5.1 together with
their approximate standard errors (in parentheses). The estimated scale flexibilities of
domestic crawfish and oysters are insignificantly different from -1, suggesting
homotheticity. However, the estimated scale flexibilities of imported crawfish, catfish,
and shrimp are significantly different from -1, implying the underlying scale curves differ
significantly from both linear and linear logarithmic forms.
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5.4.2. Estimation of Compensated Price Flexibility
5.4.2.1. Own Compensated Price Flexibility
Now consider the estimated Antonelli substitution or Quantity effects of Table
5.5.1. The own price flexibilities have all been estimated negatively. One observes that
these price flexibilities are relatively lower than that of Park, Thurman, and Easley
(2004), Holt and Bishop (2002), Eales, Durham, and Wessells (1997), and Barten and
Bettendorf (1989) but are about unit value except for catfish and shrimp. For example, a
1% increase in domestic crawfish quantity is associated with a 0.769% decline in
domestic crawfish price. The negative sign of own price flexibilities is closely related to
the negativity condition of Antonelli matrix. The estimated matrix is a negative
semidefinite matrix. The absolute value of the own price flexibility of oysters is the
largest among the five own price flexibilities, implying that the domestic oysters price is
more sensitive to a change in own good than the other fishery products. For example, a
1% increase in the quantity of oysters is associated with a 1.085% decline in the domestic
oysters price while 0.967% for imported crawfish, 0.554% for catfish, 0.102% for
shrimp, declined, respectively. However, the estimated own compensated coefficients of
domestic crawfish, imported crawfish, catfish, and shrimp are insignificantly different
from zero at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

5.4.2.2. Cross Compensated Price Flexibility
For the Antonelli matrix off-diagonal elements, representing between-species
substitution, 2 of the 10 cross effects are negative. A negative cross effect implies that the
increase in quantity of one good reduces the marginal valuation of another good and
induces consumers to consume less of that good. Notably, we see that imported crawfish
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is a substitute for domestic crawfish. A positive cross effect implies that the increase in
quantity of one good raises the marginal valuation of another good and induces to
consume more of that good. In this study, we see that the cross compensated price
flexibilities of catfish, shrimp, and oysters are positive, implying catfish, shrimp, and
oysters are complements to domestic crawfish. Among 10 cross effects, 5 cross effects
are statistically significant at least at α =0.1 . In particular, the cross effect of imported
crawfish for domestic crawfish is statistically significant at α =0.05 .
In order to precisely quantify the impacts of imported crawfish, catfish, shrimp,
and oysters on the domestic crawfish price, we can use the cross compensated price
flexibilities of these products. For example, the cross compensated price flexibility of
imported crawfish, -0.378, indicates that a 1% increase in quantity of imported crawfish
decreases the domestic crawfish price by 0.378%. The cross compensated price flexibility
of catfish, 0.986, indicates that a 1% increase in quantity of catfish increases the domestic
crawfish price by 0.986%. The cross compensated price flexibility of shrimp, 0.002,
indicates that a 1% increase in quantity of shrimp increases the domestic crawfish price
by 0.002%. The cross compensated price flexibility of oysters, 0.158, indicates that a 1%
increase in quantity of oysters increases the domestic crawfish price by 0.158%.
The study confirms the negative impacts of imported crawfish on the domestic
crawfish price. Furthermore, the scale flexibility of domestic crawfish, -1.24, indicates
that a 1% increase in quantities of domestic and imported crawfish, catfish, shrimp, and
oysters simultaneously decreases the domestic crawfish price by 1.24%. Although Table
5.5.1 shows that an increase in quantities of catfish, shrimp, and oysters has a positive
relationship with the domestic price of crawfish, it can be deduced that an increase in
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aggregated fish supply has a strong negative impact on the domestic crawfish price from
the result of scale flexibility.

5.4.3. Morishima Elasticity of Complementarity
As Barten and Bettendorf (1989) pointed out, interpreting similar results, “the
small number of negative cross effects, of which in this study 2 cross effects are negative
and 8 cross effects are positive, does not agree with the notion that most types of fish are
mutual substitutes.” However, the cross effects in the Antonelli matrix are biased toward
complementarity. That is, each row of the Antonelli matrix must average to zero because
of the property of homogeneity in the system of budget share equations and a good, being
a “substitute for itself,” has a negative own-price flexibility. As a result, complementarity
dominates over substitutability in the off-diagonal terms.
While the tendency of the cross-price flexibilities toward complementarity is
consistent with the more usual notion in a direct demand system that goods tend to be
substitutes for one another, a standardized measure of substitutability is more useful than
the price flexibilities themselves: the Morishima elasticity of complementarity.32 It is the
inverse demand system analogue of the Morishima elasticity of substitution. Table 5.6
presents the estimated elasticities from the flexibilities obtained by the GIDS model. The
Morishima elasticity of complementarity is defined as σ ij = f ji* − f ii* . It is the proportionate
change in the j, i compensated demand price ratio due to a 1% increase in the ith quantity.
_________________________
32

In order to see why this is the case, consider the effect on the optimal quantity ratio, qi/qj induced by a
percentage change in the price ratio, pi/pj. Suppose that this change is induced solely by changing the ith
price. This will cause the compensated demands, including qi, to change in a particular way. On the other
hand, this same percentage change in the price relative can be induced by changing only the jth price; but
all the compensated demands, including xj, will generally adjust differently in response to this price
change. Hence, in general, the percentage change in the ratio, qi/qj, depends upon how this price relative,
pi/pj, is changed (Blackorby and Russel, 1989).
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Table 5.6 shows the proportionate change in domestic crawfish and other goods
compensated demand price ratio due to a 1% increase in other goods quantity. For
example, the imported/domestic crawfish value of 0.664 indicates that a 1% increase in
the quantity of imported crawfish consumed results in a 0.664% increase in the ratio of
the domestic crawfish demand price to the imported crawfish demand price, all other
quantities and utility held constant. The catfish/domestic crawfish value is 0.588,
indicating that a 1% increase in the quantity of catfish consumed results in a 0.588%
increase in the ratio of the domestic crawfish demand price to the catfish demand price,
all other quantities and utility held constant. The shrimp/domestic crawfish value is
0.102, indicating that a 1% increase in the quantity of shrimp consumed results in a
0.102% increase in the ratio of the domestic crawfish demand price to the shrimp demand
price, all other quantities and utility held constant. The oysters/domestic crawfish value is
1.109, indicating that a 1% increase in the quantity of oysters consumed results in a
1.109% increase in the ratio of the domestic crawfish demand price to the oysters demand
price, all other quantities and utility held constant. The elasticities of complementarity in
Table 5.6 are all positive, reflecting both the tendency toward complementarity and the
negativity of the own-price flexibilities.

5.4.4. Estimation of Uncompensated Price Flexibility
5.4.4.1. Own Uncompensated Price Flexibility
Uncompensated flexibilities are given in Table 5.7.1. The absolute values of own
uncompensated flexibilities are greater than the absolute values of own compensated
flexibilities because of negative values of scale flexibility and own compensated price
flexibility. However, the absolute values of cross uncompensated flexibilities are
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dependent on the sign of the value of cross compensated price flexibility. If the cross
compensated price flexibility is positive, then the absolute value of cross uncompensated
price flexibility is less than the absolute value of cross compensated price flexibility,
implying the scale effect reduce the substitution effect. As this study discussed in Chapter
III, uncompensated price flexibility is the summation of both compensated price
flexibility and scale flexibility. As a result, the uncompensated price flexibility represents
the effects of scale and substitution as one. Table 5.7.1 shows the own uncompensated
price flexibilities of five fish. The own domestic crawfish uncompensated price flexibility
is estimated to be -0.774, implying a 1% increase in quantity of domestic crawfish
decreases the domestic crawfish price by 0.774%. The own imported crawfish
uncompensated price flexibility is estimated to be -0.980, implying a 1% increase in
quantity of imported crawfish decreases the imported crawfish price by 0.980%. The own
catfish uncompensated price flexibility is estimated to be -0.784, implying a 1% increase
in quantity of catfish decreases the domestic catfish price by 0.784%. The own shrimp
uncompensated price flexibility is estimated to be -1.895, implying a 1% increase in
quantity of shrimp decreases the domestic shrimp price by 1.895%. The own oysters
uncompensated price flexibility is estimated to be -1.131, implying a 1% increase in
quantity of oysters decreases the domestic oysters price by 1.131%.
As seen in Tables 5.5.1 and 5.7.1, own goods are shown to have negative effects
on their own price no matter what price is measured: compensated or uncompensated
demand price. However, due to negativities of own price flexibility and scale flexibility
the absolute magnitude of own uncompensated price flexibility is measured to be greater
than own compensated price flexibility.
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5.4.4.2. Cross Uncompensated Price Flexibility
The cross uncompensated price flexibilities for domestic crawfish are also shown
in Table 5.7.1. The cross imported crawfish uncompensated price flexibility for domestic
crawfish is estimated to be -0.384, implying that a 1% increase in quantity of imported
crawfish decreases the domestic price by 0.384%. The cross catfish uncompensated price
flexibility for domestic crawfish is estimated to be 0.840, implying that a 1% decrease in
quantity of catfish increases the domestic crawfish price by 0.840%. The cross shrimp
uncompensated price flexibility for domestic crawfish is estimated to be -1.047, implying
that a 1% increase in shrimp quantity decreases the domestic crawfish price by 1.047%.
The cross oysters uncompensated price flexibility for domestic crawfish is estimated to
be 0.125, implying that a 1% decrease in quantity of oysters increases the domestic
crawfish price by 0.125%. As seen in Tables 5.5.1 and 5.7.1, even though the cross
compensated price flexibility of shrimp is positive, the uncompensated flexibilities turned
out to be negative due to negative scale flexibilities of shrimp. In light of this, consumer
surplus, which is related to the uncompensated flexibility, miscalculates the consumer
welfare effect of quantity.

5.5. Welfare Measurements
The empirical work of the previous section is motivated by an interest in crawfish
imports. While the benefits of crawfish imports might come from the consumer side, by
way of lower domestic prices, the costs come from losses to domestic producers.
Therefore, the study is intended to measure both the benefits and costs of crawfish
imports. A theory of welfare measurement as to changes in quantity space has been
developed by Barten and Bettendorf (1989), and this current section is an empirical
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counterpart to that work. The study evaluates the welfare effects of crawfish imports by
calculating quantity-based compensating variations, consumer surplus and producer
surplus.
In order to measure consumer welfare, the study uses consumer surplus and
compensating variation based on uncompensated price flexibility and compensated price
flexibility estimated in the empirical models. Producer welfare is calculated using change
in net revenue of domestic crawfish processors. In measuring the change in net revenue
of domestic crawfish processors, the study uses price flexibility, cost flexibility of
domestic crawfish production, and quantity elasticity for imports of crawfish. Basically,
this study assumes that crawfish tail meat imports will affect both domestic price and
domestic production. The cost flexibility is estimated using crawfish processor cost data
from 1994 to 2002 reported by U.S. International Trade Commission in 2003. The cost
flexibility is estimated to be 1.6, representing a 1% increase in output increases cost by
1.6%, so that we see the domestic crawfish processors are not operating in economy of
scale, which characterizes a production process in which an increase in the scale of the
firm causes a decrease in the long run cost of each unit.
The import elasticity for domestic production is estimated using crawfish imports
and domestic production during the same period with the cost flexibilities. It is estimated
to be -0.057, representing that a 1% increase in crawfish imports decreases domestic
crawfish production by 0.057%. For welfare measurements, initial domestic price is
assumed to be the average price of the recent three years and the initial quantity of each
fishery good is assumed to be the average of the recent three years.
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5.5.1. Crawfish Imports Effects
Table 5.8.1 shows welfare changes for consumers, producers, and society
depending on change in crawfish imports. As the study indicated in the previous chapters,
it is the income effect that separates consumer surplus from compensating variation, and
income effect is determined by scale flexibility. The difference between consumer
surplus and compensating variation comes from the difference between uncompensated
and compensated price flexibilities. As we see in Tables 5.5.1 and 5.7.1, there is little
difference between own compensated price flexibility and own uncompensated price
flexibility of domestic crawfish, indicating a small scale flexibility which determines the
income effect. As a result, the consumer surplus shows that it is a reasonable
approximation for exact welfare measurement of consumer related to a change in
crawfish imports.
As expected, an increase in crawfish imports increases consumer welfare because
both cross compensated and uncompensated price flexibilities of imported crawfish are
negative. The result of the study shows that a 10% increase in crawfish imports increases
consumer surplus by $3,628,000. The other four nested models: DIRDS, DIAIDS,
DICBS, and DINBR models show similar results.
As mentioned previously, however, an increase in crawfish imports negatively
affects domestic crawfish producers’ income because of the negative price flexibility.
Furthermore, in order to ease their loss along with decreasing prices, domestic crawfish
processors should reduce volume of production. The empirical producer welfare change
is calculated by using change in the net revenue of domestic crawfish processors. As
Table 5.8.1 shows, an increase in crawfish imports decreases domestic crawfish
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processors’ net revenue. For example, the result shows that a 10% increase in crawfish
imports decreases domestic crawfish processor’s economic welfare by $755,000. Unlike
with consumer welfare, the four other nested models displayed different results,
respectively.
In terms of net social welfare, the results of the study show that an increase in
crawfish imports improves net social welfare because gains in consumer welfare are
greater than the loss to producers’. Table 5.8.1 shows that an increase in crawfish imports
increases net social welfare. For example, a 10% increase in crawfish imports increases
net social welfare by $2,872,000. The four other nested models also show similar results
with the exception that the dollar values are greater than those estimated in GIDS model.
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Table 5.5.1. Scale and Compensated Price Flexibilities: GIDS
Scale
Flexibility

Crawfish (D)

Crawfish (I)

Catfish

Shrimp

Oysters

R2/DW

1. Crawfish (D)

-1.240
(0.899)

-0.769
(0.904)

-0.378 **
(0.126)

0.986
(0.545)

0.002
(0.001)

0.158
(0.151)

0.94 / 1.79

2. Crawfish (I)

-2.550 ***
(0.680)

-0.303**
(0.101)

-0.967
(2.844)

-0.414
(0.600)

1.975
(1.091)

-0.291*
(0.153)

0.89 / 1.60

3. Catfish

-1.946 ***
(0.472)

0.034
(0.019)

-0.018
(0.026)

-0.554
(0.494)

0.463
(0.320)

0.074
(0.049)

0.68 / 2.58

4. Shrimp

-2.120 ***
(0.098)

0.000
(0.000)

0.012
(0.007)

0.065
(0.045)

-0.102
(0.091)

0.025
(0.063)

0.84 / 2.28

5. Oysters

-1.731
(0.890)

0.024
(0.023)

-0.056
(0.029)

0.327
(0.215)

0.790
(1.974)

-1.085*
(0.500)

0.57 / 2.07

Equation

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*
Indicates significance at 10% level.
**
Indicates significance at 5% level.
***
Indicates significance at 1% level.
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Table 5.5.2. Scale and Compensated Price Flexibilities: DIRDS
Equation

Scale
Flexibility

Domestic (D)

Imports (I)

Catfish

Shrimp

Oysters

R2/DW

1. Domestic (D)

-97.908***
(4.186)

0.555
(0.308)

-0.740 **
(0.322)

1.241
(0.730)

-1.201
(0.751)

0.144
(0.147)

0.46 / 1.13

2. Imports (I)

-113.706***
(3.805)

-0.593 **
(0.258)

0.724 *
(0.334)

-0.473
(0.775)

0.857
(0.751)

-0.516***
(0.146)

0.87 / 1.13

3. Catfish

-1.997 ***
(0.340)

0.043
(0.026)

-0.021
(0.034)

1.057 ***
(0.190)

-1.149 ***
(0.195)

0.069 **
(0.031)

0.67 / 1.60

4. Shrimp

0.200 ***
(0.048)

-0.006
(0.004)

0.005
(0.005)

-0.161
(0.027)

0.172
(0.030)

-0.010
(0.005)

0.79 / 1.44

5. Oysters

2.203 ***
(0.282)

0.022
(0.023)

-0.099
(0.028)

0.304
(0.139)

-0.325
(0.160)

0.098
(0.084)

0.53 / 1.25

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*
Indicates significance at 10% level.
**
Indicates significance at 5% level.
***
Indicates significance at 1% level.
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Table 5.5.3. Scale and Compensated Price Flexibilities: DIAIDS
Scale
Flexibility

Domestic (D)

Imports (I)

Catfish

Shrimp

Oysters

R2/DW

-13.979 ***
(3.938)

-1.088
(4.029)

-0.024
(0.238)

-0.322
(0.322)

1.562
(1.157)

-0.130
(0.142)

0.38 / 1.49

4.746
(2.894)

-0.019
(0.191)

-0.274 *
(0.146)

-1.074 **
(0.424)

1.244
(1.413)

0.123
(0.252)

0.76 / 0.99

3. Catfish

-1.767***
(0.430)

-0.011
(0.011)

-0.047 **
(0.018)

0.624 ***
(0.039)

-0.373 ***
(0.026)

-0.194***
(0.033)

0.87 / 0.97

4. Shrimp

-0.895 ***
(0.239)

0.008
(0.006)

0.008
(0.009)

-0.052 ***
(0.004)

0.012 ***
(0.001)

0.025
(0.090)

0.80 / 0.60

5. Oysters

-0.014 **
(0.004)

-0.020
(0.022)

0.024
(0.048)

-0.855 ***
(0.146)

0.796
(2.841)

0.055
(0.008)

0.77 / 2.45

Equation

1. Domestic (D)

2. Imports (I)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*
Indicates significance at 10% level.
**
Indicates significance at 5% level.
***
Indicates significance at 1% level.
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Table 5.5.4. Scale and Compensated Price Flexibilities: DICBS
Scale
Flexibility

Domestic (D)

Imports (I)

Catfish

Shrimp

Oysters

R2/DW

3.475**
(1.436)

0.027
(0.166)

-0.380 *
(0.178)

-0.621
(0.647)

1.183
(0.783)

-0.210
(0.132)

0.31 / 1.85

12.874 ***
(3.547)

-0.304 *
(0.143)

0.329
(0.417)

0.163
(0.740)

-0.031
(0.775)

-0.157
(0.152)

0.61 / 1.35

3. Catfish

-1.405
(1.098)

-0.022
(0.023)

0.007
(0.032)

-0.064
(0.167)

0.037
(0.177)

0.041
(0.027)

0.34 / 1.91

4. Shrimp

-1.044
(1.159)

0.006
(0.004)

0.000
(0.005)

0.005
(0.025)

-0.013
(0.028)

0.003
(0.004)

0.21 / 2.87

5. Oysters

-1.198
(1.641)

-0.032
(0.020)

-0.030
(0.029)

0.181
(0.120)

0.081
(0.133)

-0.199 **
(0.087)

0.27 / 1.86

Equation

1. Domestic (D)

2. Imports (I)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*
Indicates significance at 10% level.
**
Indicates significance at 5% level.
***
Indicates significance at 1% level.
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Table 5.5.5. Scale and Compensated Price Flexibilties: DINBR
Equation

Scale
Flexibility

Domestic (D)

Imports (I)

Catfish

Shrimp

Oysters

R2/DW

1. Domestic (D)

27.055***
(0.362)

-1.240
(1.771)

-0.077
(0.296)

-0.367
(0.337)

1.802
(1.112)

-0.118
(0.139)

0.35 / 1.78

2. Imports (I)

57.668***
(0.383)

-0.062
(0.238)

-0.376
(0.258)

-1.000**
(0.405)

1.280
(1.506)

0.157
(0.228)

0.68 / 2.11

3. Catfish

-0.508 **
(0.182)

-0.013
(0.012)

-0.044 **
(0.018)

0.677 ***
(0.043)

-0.434***
(0.031)

-0.186 ***
(0.033)

0.87 / 1.44

4. Shrimp

-0.437***
(0.032)

0.009
(0.005)

0.008
(0.009)

-0.061 ***
(0.004)

0.020 ***
(0.002)

0.024
(0.052)

0.96 / 1.79

5. Oysters

0.760 **
(0.299)

-0.018
(0.021)

0.030
(0.044)

-0.820 ***
(0.146)

0.764
(1.625)

0.045 ***
(0.007)

0.76 / 2.15

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*
Indicates significance at 10% level.
**
Indicates significance at 5% level.
***
Indicates significance at 1% level.
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Table 5.6. Morishima Easticities of Complementarity
Crawfish (D)

Crawfish (I)

Catfish

Shrimp

Oysters

Crawfish (D)

0.000

0.391

1.755

0.771

0.927

Crawfish (I)

0.664

0.000

0.553

2.942

0.676

Catfish

0.588

0.536

0.000

1.017

0.628

Shrimp

0.102

0.114

0.167

0.000

0.127

Oysters

1.109

1.029

1.412

1.875

0.000
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Table 5.7.1. Uncompensated Price Flexibilities: GIDS
Domestic (D)

Imports (I)

Catfish

Shrimp

Oysters

Domestic (D)

-0.774

-0.384

0.840

-1.047

0.125

Imports (I)

-0.313

-0.980

-0.716

-0.182

-0.359

Catfish

0.026

-0.028

-0.784

-1.182

0.022

Shrimp

-0.009

0.001

-0.186

-1.895

-0.032

Oysters

0.017

-0.065

0.122

-0.674

-1.131
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Table 5.7.2. Uncompensated Price Flexibilities: DIRDS
Domestic (D)

Imports (I)

Catfish

Shrimp

Oysters

Domestic (D)

0.150

-1.245

-10.350

-83.982

-2.482

Imports (I)

-1.064

0.138

-13.935

-95.281

-3.566

Catfish

0.035

-0.031

0.820

-2.837

0.015

Shrimp

-0.005

0.006

-0.137

0.341

-0.005

Oysters

0.031

-0.088

0.565

1.537

0.157
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Table 5.7.3. Uncompensated Price Flexibilities: DIAIDS
Domestic (D)

Imports (I)

Catfish

Shrimp

Oysters

Domestic (D)

-1.146

-0.096

-1.976

-10.256

-0.505

Imports (I)

0.001

-0.250

-0.512

5.256

0.251

Catfish

-0.019

-0.056

0.415

-1.867

-0.241

Shrimp

0.004

0.003

-0.158

-0.745

0.001

Oysters

-0.020

0.024

-0.856

0.784

0.055
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Table 5.7.4. Uncompensated Price Flexibilities: DICBS
Domestic (D)

Imports (I)

Catfish

Shrimp

Oysters

Domestic (D)

0.041

-0.362

-0.210

4.121

-0.117

Imports (I)

-0.251

0.396

1.687

10.854

0.188

Catfish

-0.028

0.000

-0.230

-1.151

0.003

Shrimp

0.001

-0.006

-0.118

-0.896

-0.025

Oysters

-0.037

-0.036

0.039

-0.931

-0.232
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Table 5.7.5. Uncompensated Price Flexibilities: DINBR
Domestic (D)

Imports (I)

Catfish

Shrimp

Oysters

Domestic (D)

-1.128

0.063

2.836

24.677

0.608

Imports (I)

0.177

-0.079

5.827

50.038

1.704

Catfish

-0.015

-0.046

0.617

-0.864

-0.199

Shrimp

0.007

0.006

-0.113

-0.350

0.013

Oysters

-0.015

0.034

-0.730

1.407

0.065
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Table 5.8.1. Estimated Welfare Measures in $1000 from Increase of Crawfish Imports: GIDS
ΔCrawfish Imports
Consumer Welfare
Producer Welfare

Net Social Welfare

(Δ%)

(Δton)

CS

CV

PS

CS+PS

CV+PS

1%

40

368

368

-76

292

292

2%

79

735

735

-152

583

583

3%

119

1101

1101

-227

873

873

4%

158

1465

1465

-303

1162

1162

5%

198

1829

1829

-379

1450

1450

10%

396

3628

3629

-755

2872

2873

20%

791

7137

7141

-1502

5635

5639

30%

1187

10527

10536

-2239

8287

8296

40%

1582

13798

13814

-2968

10830

10846

50%

1978

16951

16976

-3688

13263

13287

60%

2374

19985

20021

-4400

15585

15621

70%

2769

22901

22949

-5102

17798

17847

80%

3165

25697

25760

-5796

19901

19965

90%

3560

28375

28455

-6481

21894

21974

100%

3956

30934

31033

-7157

23777

23876
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Table 5.8.2. Estimated Welfare Measures in $1000 from Increase of Crawfish Imports: DIRDS
ΔCrawfish Imports
Consumer Welfare
Producer Welfare

Net Social Welfare

(Δ%)

(Δton)

CS

CV

PS

CS+PS

CV+PS

1%

40

367

368

-236

131

132

2%

79

730

733

-471

258

262

3%

119

1089

1096

-706

382

389

4%

158

1444

1456

-941

503

515

5%

198

1795

1815

-1176

619

639

10%

396

3495

3573

-2345

1150

1228

20%

791

6604

6917

-4661

1943

2255

30%

1187

9329

10032

-6949

2380

3083

40%

1582

11669

12918

-9208

2460

3710

50%

1978

13624

15576

-11439

2184

4137

60%

2374

15194

18005

-13642

1552

4363

70%

2769

16379

20205

-15815

563

4390

80%

3165

17179

22177

-17961

-782

4216

90%

3560

17594

23919

-20077

-2483

3842

100%

3956

17625

25434

-22166

-4541

3268
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Table 5.8.3. Estimated Welfare Measures in $1000 from Increase of Crawfish Imports: DIAIDS
ΔCrawfish Imports
Consumer Welfare
Producer Welfare

Net Social Welfare

(Δ%)

(Δton)

CS

CV

PS

CS+PS

CV+PS

1%

40

369

369

-22

346

346

2%

79

737

737

-45

692

692

3%

119

1105

1106

-67

1037

1038

4%

158

1472

1474

-90

1383

1385

5%

198

1840

1843

-112

1728

1731

10%

396

3672

3683

-224

3449

3460

20%

791

7315

7359

-445

6870

6914

30%

1187

10927

11028

-664

10263

10364

40%

1582

14511

14689

-881

13630

13808

50%

1978

18064

18343

-1096

16968

17247

60%

2374

21588

21989

-1308

20280

20681

70%

2769

25082

25628

-1519

23563

24110

80%

3165

28546

29260

-1727

26820

27533

90%

3560

31981

32884

-1933

30048

30951

100%

3956

35386

36501

-2137

33250

34365
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Table 5.8.4. Estimated Welfare Measures in $1000 from Increase of Crawfish Imports: DICBS

ΔCrawfish Imports

Consumer Welfare

Producer Welfare

Net Social Welfare

(Δ%)

(Δton)

CS

CV

PS

CS+PS

CV+PS

1%

40

368

368

-72

296

296

2%

79

735

735

-143

592

592

3%

119

1101

1101

-215

886

886

4%

158

1466

1465

-287

1179

1179

5%

198

1830

1829

-358

1471

1471

10%

396

3631

3628

-714

2917

2914

20%

791

7150

7139

-1420

5731

5719

30%

1187

10558

10533

-2117

8441

8416

40%

1582

13853

13809

-2806

11047

11003

50%

1978

17037

16968

-3487

13550

13481

60%

2374

20109

20010

-4160

15949

15850

70%

2769

23070

22934

-4824

18245

18109

80%

3165

25918

25741

-5480

20438

20260

90%

3560

28655

28430

-6128

22526

22302

100%

3956

31279

31002

-6768

24512

24234
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Table 5.8.5. Estimated Welfare Measures in $1000 from Increase of Crawfish Imports: DINBR

ΔCrawfish Imports

Consumer Welfare

Producer Welfare

Net Social Welfare

(Δ%)

(Δton)

CS

CV

PS

CS+PS

CV+PS

1%

40

369

369

7

376

376

2%

79

737

737

14

751

751

3%

119

1105

1105

21

1126

1126

4%

158

1473

1473

28

1501

1501

5%

198

1841

1841

35

1876

1875

10%

396

3677

3675

69

3746

3744

20%

791

7335

7326

137

7472

7463

30%

1187

10974

10954

203

11177

11157

40%

1582

14593

14557

268

14861

14825

50%

1978

18193

18137

331

18525

18469

60%

2374

21774

21693

393

22167

22086

70%

2769

25335

25225

454

25789

25679

80%

3165

28877

28734

513

29390

29247

90%

3560

32400

32218

571

32970

32789

100%

3956

35903

35679

627

36530

36306
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
6.1. Introduction
The crawfish industry in Louisiana has become an important portion of
Louisiana’s economy. Historically, whenever local crawfish harvests exceeded what
could be moved through market channels to restaurants and retail consumers, excess
product found its way to processing plants to be peeled and sold as fresh or frozen tail
meat. This marketing outlet served to moderate drastic price swings and provided
regional economic benefits in terms of adding value and creating employment. After the
mid-1990s, however, these enterprises met a new face from low-priced imported crawfish
tail meat, resulting in over all price instability not only for frozen tail meat but also for
fresh tail meat and whole live and boiled crawfish. In fact, the International Trade
Commission in 2003 reported that the Chinese imported crawfish tail meat had
suppressed domestic processed crawfish prices to a significant degree. Substantial
volumes of low-priced crawfish tail meat imports displaced sales of the domestic like
product and, unable to meet those low prices, domestic producers responded by selling
more fresh meat in season, selling more whole live crawfish, or scaling back production.
Domestic crawfish producers experienced falling production and sales volume, capacity
utilization, and employment, along with rising per-unit costs. The domestic crawfish
industry suffered serious financial declines as falling sales volumes and rising costs
erased profit margins. Furthermore, the domestic crawfish price may decline on account
of increases in the availability of other fishery products as substitutes. Over the last
decade the amount of fish imported into the U.S. market has increased considerably. A
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good example of this is the growth of shrimp imports and frozen catfish fillet imports. In
2004, U.S. shrimp imports were valued at $4 billion, representing 230% increase from
1989 when it was $1.7 billion. Thus, the domestic crawfish industry could be affected by
other related fish imports.
In contrast, U.S. demand for crawfish has continued to grow since the mid-1990s.
Demand growth is connected to a wider acceptance of crawfish as a food outside of
Louisiana, and a growing national interest in Cajun cuisine. Some importers of crawfish
stated that demand growth is due to the wider availability and lower prices associated
with frozen Chinese crawfish tail meat. Increases in the consumption of crawfish leads
one to conclude that domestic production capacity was not sufficient to supply domestic
demand and this is why the volume of imports increased significantly. As a result, the
market share of shipments of crawfish tail meat imports rose from 21 percent in 1994 to
83 percent in 2005.
One contribution of this study is to estimate a recently developed inverse demand
system and use it to measure the welfare for the domestic crawfish industry. Unlike
single equation models, the system-wide approach does not exclude substitution
possibilities and includes interactions that are potentially important for understanding fish
consumption patterns and price determination. This study applies the estimated system by
analyzing welfare measures of change in quantity caused by imports.

6.2. Results
In order to measure the quantity effect on price, previous studies have developed
inverse demand systems. These inverse demand systems have been developed using two
primary approaches. The Rotterdam methodology determines the quantity effect on price
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in terms of scale and substitution effects while the distance function approach provides
more information about utility and consumer preference. Since this study is intended to
determine quantity effect on price, the study used the Rotterdam approach in developing
inverse demand systems. The GIDS model is better suited for the data used in this study
than the other four nested models. By using inverse demand systems, the study
determined the substitution effect and scale effect of changes in quantity caused by
changes in imports of crawfish and other related fish on the domestic crawfish price.
Furthermore, using compensating price flexibility as a measure of the substitution effect
of quantity and scale flexibility as a measure of the income effect, the study was able to
provide welfare analyses for domestic crawfish consumers and producers. As expected,
the study showed a negative effect of crawfish imports on the domestic price and
producers welfare while the lower price caused by imports made domestic crawfish
consumers better off. Related to other fish products, not all of fish used in the study
proved to be substitutes for crawfish.
Scale effects have all been estimated to be negative, implying an increase in
aggregate fish supply causes fish prices to decline, as was expected. However, the
estimated scale flexibilities are significantly different from -1. Furthermore, test statistics
show that the underlying scale curves differ significantly from both linear and linear
logarithmic forms. This result suggests the need for better specification of utility function
which can be more effectively described through distance function methodology.
Own price flexibilities have all been estimated as negative, implying an increase
in own fishery production decreases the own price. This is to be expected. The negative
own price flexibility is theoretically consistent because of the negativity of the Antonelli
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matrix. However, these price flexibilities estimated in the study are relatively lower than
those of other studies. Among the five fish categories utilized in the study, the absolute
value of own price flexibility for oysters is the largest, implying that domestic oyster
price is more sensitive to change in the own good than for other fish.
Related to the cross price flexibility, this study confirmed the bias toward
complementarity in the off-diagonal term of Antonelli matrix. However, as Barten and
Bettendorf (1989) and Park, Thurman, and Easley (2004) showed, the small number of
negative cross effects in this study does not agree with the notion that most types of fish
are substitutes. Therefore, the Morishima elasticity of complementarity was proposed as a
more adequate measure of interaction between commodities in their ability to satisfy
needs than the coefficients of the Antonelli matrix. The study showed that elasticities of
complementarity are primarily positive, implying both the tendency toward
complementarity and the negativity of the own-quantity elasticities.
The study shows that the scale effect for crawfish is relatively small, implying
that the consumer surplus can be used as a welfare measurement. In this study, the own
crawfish compensated and uncompensated price flexibilities are estimated to be -0.769
and -0.774, respectively. As a result, the welfare effect does not show a difference
between consumer surplus and compensating variation. However, the absolute values of
cross uncompensated flexibility are different from that of cross compensated flexibility,
depending on the sign of the cross compensated price flexibility.
This study was initially motivated to measure the effect of crawfish imports on
the economic welfare of domestic crawfish industry. Estimating the price effect of
quantity, such as price flexibility and scale flexibility obtained by using a family of
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inverse demand systems, this objective was accomplished. As expected, the result of the
study shows that the domestic crawfish consumer experiences welfare gains while the
domestic crawfish producer is worse off with increases in crawfish imports. The gains to
the domestic crawfish consumers are greater than the loss to domestic crawfish
producers, implying that the overall welfare of the domestic crawfish industry will be
improved with increases in crawfish imports. However, even though the gains to
domestic crawfish consumers are greater than the losses to domestic crawfish producers,
the economic loss to domestic crawfish producers is quite serious because the loss is
imposed on a small number of domestic crawfish processors. Such negative effects of
crawfish imports on the domestic crawfish producers may be to blame for decreasing the
number of domestic crawfish processors. Harrison et al. (2003) reported that, in 1996,
there were estimated 90 to 100 crawfish processors in Louisiana; today there are
approximately 15.

6.3. Implication
In evaluating the likely impact of crawfish and other related fish imports on the
domestic crawfish industry, inverse demand systems provide a theoretically consistent
method of analysis. In order to estimate flexibility as an indicator of the impact of
imports on the domestic crawfish price, the generalized inverse demand system of
Brown, Lee, and Seale was used with DIRDS, DIAIDS, DICBS, and DINBR. In terms of
test statistics and economic theory, the GIDS model is better fitted for the actual data
used in this study than any other models. The contribution of this study is to estimate
recently developed inverse demand systems and use them to measure the welfare effect
of increases in imports of crawfish and other related fish. As the study indicated, by using
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such a system-wide approach the study can also detect substitutability and interactions
that are potentially important for understanding fish consumption patterns and price
relationships. In particulation, substitutability implies that the domestic crawfish price
can also be affected negatively by substitutable fish which are detected by this study.
Thus, it would be useful to develop a policy tool in light of the negative relationship
between domestic crawfish price and substitutable fish imports. Up until now, domestic
policy has focused on own crawfish imports. However, this study has shown that other
related fish supply also have negative impacts on the domestic crawfish price. Even
though substitutability is shown to vary depending on the model, imported crawfish is
shown to be a substitute for domestic crawfish in each of the models, GIDS, DIRDS,
DIAIDS, DICBS, and DINBR. Furthermore, the scale flexibility also implies the negative
impact of increases in the aggregate fish imports on domestic crawfish price. This result
may have implication regarding the impact of the antidumping and counter-vailing duty
on crawfish tail meat imports and its effect on the domestic crawfish price.
Quantitative measurement of welfare is another product of this study. The price
flexibilities and scale flexibilities estimated in the inverse demand systems can be used as
a tool to quantitatively measure welfare change caused by increases in imports of
crawfish and other related fish. The welfare effects of quantity changes are associated
with the inverse demand system in which commodity prices are dependent on their
quantities. In particular, quantity-based welfare measures are useful in situations where
supply is inelastic in the short run and the producers are price takers. This study showed
that, although the gains to domestic crawfish consumers are greater than the losses to
domestic crawfish producers, the economic burden imposed on the domestic crawfish
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producers is serious given that a small number of domestic crawfish processors bear the
economic loss caused by increases in Chinese crawfish tail meat imports. In fact, this
economic burden has reduced the number of domestic crawfish processors in Louisiana.
The findings in this study suggest that since increases in crawfish imports
negatively affect domestic crawfish prices, and since producer losses are concentrated
among a small number of domestic crawfish processors, the economic policy for
preserving the domestic crawfish industry should be developed to reflect these results.

6.4. Limitations
This study determined the economic impact of imports of crawfish and other
related fish on the domestic crawfish industry. The systems-wide model approach gives
theoretically consistent results but the main concern with the study come from the data
quality.
Secondly, even though there may be a relationship between crawfish price and
other fish and/or red meat this study did not include all of them because of the size
limitations of the inverse demand system. The omission of relevant products in the
system may distort consumer preference and utility related to seafood consumption.
Related to analysis of domestic crawfish producer welfare, the cost flexibilities
and import elasticities will differ according to cost structure in the activation of
individual domestic processors. For example, if marginal cost is lower than the imported
price, the domestic industry will produce more with increased domestic demand, while
individual processors with higher marginal costs will reduce their level of production.
This implies that precise information regarding production functions and cost structure of
domestic crawfish producers would be useful.
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6.5. Future Research
The Trade Adjustment Assistance Program allows the Secretary of Agriculture to
compensate certain growers for economic damages incurred when imports have
materially reduced domestic prices. The imported good must, even if lightly processed,
be a close substitute for the domestic product. Compensation may be warranted if imports
have brought domestic prices between 80% of the five-year, 1998 – 2002 average price.
According to the results of the study, the imported crawfish is shown to reduce domestic
prices. Furthermore, the negative scale effect of domestic crawfish indicates that
increases in aggregated fish supply also have negative impact on domestic crawfish price.
As a result, increases in fish imports, including crawfish and other related fish used in the
study, affect domestic crawfish producers as shown in the results of this study. However,
this analysis does not provide information regarding the economic impact of imports of
crawfish and other related fish on individual domestic crawfish processors. Furthermore,
since domestic crawfish farmers and wild harvesters are also affected by imports, it
would be useful to extend this research to measuring the economic impacts of imports on
individual crawfish producers including crawfish farmers and wild harvesters.
Related to government policy, since 1997 the government has imposed
antidumping duties on Chinese imported crawfish tail meat. Since 2001, the Byrd
Amendment has directed the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection to distribute
the monies collected to domestic crawfish processors that had petitioned or supported
antidumping and countervailing duty actions. However, under current policy, many
domestic crawfish producers complain that this policy does not work. In fact, this policy
focuses only on Chinese imported crawfish tail meat. As shown in this study, imports, not
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only of crawfish but also other related fish are closely related with the declining domestic
crawfish price. As a result, to encourage the domestic crawfish industry it is essential to
analyze production, cost structure, and current policy including, but not limited to: (1)
declines in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, and
utilization of capacity; (2) negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment,
wages, growth, ability to raise capital, and investment; and (3) negative effects on the
existing development and production efforts of the industry.
As previous research indicates, red meat can also substitute for crawfish as a
protein source. Changes in the prices of chicken, beef, and pork can affect crawfish
consumption. According to the USDA (2005), the prices for chicken, beef, and pork are
forecast to be lower in 2006 and to fall even lower again in 2007. These forecasts for
lower prices of the major livestock and poultry protein sources indicate strong
competition for domestic and imported crawfish consumption. Furthermore, according to
the U.S. International Trade Commission (2003), there are many other factors affecting
fish consumption. For example, quality and availability are another important factors that
influence purchasing decisions for crawfish. Survey results show that price is an
important factor for most purchasers, but often come after quality in importance. These
factors indicate that consumer decision making process should be researched. Additional
knowledge related to qualitative data analysis will assist in achieving this goal.

6.6. Conclusions
This research quantitatively determined the price and welfare effects of imports of
crawfish. Inverse demand systems were used to estimate price and scale flexibilities as
indicators of the effects of imports of crawfish on the domestic crawfish price. Among
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the different types of inverse demand systems, the generalized inverse demand model
was shown to be best fitted for the data used in the study. As expected, the own price
flexibility and scale flexibility are shown to be negative, while cross price flexibilities
show either substitutability or complementarity relationships. Consumer welfare is
measured by consumer surplus and compensating variation calculated by uncompensated
and compensated price flexibility, respectively. Even though consumer surplus
theoretically overestimates the quantity effect on welfare, empirical results show that
there is little difference between consumer surplus and compensating variation related to
crawfish imports because of the small scale effect in crawfish. Producer welfare is
measured using price and cost flexibility in the profit function. Even though the economic
loss to domestic crawfish producers resulting from the increase in imports of crawfish is
relatively small compared with the gains to the domestic crawfish consumer, the impact
of imports of crawfish are significant to domestic crawfish producers given that the loss
is borne by a small number of domestic crawfish producers. However, this study shows a
net social welfare gain through increased crawfish imports.
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APPENDIX I. DATA VARIABLE DEFINITION
Variables

Abbreviation

Crawfish Domestic Supply, 1000kg

crds

Crawfish Domestic Price, $/kg

crdp

Crawfish Imports, 1000kg

crms

Crawfish Imports Price, $/kg

crmp

Catfish Total Supply, 1000kg

cats

Catfish Domestic Price, $/kg

cadp

Shrimp Total Supply, 1000kg

shts

Shrimp Domestic Price, $/kg

shdp

Oysters Total Supply, 1000kg

oyts

Oysters Domestic Price, $/kg

oydp

Expenditure for Domestic Crawfish

wcd

Expenditure for Imported Crawfish

wcm

Expenditure for Catfish

wca

Expenditure for Shrimp

wsh

Expenditure for Oysters

woy

Total Expenditure for Crawfish, Catfish, Shrimp, and Oysters

w

Normalized Domestic Crawfish Price

ncrdp

Normalized Imported Crawfish Price

ncrmp

Normalized Domestic Catfish Price

ncadp

Normalized Domestic Shrimp Price

nshdp

Normalized Domestic Oysters Price

noydp

Normalized Domestic Crawfish Supply

ncrds
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Variables

Abbreviation

Normalized Imported Crawfish Supply

ncrms

Normalized Catfish Supply

ncats

Normalized Shrimp Supply

nshts

Normalized Oysters Supply

noyts

Log Normalized Domestic Crawfish Supply

lnncrdp

Log Normalized Imported Crawfish Supply

lnncrmp

Log Normalized Catfish Suppy

lnncadp

Log Normalized Shrimp Supply

lnnshdp

Log Normalized Oysters Supply

lnnoydp

One Year Lagged Log Normalized Domestic Crawfish Supply

laglnncrdp

One Year Lagged Log Normalized Imported Crawfish Supply

laglnncrmp

One Year Lagged Log Normalized Catfish Supply

laglnncadp

One Year Lagged Log Normalized Shrimp Supply

laglnnshdp

One Year Lagged Log Normalized Oysters Supply

laglnnoydp

Difference Log Normalized Domestic Crawfish Supply

dlnncrdp

Difference Log Normalized Imported Crawfish Supply

dlnncrmp

Difference Log Normalized Catfish Supply

dlnncadp

Difference Log Normalized Shrimp Supply

dlnnshdp

Difference Log Normalized Oysters Supply

dlnnoydp

Normalized Expenditure for Domestic Crawfish

nwcd

Normalized Expenditure for Imported Crawfish

nwcm

Normalized Expenditure for Catfish

nwca
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Variables

Abbreviation

Normalized Expenditure for Shrimp

nwsh

Normalized Expenditure for Oysters

nwoy

One Year Lagged Normalized Expenditure for Domestic Crawfish

lagnwcd

One Year Lagged Normalized Expenditure for Imported Crawfish

lagnwcm

One Year Lagged Normalized Expenditure for Catfish

lagnwca

One Year Lagged Normalized Expenditure for Shrimp

lagnwsh

One Year Lagged Normalized Expenditure for Oysters

lagnwoy

Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure for Domestic Crawfish

bwcd

Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure for Imported Crawfish

bwcm

Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure for Catfish

bwca

Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure for Shrimp

bwsh

Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure for Oysters

bwoy

One Year Lagged Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure
for Domestic Crawfish

lagbwcd

One Year Lagged Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure
for Imported Crawfish

lagbwcm

One Year Lagged Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure
for Catfish

lagbwca

One Year Lagged Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure
for Shrimp

lagbwsh

One Year Lagged Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure
for Oysters

lagbwoy

DIAIDS Dependent Variable for Domestic Crawfish

dbwcd

DIAIDS Dependent Variable for Imported Crawfish

dbwcm
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Variables

Abbreviation

DIAIDS Dependent Variable for Catfish

dbwca

DIAIDS Dependent Variable for Shrimp

dbwsh

DIAIDS Dependent Variable for Oysters

dbwoy

Log Domestic Crawfish Price

lncrdp

Log Imported Crawfish Price

lncrmp

Log Domestic Catfish Price

lncadp

Log Domestic Shrimp Price

lnshdp

Log Domestic Oysters Price

lnoydp

One Year Lagged Log Domestic Crawfish Price

laglncrdp

One Year Lagged Log Imported Crawfish Price

laglncrmp

One Year Lagged Log Domestic Catfish Price

laglncadp

One Year Lagged Log Domestic Shrimp Price

laglnshdp

One Year Lagged Log Domestic Oysters Price

laglnoydp

Difference Log Domestic Crawfish Price

dlncrdp

Difference Log Imported Crawfish Price

dlncrmp

Difference Log Domestic Catfish Price

dlncadp

Difference Log Domestic Shrimp Price

dlnshdp

Difference Log Domestic Oysters Price

dlnoydp

Divisia Price Index

dlnP

Log Normalized Domestic Crawfish Supply

lnncrds

Log Normalized Imported Crawfish Suppy

lnncrms

Log Normalized Catfish Supply

lnncats
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Variables

Abbreviation

Log Normalized Shrimp Supply

lnnshts

Log Normalized Oysters Supply

lnnoyts

One Year Lagged Log Normalized Domestic Crawfish Supply
One Year Lagged Log Normalized Imported Crawfish Supply
One Year Lagged Log Normalized Catfish Supply
One Year Lagged Log Normalized Shrimp Supply
One Year Lagged Log Normalized Oysters Supply
Difference Log Normalized Domestic Crawfish Supply
Difference Log Normalized Imported Crawfish Supply
Difference Log Normalized Catfish Supply
Difference Log Normalized Shrimp Supply
Difference Log Normalized Oysters Supply
Quantity Divisia Index

laglnncrds
laglnncrms
laglnncats
laglnnshts
laglnnoyts
dlnncrds
dlnncrms
dlnncats
dlnnshts
dlnnoyts
dlnQ

Mixing Parameter θ1 for Domestic Crawfish
Mixing Parameter θ1 for Imported Crawfish
Mixing Parameter θ1 for Catfish

bwcddlnQ
bwcmdlnQ
bwcadlnQ

Mixing Parameter θ1 for Shrimp

bwshdlnQ

Mixing Parameter θ1 for Oysters

bwoydlnQ

Mixing Parameter θ 2 for Domestic Crawfish

bwcddlnncrdsQ

Mixing Parameter θ 2 for Imported Crawfish

bwcmdlnncrmsQ

Mixing Parameter θ 2 for Catfish

bwcadlnncatsQ
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Variables

Abbreviation

Mixing Parameter θ 2 for Shrimp

bwshdlnnshtsQ

Mixing Parameter θ 2 for Oysters

bwoydlnnoytsQ

GIDS and DIRDS Dependent Variable for Domestic Crawfish

bwcddlnncrdp

GIDS and DIRDS Dependent Variable for Imported Crawfish

bwcmdlnncrmp

GIDS and DIRDS Dependent Variable for Catfish

bwcadlnncadp

GIDS and DIRDS Dependent Variable for Shrimp

bwshdlnnshdp

GIDS and DIRDS Dependent Variable for Oysters

bwoydlnnoydp

DICBS Dependent Variable for Domestic Crawfish

bwcddlncdP

DICBS Dependent Variable for Imported Crawfish

bwcmdlncmP

DICBS Dependent Variable for Catfish

bwcadlncaP

DICBS Dependent Variable for Shrimp

bwshdlnshP

DICBS Dependent Variable for Oysters

bwoydlnoyP

DINBR Dependent Variable for Domestic Crawfish

dbwcddlnQ

DINBR Dependent Variable for Imported Crawfish

dbwcmdlnQ

DINBR Dependent Variable for Catfish

dbwcadlnQ

DINBR Dependent Variable for Shrimp

dbwshdlnQ

DINBR Dependent Variable for Oysters

dbwoydlnQ
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year

crds

crdp

crms

crmp

cats

cadp

shts

shdp

oyts

oydp

1980

346

13.79

0

-

27844

2.00

253565

4.42

13797

3.72

1981

278

12.50

0

-

31870

1.88

261871

4.53

17228

3.80

1982

416

12.82

0

-

47763

1.62

252917

5.89

19706

3.85

1983

761

11.80

0

-

64194

1.81

268118

6.44

18868

3.94

1984

747

12.58

0

-

72765

2.04

292227

5.83

20620

4.15

1985

974

11.24

0

-

90118

2.15

314610

5.17

24086

3.88

1986

1768

10.84

0

-

100662

1.97

363006

5.78

22960

3.77

1987

1991

7.76

0

-

130442

1.82

381674

6.00

21960

4.06

1988

1841

9.25

0

-

136510

2.26

378637

5.97

19115

4.83

1989

4367

9.54

3

2.85

158179

2.11

387585

5.61

14234

5.48

1990

2087

8.66

9

7.26

165316

2.24

384121

5.60

11376

5.77

1991

2296

7.58

33

7.44

179648

2.09

389943

6.08

9399

6.41

1992

3948

8.02

193

7.00

208786

2.00

423290

5.90

10173

6.73

1993

4500

7.18

281

6.95

210069

2.18

411865

6.32

13133

6.17

1994

2546

5.60

714

5.55

200830

2.39

413022

7.83

11669

6.08

1995

3670

5.20

1288

7.32

203804

2.40

410081

7.68

11289

6.51

1996

1390

7.25

1267

3.98

215277

2.36

407938

7.27

12321

6.85

1997

1641

7.80

1034

4.25

238540

2.26

433041

8.14

14491

6.93

1998

1678

8.42

2818

3.89

256616

2.31

459966

8.02

14427

6.18

1999

949

8.26

1762

3.79

272191

2.34

474996

7.85

14978

6.46

2000

121

15.72

2884

4.73

272990

2.38

495886

8.97

16687

7.00

2001

187

17.41

5859

8.19

279044

2.25

547514

7.66

14188

7.26

2002

572

12.79

4147

7.68

290663

2.07

585838

6.74

17205

6.52

2003

728

13.06

7101

8.66

302516

2.05

651535

6.45

19891

5.99

2004

677

13.11

6639

7.39

290151

2.24

661732

6.24

20458

7.02

2005

761

13.57

3956

5.07

286114

2.33

647767

6.25

18127

6.89

Soucers: National Marine Fisheries Service and USDA.
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APPENDIX III. SAS CODE: GENERALIZED INVERSE DEMAND MODEL
Variable Description
wcd=crdp*crds;
wcm=crmp*crms;
wca=cadp*cats;
wsh=shdp*shts;
woy=oydp*oyts;
w=wcd+wcm+wca+wsh+woy;
ncrdp=(crdp*crds)/w;
ncrmp=(crmp*crms)/w;
ncadp=(cadp*cats)/w;
nshdp=(shdp*shts)/w;
noydp=(oydp*oyts)/w;
ncrds=crds/1586.15;
ncrms=crms/1538.00;
ncats=cats/177871.54;
nshts=shts/421259.42;
noyts=oyts/16245.62;
lnncrdp=log(ncrdp);
lnncrmp=log(ncrmp);
lnncadp=log(ncadp);
lnnshdp=log(nshdp);
lnnoydp=log(noydp);
laglnncrdp=lag(lnncrdp);
laglnncrmp=lag(lnncrmp);
laglnncadp=lag(lnncadp);
laglnnshdp=lag(lnnshdp);
laglnnoydp=lag(lnnoydp);
dlnncrdp=lnncrdp-laglnncrdp;
dlnncrmp=lnncrmp-laglnncrmp;
dlnncadp=lnncadp-laglnncadp;
dlnnshdp=lnnshdp-laglnnshdp;
dlnnoydp=lnnoydp-laglnnoydp;
nwcd=ncrdp*ncrds;
nwcm=ncrmp*ncrms;
nwca=ncadp*ncats;
nwsh=nshdp*nshts;
nwoy=noydp*noyts;
lagnwcd=lag(nwcd);
lagnwcm=lag(nwcm);
lagnwca=lag(nwca);
lagnwsh=lag(nwsh);
lagnwoy=lag(nwoy);
bwcd=(nwcd+lagnwcd)/2;
bwcm=(nwcm+lagnwcm)/2;
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bwca=(nwca+lagnwca)/2;
bwsh=(nwsh+lagnwsh)/2;
bwoy=(nwoy+lagnwoy)/2;
lagbwcd=lag(bwcd);
lagbwcm=lag(bwcm);
lagbwca=lag(bwca);
lagbwsh=lag(bwsh);
lagbwoy=lag(bwoy);
dbwcd=bwcd-lagbwcd;
dbwcm=bwcm-lagbwcm;
dbwca=bwca-lagbwca;
dbwsh=bwsh-lagbwsh;
dbwoy=bwoy-lagbwoy;
lncrdp=log(crdp);
lncrmp=log(crmp);
lncadp=log(cadp);
lnshdp=log(shdp);
lnoydp=log(oydp);
laglncrdp=lag(lncrdp);
laglncrmp=lag(lncrmp);
laglncadp=lag(lncadp);
laglnshdp=lag(lnshdp);
laglnoydp=lag(lnoydp);
dlncrdp=lncrdp-laglncrdp;
dlncrmp=lncrmp-laglncrmp;
dlncadp=lncadp-laglncadp;
dlnshdp=lnshdp-laglnshdp;
dlnoydp=lnoydp-laglnoydp;
dlnP=bwcd*dlncrdp+bwcm*dlncrmp+bwca*dlncadp+bwsh*dlnshdp+bwoy*dlnoydp;
lnncrds=log(ncrds);
lnncrms=log(ncrms);
lnncats=log(ncats);
lnnshts=log(nshts);
lnnoyts=log(noyts);
laglnncrds=lag(lnncrds);
laglnncrms=lag(lnncrms);
laglnncats=lag(lnncats);
laglnnshts=lag(lnnshts);
laglnnoyts=lag(lnnoyts);
dlnncrds=lnncrds-laglnncrds;
dlnncrms=lnncrms-laglnncrms;
dlnncats=lnncats-laglnncats;
dlnnshts=lnnshts-laglnnshts;
dlnnoyts=lnnoyts-laglnnoyts;
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dlnQ=bwcd*dlnncrds+bwcm*dlnncrms+bwca*dlnncats+bwsh*dlnnshts+
bwoy*dlnnoyts;
bwcddlnQ=bwcd*dlnQ;
bwcmdlnQ=bwcm*dlnQ;
bwcadlnQ=bwca*dlnQ;
bwshdlnQ=bwsh*dlnQ;
bwoydlnQ=bwoy*dlnQ;
bwcddlnncrdsQ=bwcd*(dlnncrds-dlnQ);
bwcmdlnncrmsQ=bwcm*(dlnncrms-dlnQ);
bwcadlnncatsQ=bwca*(dlnncats-dlnQ);
bwshdlnnshtsQ=bwsh*(dlnnshts-dlnQ);
bwoydlnnoytsQ=bwoy*(dlnnoyts-dlnQ);
bwcddlnncrdp=bwcd*dlnncrdp;
bwcmdlnncrmp=bwcm*dlnncrmp;
bwcadlnncadp=bwca*dlnncadp;
bwshdlnnshdp=bwsh*dlnnshdp;
bwoydlnnoydp=bwoy*dlnnoydp;
bwcddlncdP=bwcd*(dlncrdp-dlnP);
bwcmdlncmP=bwcm*(dlncrmp-dlnP);
bwcadlncaP=bwca*(dlncadp-dlnP);
bwshdlnshP=bwsh*(dlnshdp-dlnP);
bwoydlnoyP=bwoy*(dlnoydp-dlnP);
dbwcddlnQ=dbwcd-bwcd*dlnQ;
dbwcmdlnQ=dbwcm-bwcm*dlnQ;
dbwcadlnQ=dbwca-bwca*dlnQ;
dbwshdlnQ=dbwsh-bwsh*dlnQ;
dbwoydlnQ=dbwoy-bwoy*dlnQ;

Generalized Inverse Demand System (GIDS)
proc syslin data=crawfish sur vardef=n out=ehatdat1;
domestic:model bwcddlnncrdp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts
dlnnoyts dlnQ bwcddlnQ bwcddlnncrdsQ/dw;
imports:model bwcmdlnncrmp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts
dlnnoyts dlnQ bwcmdlnQ bwcmdlnncrmsQ/dw;
catfish:model bwcadlnncadp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts
dlnnoyts dlnQ bwcadlnQ bwcadlnncatsQ/dw;
shrimp:model
bwshdlnnshdp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts
dlnnoyts dlnQ bwshdlnQ bwshdlnnshtsQ/dw;
oysters:model bwoydlnnoydp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts
dlnnoyts dlnQ bwoydlnQ bwoydlnnoytsQ/dw;
srestrict
domestic.bwcddlnQ=imports.bwcmdlnQ=catfish.bwcadlnQ=shrimp.bwshdlnQ=oys
ters.bwoydlnQ,
domestic.bwcddlnncrdsQ=imports.bwcmdlnncrmsQ=catfish.bwcadlnncatsQ=shri
mp.bwshdlnnshtsQ=oysters.bwoydlnnoytsQ,

161

APPENDIX III. (Cont.)
domestic.dlnQ+imports.dlnQ+catfish.dlnQ+shrimp.dlnQ+oysters.dlnQ=-1,
domestic.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrds+oys
ters.dlnncrds=0,
domestic.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncrms+oys
ters.dlnncrms=0,
domestic.dlnncats+imports.dlnncats+catfish.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnncats+oys
ters.dlnncats=0,
domestic.dlnnshts+imports.dlnnshts+catfish.dlnnshts+shrimp.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnshts=0,
domestic.dlnnoyts+imports.dlnnoyts+catfish.dlnnoyts+shrimp.dlnnoyts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0,
domestic.intercept+imports.intercept+catfish.intercept+shrimp.intercept
+oysters.intercept=0,
domestic.dlnncrds+domestic.dlnncrms+domestic.dlnncats+domestic.dlnnshts
+domestic.dlnnoyts=0,
imports.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncats+imports.dlnnshts+imp
orts.dlnnoyts=0,
catfish.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncats+catfish.dlnnshts+cat
fish.dlnnoyts=0,
shrimp.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnnshts+shrimp.
dlnnoyts=0,
oysters.dlnncrds+oysters.dlnncrms+oysters.dlnncats+oysters.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0,
domestic.dlnncrms=imports.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrds,
domestic.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrds,
imports.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrms, imports.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrms,
imports.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrms,
catfish.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncats, catfish.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncats,
shrimp.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnnshts;
stest domestic.bwcddlnQ=1;
stest domestic.bwcddlnQ=0;
stest domestic.bwcddlnncrdsQ=1;
stest domestic.bwcddlnncrdsQ=0;
stest domestic.bwcddlnQ=0, domestic.bwcddlnncrdsQ=0;
stest domestic.bwcddlnQ=1, domestic.bwcddlnncrdsQ=1;
stest domestic.bwcddlnQ=0, domestic.bwcddlnncrdsQ=1;
stest domestic.bwcddlnQ=1, domestic.bwcddlnncrdsQ=0;
output r=ehat;
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APPENDIX III. (Cont.)
data rhohat1;
set ehatdat1;
ehat1=lag(ehat);
proc reg;
rhohat1:model ehat=ehat1/noint;
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APPENDIX IV. SAS CODE:
DIFFERENTIAL INVERSE ROTTERDAM DEMAND MODEL
proc syslin data=crawfish sur vardef=n out=ehatdat2;
domestic:model bwcddlnncrdp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts
dlnnoyts dlnQ/dw;
imports:model bwcmdlnncrmp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts
dlnnoyts dlnQ/dw;
catfish:model bwcadlnncadp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts
dlnnoyts dlnQ/dw;
shrimp:model
bwshdlnnshdp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts
dlnnoyts dlnQ/dw;
oysters:model bwoydlnnoydp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts
dlnnoyts dlnQ/dw;
srestrict
domestic.dlnQ+imports.dlnQ+catfish.dlnQ+shrimp.dlnQ+oysters.dlnQ=-1,
domestic.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrds+oys
ters.dlnncrds=0,
domestic.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncrms+oys
ters.dlnncrms=0,
domestic.dlnncats+imports.dlnncats+catfish.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnncats+oys
ters.dlnncats=0,
domestic.dlnnshts+imports.dlnnshts+catfish.dlnnshts+shrimp.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnshts=0,
domestic.dlnnoyts+imports.dlnnoyts+catfish.dlnnoyts+shrimp.dlnnoyts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0,
domestic.intercept+imports.intercept+catfish.intercept+shrimp.intercept
+oysters.intercept=0,
domestic.dlnncrds+domestic.dlnncrms+domestic.dlnncats+domestic.dlnnshts
+domestic.dlnnoyts=0,
imports.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncats+imports.dlnnshts+imp
orts.dlnnoyts=0,
catfish.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncats+catfish.dlnnshts+cat
fish.dlnnoyts=0,
shrimp.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnnshts+shrimp.
dlnnoyts=0,
oysters.dlnncrds+oysters.dlnncrms+oysters.dlnncats+oysters.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0,
domestic.dlnncrms=imports.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrds,
domestic.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrds,
imports.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrms, imports.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrms,
imports.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrms,
catfish.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncats, catfish.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncats,
shrimp.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnnshts;
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APPENDIX IV. (Cont.)
output r=ehat;
data rhohat2;
set ehatdat2;
ehat1=lag(ehat);
proc reg;
rhohat2:model ehat=ehat1/noint;
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APPEMDIX V. SAS CODE:
DIFFERENTIAL INVERSE ALMOST IDEAL DEMAND MODEL
proc syslin data=crawfish sur vardef=n out=ehatdat3;
domestic:model dbwcd=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts
dlnQ/dw;
imports:model dbwcm=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts
dlnQ/dw;
catfish:model dbwca=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts
dlnQ/dw;
shrimp:model
dbwsh=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts
dlnQ/dw;
oysters:model dbwoy=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts
dlnQ/dw;
srestrict
domestic.dlnQ+imports.dlnQ+catfish.dlnQ+shrimp.dlnQ+oysters.dlnQ=0,
domestic.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrds+oys
ters.dlnncrds=0,
domestic.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncrms+oys
ters.dlnncrms=0,
domestic.dlnncats+imports.dlnncats+catfish.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnncats+oys
ters.dlnncats=0,
domestic.dlnnshts+imports.dlnnshts+catfish.dlnnshts+shrimp.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnshts=0,
domestic.dlnnoyts+imports.dlnnoyts+catfish.dlnnoyts+shrimp.dlnnoyts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0,
domestic.intercept+imports.intercept+catfish.intercept+shrimp.intercept
+oysters.intercept=0,
domestic.dlnncrds+domestic.dlnncrms+domestic.dlnncats+domestic.dlnnshts
+domestic.dlnnoyts=0,
imports.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncats+imports.dlnnshts+imp
orts.dlnnoyts=0,
catfish.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncats+catfish.dlnnshts+cat
fish.dlnnoyts=0,
shrimp.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnnshts+shrimp.
dlnnoyts=0,
oysters.dlnncrds+oysters.dlnncrms+oysters.dlnncats+oysters.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0,
domestic.dlnncrms=imports.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrds,
domestic.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrds,
imports.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrms, imports.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrms,
imports.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrms,
catfish.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncats, catfish.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncats,
shrimp.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnnshts;
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APPENDIX V. (Cont.)
output r=ehat;
data rhohat3;
set ehatdat3;
ehat1=lag(ehat);
proc reg;
rhohat3:model ehat=ehat1/noint;
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APPENDIX VI. SAS CODE: DIFFERENTIAL INVERSE CBS MODEL
proc syslin data=crawfish sur vardef=n out=ehatdat4;
domestic:model bwcddlncdP=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts
dlnQ/dw;
imports:model bwcmdlncmP=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts
dlnQ/dw;
catfish:model bwcadlncaP=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts
dlnQ/dw;
shrimp:model
bwshdlnshP=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts
dlnQ/dw;
oysters:model bwoydlnoyP=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts
dlnQ/dw;
srestrict
domestic.dlnQ+imports.dlnQ+catfish.dlnQ+shrimp.dlnQ+oysters.dlnQ=0,
domestic.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrds+oys
ters.dlnncrds=0,
domestic.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncrms+oys
ters.dlnncrms=0,
domestic.dlnncats+imports.dlnncats+catfish.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnncats+oys
ters.dlnncats=0,
domestic.dlnnshts+imports.dlnnshts+catfish.dlnnshts+shrimp.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnshts=0,
domestic.dlnnoyts+imports.dlnnoyts+catfish.dlnnoyts+shrimp.dlnnoyts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0,
domestic.intercept+imports.intercept+catfish.intercept+shrimp.intercept
+oysters.intercept=0,
domestic.dlnncrds+domestic.dlnncrms+domestic.dlnncats+domestic.dlnnshts
+domestic.dlnnoyts=0,
imports.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncats+imports.dlnnshts+imp
orts.dlnnoyts=0,
catfish.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncats+catfish.dlnnshts+cat
fish.dlnnoyts=0,
shrimp.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnnshts+shrimp.
dlnnoyts=0,
oysters.dlnncrds+oysters.dlnncrms+oysters.dlnncats+oysters.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0,
domestic.dlnncrms=imports.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrds,
domestic.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrds,
imports.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrms, imports.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrms,
imports.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrms,
catfish.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncats, catfish.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncats,
shrimp.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnnshts;
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APPENDIX VI. (Cont.)
output r=ehat;
data rhohat4;
set ehatdat4;
ehat1=lag(ehat);
proc reg;
rhohat4:model ehat=ehat1/noint;
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APPENDIX VII. SAS CODE: DIFFERENTIAL INVERSE NBR MODEL
proc syslin data=crawfish sur vardef=n out=ehatdat5;
domestic:model dbwcddlnQ=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts
dlnQ/dw;
imports:model dbwcmdlnQ=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts
dlnQ/dw;
catfish:model dbwcadlnQ=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts
dlnQ/dw;
shrimp:model
dbwshdlnQ=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts
dlnQ/dw;
oysters:model dbwoydlnQ=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts
dlnQ/dw;
srestrict
domestic.dlnQ+imports.dlnQ+catfish.dlnQ+shrimp.dlnQ+oysters.dlnQ=0,
domestic.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrds+oys
ters.dlnncrds=0,
domestic.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncrms+oys
ters.dlnncrms=0,
domestic.dlnncats+imports.dlnncats+catfish.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnncats+oys
ters.dlnncats=0,
domestic.dlnnshts+imports.dlnnshts+catfish.dlnnshts+shrimp.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnshts=0,
domestic.dlnnoyts+imports.dlnnoyts+catfish.dlnnoyts+shrimp.dlnnoyts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0,
domestic.intercept+imports.intercept+catfish.intercept+shrimp.intercept
+oysters.intercept=0,
domestic.dlnncrds+domestic.dlnncrms+domestic.dlnncats+domestic.dlnnshts
+domestic.dlnnoyts=0,
imports.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncats+imports.dlnnshts+imp
orts.dlnnoyts=0,
catfish.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncats+catfish.dlnnshts+cat
fish.dlnnoyts=0,
shrimp.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnnshts+shrimp.
dlnnoyts=0,
oysters.dlnncrds+oysters.dlnncrms+oysters.dlnncats+oysters.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0,
domestic.dlnncrms=imports.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrds,
domestic.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrds,
imports.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrms, imports.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrms,
imports.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrms,
catfish.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncats, catfish.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncats,
shrimp.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnnshts;
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APPENDIX VII. (Cont.)
output r=ehat;
data rhohat5;
set ehatdat5;
ehat1=lag(ehat);
proc reg;
rhohat5:model ehat=ehat1/noint;
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